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1
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Konstytucyjne prawo do zmiany wyznania

100%
Brzozowski W.
Przegląd Prawa Konstytucyjnego
|
2024
|
issue 1(77)
95-107
PL
Prawo do zmiany wyznania obejmuje dwa uprawnienia szczegółowe: prawo do przystąpienia do wspólnoty religijnej oraz prawo do wystąpienia z niej. Pierwsze z tych uprawnień wymaga, aby zgodna wola jednostki i grupy religijnej była warunkiem koniecznym i zarazem wystarczającym do nawiązania stosunku członkostwa. Tak rozumiane uprawnienie na ogół nie budzi kontrowersji i jest respektowane w praktyce, natomiast wykonywanie prawa wystąpienia ze związku wyznaniowego napotyka nieraz trudności. Wynikają one z pozostawienia tej materii do unormowania w systemach prawa wewnętrznego związków wyznaniowych, co skutkuje rozproszeniem regulacji, nierównym traktowaniem i niedostatkiem gwarancji proceduralnych. Sytuację znacznie poprawiłoby uregulowanie procedury wystąpienia ze związku wyznaniowego w prawie państwowym. W tym celu jednak trzeba odróżnić od siebie członkostwo w wymiarze duchowym i w wymiarze prawnym. W opracowaniu przeprowadzono analizę formalno-dogmatyczną uwzględniającą standard strasburski, praktykę orzeczniczą organów krajowych i dyskusję doktrynalną.
EN
The right to change religion comprises two sub-rights: the right to join a religious community and the right to withdraw from it. The former requires that the consent of the individual and the religious group be a necessary and sufficient condition for establishing membership. Such a right is generally uncontroversial and respected in practice, whereas the right to leave a religious association is sometimes difficult to exercise. This is due to the fact that this matter is left to be determined by the internal laws of religious associations, resulting in fragmented regulation, unequal treatment, and insufficient procedural guarantees. The situation could be significantly improved by regulating the procedure for leaving a religious association in state law. However, a distinction must be made between the spiritual and legal dimensions of membership. The article is based on doctrinal research involving the Strasbourg requirements, national case law, and existing legal scholarship.
2

Szczegółowość treściowa upoważnienia do wydania rozporządzenia – czy wytyczne nadal są potrzebne?

100%
Brzozowski W.
Przegląd Legislacyjny
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2014
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issue 2(88)
41 – 56
EN
The paper discusses the problem of a statutory authorization to issue an executive regulation in relation to the guidelines concerning its content (Article 92(1) in fine of the Constitution). The guidelines were aimed at safeguarding the principle of division of powers, at strengthening the supremacy of a statute in the system of sources of law, and at guaranteeing protection of rights and freedoms. It seems, however, that the actual practice of formulation of the guidelines deprives them of any real meaning while, at the same time, placing an excessive burden on the legislator. According to the author, ‘empty’ guidelines, which give no directions at all to the organ appropriate to issue a regulation, should be examined rigorously by the Constitutional Tribunal and eliminated from the legal system. On the other hand, in some other respects the approach to the statutory authorisations could be liberalised. Firstly, it should be accepted that in certain cases providing for a very detailed description of the matters to be regulated in an executive act could substitute the guidelines. Secondly, whenever an authorisation is contained in a statute that implements the EU law, no guidelines should be required except for those resulting from the act being implemented.
3
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Stopniowalność naruszeń konstytucji

100%
Brzozowski W.
Ruch Prawniczy, Ekonomiczny i Socjologiczny
|
2017
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vol. 79
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issue 4
5-17
EN
The constitution can be breached in many ways, from minor infringements to flagrant violations. How serious a violation is depends on two factors: (i) the importance of a violated norm in the structure of the Constitution; (ii) the intensity of the violation (the range of consequences following from that norm, yet eliminated by an unconstitutional act or action). (Ad i) Even though constitutional norms are not arranged in a hierarchical order, some of them need to be respected together so that a particular goal set by the Constitution can be achieved. If the principle of judicial independence is not respected, such a violation affects not only that principle but also the way in which the courts perform their constitutional tasks. If an authorised state body refuses, against the Constitution, to exercise its right to appoint another body, such an action violates a provision determining the appointment procedure, but also leads to the shutdown of the latter body and ‘deactivates’ the whole set of provisions determining its powers and duties. (Ad ii) Actions taken by a state body may be distant from the pattern desired by the Constitution to a lesser or greater extent. An action which is flawed but pursues the right objectives may be simply unconstitutional, while an action which neglects these objectives or even promotes adverse ones is flagrantly unconstitutional. From that perspective, signing a bill one day after the constitutional period has expired is a violation, but it is a less serious  one than not signing it at all.
PL
Naruszenia konstytucji mogą przybierać różną formę: od naruszeń mniejszej wagi aż po naruszenia rażące. Zależy to od dwóch zasadniczych czynników: 1) znaczenia (wagi) normy naruszonej na tle struktury konstytucji; 2) intensywności naruszenia normy konstytucyjnej, przez co należy rozumieć zakres zniesienia jej konsekwencji normatywnych przez niekonstytucyjny akt stanowienia lub stosowania prawa. Ad 1) Chociaż normy konstytucyjne nie podlegają formalnej hierarchizacji, niektóre z nich muszą być zrealizowane łącznie, aby osiągnięty został pożądany przez konstytucję stan rzeczy. Naruszenie zasady niezależności sądów nie ogranicza się do przepisu wyrażającego tę zasadę, lecz także rzutuje na sposób wywiązywania się przez sądy z ich konstytucyjnych zadań. Niewykonanie wbrew konstytucji kompetencji kreacyjnej przez upoważniony organ stanowi nie tylko naruszenie przepisu zawierającego kompetencję kreacyjną, lecz także prowadzi do paraliżu nieobsadzonego organu i „wyłącza” cały kompleks przepisów określających jego zadania i kompetencje. Ad 2) Postępowanie organu państwa może w mniejszym lub większym stopniu oddalać się od pożądanego przez konstytucję wzorca. Zachowanie wadliwe, lecz urzeczywistniające zasadniczy cel normy, jest po prostu niezgodne z konstytucją, natomiast zachowanie całkowicie nierealizujące tego celu lub dążące do celu przeciwstawnego jest rażąco niekonstytucyjne. W tym sensie podpisanie ustawy jeden dzień po upływie terminu jest naruszeniem konstytucji, ale mniej poważnym niż niepodpisanie jej w ogóle.
4
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Autonomia związków wyznaniowych jako zasada ustrojowa i prawo podmiotowe

100%
Brzozowski W.
Przegląd Prawa Konstytucyjnego
|
2023
|
issue 1(71)
27-38
PL
W dotychczasowej literaturze na temat autonomii związków wyznaniowych nie poświęcono wiele uwagi normatywnemu charakterowi konstrukcji przyjętej w Konstytucji RP, w tym stosunkowi zasady autonomii do wolności myśli, sumienia i religii. Artykuł zmierza do wykazania, że na gruncie Konstytucji RP autonomię związku wyznaniowego należy rozumieć zarówno jako zasadę ustrojową, jak i prawo podmiotowe. Prawo do autonomii nie ma charakteru absolutnego i może podlegać ograniczeniom, jednak im bliższy jest związek regulowanego przez prawo obszaru autonomii ze sferą tożsamości duchowej danej wspólnoty, tym węższy jest dopuszczalny zakres ingerencji. Ochronę najbardziej wrażliwym przejawom korzystania z autonomii religijnej zapewnia konstytucyjny zakaz naruszania istoty wolności i praw.
EN
In the existing body of literature on the autonomy of religious associations, little attention has been paid to the normative nature of the formula adopted in the Polish Constitution, including the relation of the principle of autonomy to freedom of religion and belief. In this article, it is argued that religious autonomy, as expressed in the Polish Constitution, should be understood both as a constitutional principle and as a right of religious associations. The right to autonomy is not absolute and may be subject to limitations, but the closer the connection between the area of autonomy subject to regulation and the spiritual identity of the community concerned, the narrower the scope of permissible interference. The protection of the most sensitive manifestations of religious autonomy is safeguarded by the constitutionnal prohibition of interference with the essence of freedoms and rights.
5
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Projekt stanowiska Sejmu w sprawie o sygn. akt K 12/16

100%
Brzozowski W.
Zeszyty Prawnicze BAS
|
2016
|
issue 4(52)
191-211
EN
In this draft position the author states that one of the provisions of the Act on combating unfair competition, concerning criminal liability for acts of dishonest competition in the field of advertising, is inconsistent with the Constitution. First, it provides an open catalogue of punishable acts, which violates the standard of specificity of criminal law. Second, the required elements of an offence were not sufficiently defined and they leave a subject of law in doubt as to whether his or her actions might result in criminal liability. Declaring the contested provision to be inconsistent with the Constitution eliminates the necessity of examining its conformity with Article 7 of the European Convention of Human Rights. Since in the examined case the constitutional standard and the international standard are practically the same, the proceedings regarding the latter should be discontinued.
6
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Irvinga Kristola krytyka demokracji

100%
Brzozowski W.
Studia Politologiczne
|
2009
|
vol. 13
142-162
EN
The article discusses selected aspects and values of democracy in the views of one of the most prominent American neoconservative thinkers, Irving Kristol, often referred to as ‘the godfather of neoconservatism’. It starts with a diagnosis of liberal democracy in times of its crisis. According to Kristol, the condition of American society threatens the future of the culture based on Western civic-bourgeois values. Every moral authority is nowadays being put into question. This constitutes a great danger as no society can totally reject wisdom based on the experience of past generations. Moreover, no society can survive without religion, which supplies answers to the most fundamental questions. In this respect, Kristol argues that a liberal form of censorship favouring Christian morality should be established. In general, the problems of contemporary democracy should be dealt with by applying the ideas of the Founding Fathers. Inspirations can be found in the American Revolution, which was ‘a revolution of sober expectations’, as Martin Diamond called it, contrary to the present habits of mind described by Kristol as ‘the revolution of rising expectations’. Thus, America can only be healed by restoring the republican spirit, which has been overwhelmed by the ‘democratic ideology’ justifying all the desires and demands of man. Such a prescription, however, makes the author of the article raise several questions.
7
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Projekt stanowiska Sejmu w sprawie o sygn. akt K 53/13

100%
Brzozowski W.
Zeszyty Prawnicze BAS
|
2014
|
issue 4(44)
223-258
EN
The proceedings before the Constitutional Tribunal in this case were initiated by a group of Deputies who questioned the constitutionality of some provisions of the Act of 21 June 2013 amending the Act on the Office of the Minister of National Defence and other acts. The Sejm did not share the arguments of the applicant. The abolishment of the posts of the commanders of the Army, Air Force, Navy and Special Forces (and their corresponding commands) accompanied by the creation of the posts of General Commander of the Branches of the Armed Forces and Operational Commander of the Branches of the Armed Forces is within the regulatory discretion of the legislature. The constitutional position of Chief of General Staff has not weakened, and the changes resulting from the Amending Act do not go beyond the framework set by the relevant constitutional provision. Entrusting to the President of the Republic of the competence to appoint – at the request of the Prime Minister – a person “designated for an appointment as Commander‑in‑Chief of the Armed Forces” has a strong constitutional grounds and ensures efficient procedure for filling the position of Commander‑in‑Chief for a period of war. In addition, the procedure in which the amendment was made did not infringe the principle of proper legislation.
8
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Projekt stanowiska Sejmu w sprawie o sygn. akt K 13/15

100%
Brzozowski W.
Zeszyty Prawnicze BAS
|
2015
|
issue 4(48)
288-308
EN
In the proposed draft position the author states that the Sejm does not share the belief of the Commissioner for Citizens’ Rights that the provisions of Article 12 § 1 and § 2 of the Family and Guardianship Code violate the Constitution in that they lead to humiliation and a justified sense of grievance of people affected by their operation. It has been shown that in this case the law is not a source of harm to the individual, on the contrary – the adopted regulations are aimed at protecting constitutional values, with maximum respect for the rights and dignity of persons with disabilities. In the opinion of the author of the draft position, it cannot be found that the arguments of the Commissioner for Citizens’ Rights – referring generally to social degradation of people affected by mental disabilities, without taking into account the details of construct of marriage ban – meets the high standards required by the Constitutional Tribunal. According to the author, from the considerations contained in the draft position it follows that the above-mentioned provision of the Code is compatible with Article 30 of the Constitution.
9

When Anointing Becomes Annoying: Remarks on the Polish Supreme Court’s Judgment of 20 September 2013 (II CSK 1/13)

100%
Brzozowski W.
Wroclaw Review of Law, Administration & Economics
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2015
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vol. 5
|
issue 2
70-80
10
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Projekt stanowiska Sejmu w sprawie o sygn. akt K 25/131

100%
Brzozowski W.
Zeszyty Prawnicze BAS
|
2014
|
issue 1(41)
365-378
EN
In this draft position the author points out the conformity of Article 16 para. 3 subparas (1), (3), (4) and (6) of the Act on the removal, storage and transplantation of human bodies, organs and tissue and Article 16 para. 3 subpara. 2 in part containing the phrase “and place”, with Article 47 and Article 51 para. 2, in conjunction with Article 31 para. 3 of the Constitution. According to the author, the proceedings should be discontinued in relation to other issues, due to inadmissibility of issuing a judgment. In justifications, he claims that the provisions referred to by the Human Rights Defender do meet the criterion of necessity within the meaning of the constitutional provision imposing limitations on obtaining, gathering and disclosure of information o citizens by public authorities and, thereby, meet the constitutional standard concerning the right to privacy and its admissible limitations.
11
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Efekt mrożący

100%
Brzozowski W.
Constitutional Review
|
2023
|
issue 4
37-53
EN
The chilling effect is a real threat to freedom of expression and unfettered public debate. It occurs when, as a result of the conduct of public authorities, an individual decides to refrain from freely exercising his or her rights, even though they have not been formally restricted or taken away. This self-restraint is caused by fear of the negative consequences of freely exercising one’s rights, which leads the individual to calculate whether the action in question, although formally lawful, is cost-effective. Such a fear should be real and therefore at least substantiated by objective factors. The account is less obvious if the renunciation of the exercise of rights is based on a threat that is unreal or vague. In legal discourse, the chilling effect is also identified, not necessarily correctly, in different contexts. First, it is sometimes recognised in cases of pressure by political authorities on independent judges. Second, it is claimed in relations between non-state actors, especially between government-sponsored private agencies that launch smear campaigns against political opponents, or between internet platforms and their users. Such use of the chilling effect doctrine may be intellectually appealing, but ultimately dilutes its meaning.It is much easier to identify a chilling effect when it is assumed to be the consequence of a flaw in the design of a legal provision than when it is alleged to result from acts of application of the law. In the latter case, the concept of chilling effect seems to serve two main purposes: the criticism of bad practices on the part of public actors, and the strengthening of the persuasiveness of judicial decisions that employ the concept. Its usefulness for legal analysis is therefore limited.
12
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Wytyczne dotyczące treści rozporządzenia (uwagi na tle formułowania upoważnień ustawowych

100%
Brzozowski W.
Przegląd Sejmowy
|
2013
|
issue 4(117)
65-82
EN
The purpose of the article is to provide initial identifi cation of the problems which arise most often in the practice of formulating statutory authorisation to issue a regulation, in relation to guidelines concerning its content (Article 92 (1) in fi ne of the Constitution). In the author’s view, the main weaknesses of guidelines contained in a statutory authorisation include, inter alia: 1) putting an emphasis on the praxiological values that should be a natural component of any proposed mechanism, such as reliability, effi ciency, effectiveness, effi cacy and regularity; 2) ordering the author of a resolution to allow for the value, implementing of which is an obvious consequence of taking the action specifi ed by the authorisation; 3) indicating the necessity of inclusion of actions which are objectively inseparable from the required action; 4) formulating therein a demand that the authority issuing a regulation be driven by the indicated constitutional values, thus repeating the normative content of the Constitution. An analysis of the practice leads the author to the refl ection of whether
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