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How Quantum Prisoner’s Dilemma Can Support Negotiations

100%
Szopa M.
Optimum. Studia Ekonomiczne
|
2014
|
vol. 5(71)
EN
Decision-making by the two negotiating parties is simulated by a prisoner’s dilemma game. The game is formulated in a quantum manner, where players strategies are unitary transformations of qubits built over the basis of opposite decision options. Quantum strategies are correlated through the mechanism of quantum entanglement and the result of the game is obtained by the collapse of the resulting transformed state. The range of strategies allowed for quantum players is richer than in case of a classical game and therefore the result of the game can be better optimized. On the other hand, the quantum game is save against eavesdropping and the players can be assured that this type of quantum arbitration is fair. We show that quantum prisoner’s dilemma has more favorable Nash equilibria than its classical analog and they are close to the Pareto optimal solutions. Some economical examples of utilizing quantum game Nash equilibria are proposed.
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Projektowanie rynków w oparciu o algorytmy kojarzenia

100%
Szopa M.
Studia Ekonomiczne
|
2018
|
vol. 364
167-184
PL
W pracy przedstawiono teorię stabilnego dopasowania algorytmu odroczonej akceptacji (AOA) oraz algorytmy TTC i TTCC wraz z ich zastosowaniami do np. kojarzenia uczelni i studentów, domów i właścicieli czy dawców i biorców nerek do przeszczepu. Dzięki tym algorytmom można projektować tzw. rynki kojarzenia, dla których optymalna alokacja dóbr jest możliwa bez wykorzystania mechanizmów finansowych charakterystycznych dla rynków towarowych. Omówiono właściwości algorytmów kojarzenia, m.in. ich stabilność, Pareto optymalność i odporność na manipulacje, oraz cechy algorytmu TTCC, dzięki którym krzyżowe transplantacje można zastąpić łańcuchowymi, co dzięki osiągnięciu głębszego rynku, pozwala na bardziej optymalne wykorzystanie nerek do przeszczepu.
EN
The paper presents the theory of stable allocations of deferred acceptance algorithms (DAA), as well as TTC and TTCC algorithms together with their applications to matching, e.g. universities and students, homes and owners or donors and transplant patients. These algorithms design so-called matching markets, for which optimal allocation of goods is possible without the use of financial mechanisms specific to commodity markets. Discussed are properties of matching algorithms: their stability, Pareto’s optimality and resistance to manipulation. The TTCC algorithm allows to replace the pairwise exchange by the chain exchange transplantations, which due to the thickness of market improve match quality of transplanted kidneys.
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