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Fregowska kategoria Bedeutung

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Bogucki K.
Analiza i Egzystencja. Czasopismo Filozoficzne
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2018
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vol. 43
83-102
EN
The paper concerns Frege’s notion of Bedeutung. My main thesis is that Frege notion of meaning should be understand as a truth-value potential of an expression rather than reference/denotation. This interpretation allow us to treat homogenously Bedeutung of names, sentences and predicates. It should be obvious in the case of predicates, because Bedeutung of predicates aren’t some objects, but some functions (something ‘unsaturated’). Therefore, the name-relation (relation name-referent) cannot be implied in the very meaning of the word ‘Bedeutung’.
PL
W artykule omawiam Fregowską kategorię Bedeutung. Główną tezą artykułu jest to, że za Fregowskie znaczenie (Bedeutung) należy uznać potencjał wartości logicznej wyrażenia, a nie referencję czy też denotację. Za pomocą tej interpretacji możemy w sposób jednorodny ująć znaczenie nazw, zdań oraz predykatów. Powinna być ona oczywista w przypadku predykatów, ponieważ znaczeniem (Bedeutung) predykatów nie jest żaden przedmiot, lecz funkcja (coś ‘nienasyconego’). Z tego względu, relacja nazwowa (relacja nazwa-nośnik) nie powinna być wpisana w samo znaczenie słowa ‘Bedeutung’.
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„Cała matematyka to właściwie geometria”. Poglądy Gottloba Fregego na podstawy matematyki po upadku logicyzmu

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Bogucki K.
Internetowy Magazyn Filozoficzny Hybris
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2019
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vol. 44
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issue 1
1-20
EN
Gottlob Frege abandoned his logicist program after Bertrand Russell had discovered that some assumptions of Frege’s system lead to contradiction (so called Russell’s paradox). Nevertheless, he proposed a new attempt for the foundations of mathematics in two last years of his life. According to this new program, the whole of mathematics is based on the geometrical source of knowledge. By the geometrical source of cognition Frege meant intuition which is the source of an infinite number of objects in arithmetic. In this article, I describe this final attempt of Frege to provide the foundations of mathematics. Furthermore, I compare Frege’s views of intuition from The Foundations of Arithmetic (and his later views) with the Kantian conception of pure intuition as the source of geometrical axioms. In the conclusion of the essay, I examine some implications for the debate between Hans Sluga and Michael Dummett concerning the realistic and idealistic interpretations of Frege’s philosophy.
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Names and Objects in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus

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Bogucki K.
Filozofia Nauki
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2018
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vol. 26
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issue 4
111-129
PL
In this paper, I try to answer the following questions: what are objects in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus? What function does a name perform in a sentence according to Wittgenstein? What is the Bedeutung of a name? I argue that answers to these questions come from the Wittgensteinian vision of logic. The first part of the article concerns Frege and Russell’s universalist conception of logic, which is the main object of Wittgenstein’s attack. The second part of thearticle is about Wittgenstein’s conception of logic and some consequences of this conception for the interpretation of Tractatarian objects and names. My main result is that the meaning of a name should be understood as a truth-value potential of an expression. The last part concerns the connections between the so-called ontological parts of the Tractatus and Wittgenstein’s views on an ideal formal language.
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Holism and Atomism in Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus

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Bogucki K.
Analiza i Egzystencja. Czasopismo Filozoficzne
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2021
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vol. 55
25-48
PL
W artykule omawiam trzy koncepcje tego, czym jest holizm w Traktacie logiczno-filozoficznym Ludwiga Wittgensteina. Trzy stanowiska, które wyróżniam są następujące: i) Holizm Minimalistyczny (E. Anscombe, M. Black, D. Pears); ii) Holizm Umiarkowany (J. Conant, C. Diamond, G. Ryle); iii) Holizm Radykalny (G. Bar-Elli, M. Kremer, P. Livingston). Wnioskiem z mojej pracy jest stwierdzenie, iż Holizm Umiarkowany stanowi najbardziej adekwatną koncepcję holistycznych elementów w dziele Wittgensteina. Sądzę tak, ponieważ pogląd ten pozwala nam dostrzec, że holizm i atomizm stanowią dwa komplementarne aspekty Traktatu, trafnie odrzuca anachronistyczną interpretację ontologii dzieła Wittgensteina oraz poprawnie charakteryzuje użycie jako pojęcie o charakterze logiczno-syntaktycznym. W zakończeniu artykułu wskazuję konsekwencje podejmowanego przeze mnie tematu na całościową interpretację zarówno wczesnych, jak i późnych prac Wittgensteina.
EN
The aim of my paper is to describe and evaluate different conceptions of holism in Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. I distinguish three readings of holistic elements in this work: i) Minimal Holism (E. Anscombe, M. Black, D. Pears); ii) Moderate Holism (J. Conant, C. Diamond, G. Ryle); and iii) Radical Holism (G. Bar-Elli, M. Kremer, P. Livingston). The conclusion is that the most viable option is the Moderate Holism since it embraces the logico-syntactial notion of use, rejects anachronistic interpretation of Tractatarian ontology and allows us to see that the holistic elements are complementary to the initial atomism of the work. Moreover, I point to the consequences of the topic for the overall reading of Wittgenstein’s early and late work.
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Wittgenstein o rozjaśnianiu myśli. Wstęp do lektury „Traktatu logiczno-filozoficznego”

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Bogucki K.
Internetowy Magazyn Filozoficzny Hybris
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2018
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vol. 43
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issue 4
52-70
PL
In this article I examine some remarks from Wittgenstein‘s Tractatus logico-philosophicus about the point and the method of his work. First part of the article concern relationships between Frege‘s conception of elucidation and Wittgenstein‘s conception of philosophy. Second part of the article is about Wittgenstein‘s attitude to science and the role of science in philosophy. Third part of my article concern the ethical purpose of Wittgenstein‘s Tractatus logico-philosophicus.
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Wittgenstein o rozjaśnianiu myśli. Wstęp do lektury „Traktatu logiczno-filozoficznego"

100%
Bogucki K.
Internetowy Magazyn Filozoficzny Hybris
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2018
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vol. 41
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issue 2
147-165
EN
In this article I examine some remarks from Wittgenstein‘s Tractatus logico-philosophicus about the point and the method of his work. First part of the article concerns relationships between Frege‘s conception of elucidation and Wittgenstein‘s conception of philosophy. Second part of the article is about Wittgenstein‘s attitude to science and the role of science in philosophy. Third part of my article concerns the ethical purpose of Wittgenstein‘s Tractatus logico-philosophicus.
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Listy Gottloba Fregego. Uwagi o polskim wydaniu

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Bogucki K.
Folia Philosophica
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2022
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vol. 48
1-24
EN
The present article reviews the Polish-language edition of Gottlob Frege’s scientific correspondence. In the article, I discuss the material hitherto unpublished in Polish in relation to the remainder of Frege’s works. First of all, I inquire into the role and nature of definitions. Then, I consider Frege’s recognition criteria for sameness of thoughts. In the article’s third part, I study letters devoted to the principle of semantic compositionality, while in the fourth part I discuss Frege’s remarks concerning the context principle.
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