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EN
The article deals with an issue of granting equal rights (“Gleichberechtigung”) to Germany in the militarisation process. During the conference in Locarno (the 5th-16th of October 1925) the German diplomacy demanded, in vain, that the level of armed forces and militarisation of the countries which were members of the League of Nations would be significantly reduced and proportional to the level decided by Germany in the Fifth part of the Treaty of Versailles. Nevertheless, on the 12th of December 1925 Germany was invited to participate in the works of the Preparatory Commission of the Disarmament Conference in Geneva, gaining at the same time an opportunity for undertaking direct actions for the purpose of equilibrating the military status of Germany with that of other countries.  The article analyses the German preparations for the proceeding of the 1st session of the Preparatory Commission. They were conducted, supervised and coordinated by the Ministry of the Foreign Affairs (the Second Department and the Report of the League of Nations), which cooperated in this regard with the Ministry of Defence, Naval Commission, Ministry of Industry, Ministry of Commerce.  In the instructions mapped out for the German delegation the promotion of the general disarmament was recommended for the purpose of propaganda and tactics. The German delegation was to emphasise the dependence between Germany’s disarmament and the general disarmament, pointing at the 8th article of the treaty of the League of Nations, an introduction to the Fifth part of the Treaty of Versailles and a note of Georges Clemenceau from the 16th of June 1919. Enforcing the treaty’s limitations regarding the militarisation of other countries was regarded as a minimal positive goal. Berlin expected that the pressure from the United States and the Great Britain would force France and its allies to reduce armies and the conditions of armament. It was assumed that Germany would simultaneously gain a possibility for a partial rearmament. In case of a fiasco of the disarmament negotiations, the German diplomacy would gain a basis for the formal request to remilitarise Germany.  The diplomats from the Wilhelmstrasse managed to convince the military men from the Bendlerstrasse that due to the political and propagandistic reasons, until Germany’s accession to the League of Nations, it was necessary to act according to tactics. Most of all, to avoid the situation, in which the German requests (both of disarmament and remilitarisation) could be considered as a reason for the failure of the disarmament negotiations. The German diplomacy was also planning to use the discussion about defining the records of the 16th article of the treaty of the League of Nations to balance the military status between Germany and the neighbouring countries.  Deutsche Liga für Völkerbund (DLfV) played a significant role in Germany’s preparations for the first session of the Preparatory Commission. The disarmament commission of the DLfV led by Max von Montgelas mapped out a plan for the disarmament by assuming a reorganisation of the European countries’ armies and defining the level of army in relation to the number of the inhabitants. The realization of Montgelas’ plan assumed that the German army would be doubled and hence equal to the French army.  The German diplomacy avoided a public specification of the postulate of “equal rights” in the disarmament. Therefore, Mongelas’ demobilisation plan, published by DLfV, is treated as an instrument of the propaganda of the German authorities and regarded as an expression of opinions of the German official factors. Johann Heinrich von Bernstorff, the chairman of DLfV, known in the pro-league circles associated in the International Union of the Associations of the League of Nations (Union Internationale des Associations pour la Société des Nations), was chosen a chairman for the German delegation in the Preparatory Commission.
PL
W artykule nie zamieszczono abstraktu w jęz.polskim
EN
The paper discusses French a ttempts at reaching agreement with Great Britain on disarmament before summoning the first session of the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference (PCDC) in Geneva. French endeavours were mainly motivated by the fear of the British support for the possible German postulates of the general and proportional disarmament during proceedings PCDC. In the note of 10th February, 1926 the French diplomacy made out Foreign Office a detailed case against German thesis. The British diplomacy generally shared the French opinion that, from the legal point of view, the German demands, to disarm other slates to the German level, were groundless. But, at the same time, moral and political obligations of the "ex-Allies” to disarm were pointed out. Initially Foreign Office was no t willing to take up the official negotiations with Paris since it was realized that such bilateral, Anglo-French talks, before the meeting of PCDC, would be negatively judged in other capitals, especially in Washington, Berlin and Rome. Such a provisional arrangement with France would make the agreement with the United States difficult for Great Britain. Moreover, there were still fundamental Anglo-French differences or: the relationship between disarmament and security. The agenda for the PCDC (the questionnaire) included French postulates convergent with the Geneva Protocol which was rejected by His Majesty’s Government in March 1925. In the end French diplomacy was able to lead to talks with the British side. At the beginning of May 1926 Colonel Edouard Requin arrived in London. Requin’s conversation with lord Robert Cecil indicated that the British delegation in the PCDC intends neither to put forward radical disarmament proposals nor agree to the revision of the military clauses of the Treaty of Versailles. Hovewer, Requin’s visit to London did not remove basic discrepancies between London and Paris on the scope of PCDC works.
EN
The author indicates that the perspectives of beginning of the Preparatory Commission for Disarmament Conference (PCDC) works were questionable ju s t in the moment of Commission’s appearence 12th December 1925. The United States and the Soviet Union signaled their reluctance towards sending their representatives to Geneva. The Washington administration wanted to avoid the active participation in solving complicated problems of disarmament in Europe. Moscow claimed any satisfaction from the Swiss side after the assasination of Vaclav Vorowski - Soviet representative during the Lausanne conference in 1923. In January 1926 the Franch diplomacy started its endeavourses to adjourn the first session of PCDC. Paris was engaged in solving Soviet-Swiss controversy. There were serious anxieties in France that German delegation would try to put forward the postulate of universal and proportional disarmament. So Quai d’Orsay strove to start the negotiations after the formal Germany’s entrance into the League or Nations to make the revision of the 5th Part of Versailles Treaty impossible. The British diplomacy did not support the French proposal. Lord Cecil, the minister responsible for disarmament in the conservative Baldwin’s cabinet, considered the adjournement to be unwillingly received by the public opinion. The more serious problem for the British was the absence of the American delegation in Geneva. But the president Calvin Coolidge’s decision to participate in PCDC works has already been known in that moment. France supported by the four other Council of the League of Nations members (Italy, Japan, Czechoslovakia, Uruguay) succeded to change the original appointed time of the First Session of PCDC. But the problems, the caused French efforts were still unsolved. Germany were still out of the League of Nations and the Soviet-Swiss impass lasted. On 18th March 1926 the Council of the League of Nations fixed the new date of the beginning of PCDC for 18th May 1926. The possibility of the further adjournement of PCDC was nor discussed again. The French Ambassador probed Foreign Office in that question in the middle of April. But the British altitude towards the next adjournement of PCDC session appeared to be negative, mainly because of the public opinion. The British diplomats also doubled the frankness of Soviet intensions and the quality Soviet Union signature under the disarmament convension draft.
EN
The Anglo-German Naval Agreement was signed on 18 June 1935 in London through the exchange of notes between the British Foreign Secretary, Sir Samuel Hoare and the representative of the Third Reich, Joachim von Ribbentrop. In this agreement the British government accepted Germany’s right to grow their Navy up to the level equalling 35% of the aggregate naval strength of the members the British Commonwealth of Nations. From a military perspective it meant that Germany could increase their Kriegsmarine’s global tonnage fourfold (from 108,000 tonnes limit set in the Treaty of Versailles to 420,500 tonnes). From an official and legal point of view it meant a revision of the Treaty of Versailles and legalisation of Adolf Hitler’s renunciation of the Part V of the Treaty of Versailles in March 1935 by Great Britain. The political dimension highlighted a trend in British policy to seek an agreement with Berlin through a revision of the Versailles order within the so-called policy of Appeasement. It also meant a break in the joint British, French and Italian front towards Germany and a move away from a policy of agreement between western powers on revising military caveats of the Treaty of Versailles in exchange for some concessions by Adolf Hitler (Germany’s return to the League of Nations and to the Disarmament Conference and Germany’s accession to the regional security pacts: the Air Pact, the Eastern Pact and the Danubian Pact. This article presents the background to this agreement from the British point of view and the analysis of the logic that made British government accept Hitler’s demands and conclude the agreement on German terms. British government signed the agreement taking into consideration political, strategic, military and economic factors. Great Britain was not keen to react to the remilitarisation of Germany with sanctions. London believed that concluding the agreement on German terms is the only alternative to the unlimited growth of the Germany Navy. British ministers considered the rejection of the German “offer” off the table due to the view of their public opinion in the run-up to the General Election. Signing the agreement on German terms was accepted by the British Admiralty where the deal was analysed in a broader perspective through the lenses of the Japanese threat to the Far East. Foreign Office, on the other hand, assumed that a bilateral agreement with Berlin would be a good opening towards a general settlement with Germany that would embrace other elements including the Air Pact so significant for the security of Britain.
PL
Brytyjsko-niemiecki układ morski został zawarty 18 czerwca 1935 roku w Londynie w formie wymiany not pomiędzy brytyjskim sekretarzem stanu do spraw zagranicznych sir Samuelem Hoarem i przedstawicielem III Rzeszy Joachimem von Ribbentropem. W porozumieniu tym rząd brytyjski zaakceptował prawo Niemiec do rozbudowy floty wojennej do poziomu 35% połączonych sił morskich członków Brytyjskiej Wspólnoty Narodów. Z punktu widzenia militarnego oznaczało to możliwość czterokrotnego wzrostu tonażu globalnego Kriegsmarine (z poziomu 108 000 ton, przyznanego Niemcom w traktacie wersalskim, do poziomu 420 500 ton). Z punktu widzenia formalnoprawnego układ oznaczał rewizję traktatu wersalskiego i legalizację przez Wielką Brytanię wypowiedzenia części V traktatu wersalskiego przez Adolfa Hitlera w marcu 1935 roku. W wymiarze politycznym układ uwidocznił tendencję polityki brytyjskiej do poszukiwania porozumienia z Berlinem poprzez rewizję systemu wersalskiego w ramach tzw. polityki appeasementu. Oznaczał również zerwanie wspólnego brytyjsko-francusko-włoskiego frontu wobec Niemiec i odejście od polityki zakładającej zgodę mocarstw zachodnich na rewizję militarnych klauzul traktatu wersalskiego w zamian za pewne ustępstwa ze strony Hitlera (powrót Niemiec do Ligi Narodów i na Konferencję Rozbrojeniową oraz przystąpienie Niemiec do regionalnych paktów bezpieczeństwa – paktu lotniczego, paktu wschodniego i paktu dunajskiego). W artykule przedstawiono genezę tego układu z brytyjskiej perspektywy i przeanalizowano przyczyny, które skłoniły brytyjski rząd do akceptacji żądań Hitlera i zawarcia porozumienia na warunkach niemieckich. Brytyjski rząd zawarł porozumienie, mając na uwadze czynniki polityczne, strategiczne, militarne i ekonomiczne. Wielka Brytania nie była skłonna reagować na remilitaryzację Niemiec za pomocą sankcji. W Londynie uważano, że zawarcie porozumienia na warunkach niemieckich jest jedyną alternatywą dla nieograniczonego rozwoju niemieckiej floty. Brytyjscy ministrowie byli zdania, że nie można było odrzucić niemieckiej „oferty” przez wzgląd na własną opinię publiczną w przededniu wyborów do Izby Gmin. Porozumienie na warunkach niemieckich akceptowała brytyjska Admiralicja, która analizowała układ w szerszej perspektywie, w kontekście japońskiego zagrożenia na Dalekim Wschodzie. W Foreign Office zakładano natomiast, że bilateralne porozumienie z Berlinem będzie punktem wyjścia do ogólnego porozumienia z Niemcami, obejmującego inne elementy, w tym ważny dla brytyjskiego bezpieczeństwa pakt lotniczy.
EN
The Naval Disarmament Conference was held in Geneva between 20 June – 4 August 1927 on the initiative of the American President Calvin Coolidge. It was a continuation of the process initiated during the Washington Conference (12 November 1921 – 6 February 1922). It was then that Great Britain, the United States of America, Japan, France and Italy determined the ratio of the naval forces in the class of battleships and aircraft carriers in line with the following: 5 : 5 : 3 : 1.75 : 1.75. During the so-called Coolidge Conference (1927) the American party did its best to conclude an international treaty and consequently achieve parity between the US Navy and Royal Navy in all classes of warships. The British government accepted an invitation to the Geneva Conference (1927) assuming that their delegation would succeed in forcing through the disarmament plan formulated by the Admiralty. The plan was aimed at modifying the Washington Treaty in order that the British Empire could make savings and at the same time improve her national security. The British plan was aimed at prolonging the service life of battleships and aircraft carriers, reducing the displacement and calibre of guns carried by battleships, and, last but not least, dividing the cruisers into heavy and light as well as imposing limitations only on the number of the former. The British plan met with strong objection from the American delegation. Attempts made to reach a consensus over parity between the Royal and US Navy in the class of cruisers were unsuccessful, and the conference eventually turned into a fiasco. Such a state of affairs had to do with strategic, political and economic issues. The Admiralty opposed to reaching an agreement which put the security of the British Empire at a serious risk, and the majority of the British ministers were inclined to believe that the conference breakdown would be lesser evil than agreeing to the American demands. The British diplomats strove for adopting a common stance with the Japanese delegation in order that the responsibility for the conference collapse rested with the American party.
PL
Morska konferencja rozbrojeniowa w Genewie (20 czerwca – 4 sierpnia 1927 r.) została zwołana z inicjatywy amerykańskiego prezydenta Calvina Coolidge’a i miała stanowić kontynuację procesu zapoczątkowanego na Konferencji Waszyngtońskiej (12 listopada 1921 r. – 6 lutego 1922 r.). Na konferencji w Waszyngtonie ustalono stosunek sił morskich Imperium Brytyjskiego, Stanów Zjednoczonych, Japonii, Francji i Włoch w klasie pancerników i lotniskowców według ratio: 5 : 5 : 3 : 1,75 : 1,75. Na konferencji Coolidge’a w 1927 roku strona amerykańska dążyła do uzyskania w traktacie międzynarodowym parytetu pomiędzy US Navy i Royal Navy we wszystkich klasach okrętów wojennych. Brytyjski rząd przyjął zaproszenie na konferencję w 1927 roku wychodząc z założenia, że delegacja brytyjska zdoła w Genewie przeforsować własny plan rozbrojenia opracowany przez Admiralicję. Polegał on na modyfikacji zasad traktatu waszyngtońskiego w taki sposób, aby zapewnić oszczędności finansowe, ale jednocześnie zachować bezpieczeństwo Imperium Brytyjskiego. Głównymi elementami brytyjskiego planu było: wydłużenie okresu pozostawania w służbie pancerników i lotniskowców, redukcja kalibru dział i wyporności pancerników, wprowadzenie traktatowego podziału krążowników na ciężkie i lekkie oraz nałożenie ograniczeń ilościowych tylko na krążowniki ciężkie. Brytyjski plan spotkał się ze zdecydowaną opozycją delegacji amerykańskiej. Próby opracowania kompromisowego porozumienia w sprawie parytetu pomiędzy flotą brytyjską i amerykańską w klasie krążowników zakończyły się niepowodzeniem, a konferencja zakończyła się fiaskiem. Przesądziły o tym względy strategiczne, polityczne i ekonomiczne. Admiralicja była przeciwna porozumieniu, które narażało na szwank bezpieczeństwo Imperium Brytyjskiego, a większość członków rządu brytyjskiego uważała, że niepowodzenie konferencji będzie mniejszym złem niż kapitulacja przed żądaniami amerykańskimi. Dyplomacja brytyjska dążyła do ustalenia wspólnego stanowiska z delegacją japońską, aby odium za niepowodzenie konferencji skierować na przedstawicieli Waszyngtonu.
EN
The aim of the review article is a discussion on a book by Janusz Faryś, Functioning of a parliamentary democracy in the Second Polish Republic. Conflicts around the government crisis in 1922 (Funkcjonowanie demokracji parlamentarnej w Drugiej Rzeczypospolitej. Konflikty wokół przesilenia rządowego w 1922 roku). The reviewed monograph is the first book devoted entirely to the crisis of Poland’s parliamentary democracy from summer 1922. The crisis occurred in the runup to the parliamentary and presidential elections and involved the longest government crisis in the history of the Second Polish Republic. It was triggered by a political confrontation between Poland’s Chief of State Józef Piłsudski, supported by the left-wing and centre-left parties and representatives of national minorities with his opponents on the right and central right. An open constitutional conflict between the Chief of State and the Legislative Sejm peaked during a failed attempt to push through a vote of no confidence in J. Piłsudski. Alongside an eloquent presentation of the origins, course and consequences of those events, the book by Janusz Faryś provides an in-depth analysis of factors that contributed to the weakness of Poland’s parliamentary democracy at that time.
PL
Celem artykułu recenzyjnego jest omówienie książki pt. Funkcjonowanie demokracji parlamentarnej w Drugiej Rzeczypospolitej. Konflikty wokół przesilenia rządowego w 1922 roku autorstwa Janusza Farysia. Recenzowana monografia jest pierwszą w historiografii książką poświęconą w całości kryzysowi demokracji parlamentarnej w Polsce, do którego doszło latem 1922 r., w przededniu wyborów parlamentarnych i prezydenckich. Jego przejawem było najdłuższe w historii II Rzeczypospolitej (dwumiesięczne) przesilenie rządowe, spowodowane konfrontacją polityczną pomiędzy Naczelnikiem Państwa Józefem Piłsudskim, wspieranym przez partie lewicowe i centrolewicowe oraz przedstawicieli mniejszości narodowych, a jego przeciwnikami z partii prawicowych i centroprawicowych. Doszło wówczas do otwartego konfliktu Naczelnika Państwa z Sejmem Ustawodawczym o charakterze konstytucyjnym, którego apogeum stanowiła nieudana próba przegłosowania wotum nieufności wobec J. Piłsudskiego. Książka Janusza Farysia przedstawia nie tylko w sposób erudycyjny genezę, przebieg i następstwa tych wydarzeń, ale zawiera również pogłębioną analizę czynników decydujących o słabości funkcjonowania polskiej demokracji parlamentarnej w tym okresie.
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