The argument tu quoque is widely called a logical fallacy. The aim of this study is to show, that this theorem is ill-considered. The text is focused on the analysis of various examples of tu quoque. This analysis leads to the conclusion that there are logically correct tu quoque. There are given some examples of such tu quoque. Main theorem of the article is that tu quoque is correct if it’s used as some kind of mental shortcut referring to other arguments.
PL
Artykuł prezentuje wybrane wyniki opisane przeze mnie w rozprawie doktorskiej pt.: „Logiczna analiza struktury i prawomocności argumentu tu quoque”, napisanej pod kierunkiem prof. dr. hab. Andrzeja Indrzejczaka w Katedrze Logiki i Metodologii Nauk Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego i obronionej 20 lipca 2017 roku na Wydziale Filozoficzno-Historycznym UŁ. Przykłady i twierdzenia zawarte w tekście wybrałem spośród zebranych w pracy doktorskiej. Niektóre przeredagowałem, żeby uwypuklić najważniejsze w kontekście artykułu zjawiska.
Wittgenstein’s philosophy of religion is not very well known in polish philosophical literature. His conception of language-games is sometimes vague. The article presents the problem of faith and religion in the context of Wittgenstein's language-games. The trouble with it is lack of precise definition of language-game. Still, under certain conditions, we can discuss faith and religion from the perspective of language-games. It becomes possible to indicate a specific religious language which could be treated as a language-game. Three components characteristic for language-games - some set of words (vocabulary), grammar, and form of life (which is inseparably related to language-game) - could be separated also for religious language. In the face of studies, faith appears as inseparably related to activity. That means that the believer is pushed to specified activities, and we can't talk about faith without these activities. Faith is a "picture" which affects the lives of believers and forms them.