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EN
Competition law sets limits on the exercise of intellectual property rights by dominant companies, namely in cases involving standard essential patents (SEPs). This article will examine the framework for SEP owners’ right to seek an injunction, discussing competitive problems that such situations may cause as well as the solutions adopted by the European Institutions,comparing them with the US and Japanese approach, and finally reflecting upon the opportunity for a new test for a new type of abuse. Although the three legal orders – US, EU and Japan – apply different laws establishing a general presumption against injunctions in SEPs encumbered with FRAND commitments, their goal is the same: to protect the interest of the SEP holder to obtain a remuneration without an abusive recourse to injunctions. I will argue that, in the EU, the Huawei case created a new test for a new type of abuse, improving the comprehensibility and certainty for the companies involved in standardization across Europe and allowing the harmonization of national judicial solutions regarding the seeking of injunctions in the SEPs context. In spite of some uncertainties, the new test clarifies the role that competition rules should play in cases of abuses by SEPs owners.
EN
On 17 April 2014, the Proposal for a Directive on antitrust damages actions was accepted by the European Parliament and sent to the EU Council of Ministers for final approval. In addition, a Recommendation was adopted in 2013 on common principles for injunctive and compensatory collective redress mechanisms in the Member States to meet the need for a coherent European approach to antitrust private enforcement. This package comes at a time when private antitrust enforcement is rapidly evolving in a number of Member States. At the same time however, it establishes several legal solutions that do not fit well with existing national instruments. The aim of this article is to address, in particular, Portuguese and Polish experiences on a number of specific issues surrounding antitrust private enforcement, such as collective redress and contingency fees. Some doubts will also be raised concerning the solutions established in the European package, suggesting that national experiences should not be overlooked
FR
Le 17 avril 2014, la proposition de la directive relative aux actions antitrust en dommages et intérêts a été acceptée par le Parlement européen et envoyé au Conseil de l’UE pour l’adoption finale. En outre, une recommandation a été adoptée en 2013 sur des principes communs applicables aux méchanismes de recours collectif en cassation et en réparation dans les États membres pour répondre à la nécessité d’une approche européenne cohérente à l’application privée antitrust. Ce paquet est livré à un moment où l’application privée antitrust évolue rapidement dans un certain nombre d’États membres. Mais en même temps, il établitplusieurs solutions juridiques qui ne correspondent pas bien avec les instruments nationaux existants. Le but de cet article est d’examiner, en particulier, les expériences portugais et polonais sur un certain nombre de questions spécifiques entourant l’application privée antitrust, tels que le recours collectif en cessation et des honoraires. Des doutes seront également soulevés concernant les solutions établies dans le cadre du paquet européen, en suggèrant que les expériences nationales ne doivent pas être négligées.
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