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EN
The article attempts to delineate the evolution of constructivist thought. The author presents the conceptual framework of the main representatives of this school. He begins with introducing the thought of Immanuel Kant, who was the first to have firmly claimed that the products of science represented the models of natural order. Thus, they are artificial constructs and, even though they may exist independently of particular individuals, they are not independent of human actions in general. What Kant proposed is a static constructivism. This static perspective has nowadays been replaced by the dynamic model, which demonstrates itself in a variety of forms. The author analyses these models, conceptualized by the conventionalists, by Ludwik Fleck and the representatives of sociology of scientifc knowledge. Concluding remarks clearly point out to the very concept of construtivism, which maintains the idea of ontological realism, while questioning the idea of epistemological one.
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Filozofia Nauki
|
2017
|
vol. 25
|
issue 1
129-140
PL
While analyzing Mateusz Kotowski’s book Realizm zreformowany. Filozofia Iana Hackinga a spór o status poznawczy wiedzy naukowej [Realism Reformed. The Philosophy of Ian Hacking and the Controversy over the Cognitive Status of Scientific Knowledge], I raise some questions about the contemporary dispute over scientific realism. The book is a great addition to the Polish literature in the field of philosophy of science. Nevertheless, it also contains several contentious points. First, Kotowski disregards the problems of scientific realism addressed in Kant’s philosophy of science. Furthermore, there are difficulties with the illustration of the problems of representation given in the monograph, as well as with the title of the monograph itself. Also, the analysis carried out in the monograph does not necessarily focus on the status of scientific knowledge but on the status of cognition of the effects of scientific research.
Filozofia Nauki
|
2015
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vol. 23
|
issue 3
99-111
PL
Etymologically, unity comes from Latin unum, meaning one. In the context of science, unity is regarded as included in the metaphysical, epistemological, and semantic notion that the universe is one and explainable by means of scientific methods which lead to revealing the truth. Such a concept of unity is supported by thinkers who either adopt realism on metaphysical, epistemological, and semantic grounds or limit it to the epistemological (and sometimes also semantic) level. Such limitations make the philosophical dispute over the unity of science too shallow, especially in the context of the debate between realist and anti-realist positions. The key point in the problem of the unity of science is to differentiate between three levels of the discussion about realism and antirealism. My argument is that on one the hand we can accept metaphysical realism in some sense, while on the other it is still possible to question the unity of science.
Filozofia Nauki
|
2019
|
vol. 27
|
issue 1
121-138
PL
This article discusses various accounts of science and technology as well as their interrelations. The traditional approach to science and technology in the classical philosophy of science is contrasted with a relatively new approach rooted in reconstructions of laboratory practices. Subsequently, both approaches are considered in the context of globalization. The analysis of globalization licenses the claim that any reliable science and technology studies must allow for Stefan Amsterdamski’s concept of the ideal of scientific knowledge.
Filozofia Nauki
|
2015
|
vol. 23
|
issue 1
27-38
PL
The article seeks to explore the problem of scientific realism in the light of phil-osophical reflection on the laboratory. Two philosophical positions within realism are discussed: transcendental realism developed by Roy Bhaskar and experimental real-ism championed by Ian Hacking. It is argued that even though both approaches em-brace the doctrine of scientific realism, their characteristics are so different that they lead to two essentially different visions of science. The differences become especially evident when science is viewed through the prism of the laboratory. To Bhaskar, the laboratory is a place where experimental scientists are able to generate isolated closed systems and use them to discover objective laws of science. By contrast, Hacking claims that experimenters use the laboratory to intervene in the world and, with the aid of apparatus, create phenomena that never arise spontaneously in nature.
Filozofia Nauki
|
2020
|
vol. 28
|
issue 1
111-124
PL
This is a review of Radosław Kazibut’s book Filozofia przyrody i przyrodoznawstwa Roberta Boyle’a. Filozoficzna geneza nauki laboratoryjnej (Robert Boyle’s Philosophy of Nature and Natural Science: The Philosophical Origins of Laboratory Research), in which I highlight the strengths and weaknesses of the proposed approach. On the one hand, I appreciate the author’s effort to examine the origin of the laboratory style of research, which is found in Boyle’s studies, as a basis for a novel approach to the problem of the relationship between philosophy and science. On the other hand, I am critical of the fact that the author has overlooked several issues relating to the subject matter which, in the context of the topics addressed in the book, should be recognized as relevant. The characterization of the laboratory sciences presented in the book is too selective as it ignores the problem of the undesirable products of the laboratory sciences as well as their increasingly practical character.
EN
The paper addresses one of most important topics in contemporary epistemology, i.e. the controversy between realistic vs. constructivist approach to reality and science. In my article I focus on two representatives of these approaches, on Ian Hacking's realistic view of knowledge, and on Bruno Latour's radical constructivism. In the first part, Latour's idea of anthropological research of the method of sciences is discussed. I argue that Latour's conception boils down to an assertion against there being an universal method of science. In second part I discuss realistic standpoint of Ian Hacking and his view that not all scientific facts are theoretical constructions.
PL
W związku z dynamicznymi zmianami środowiska biznesu intensyfikowane są, trwające od wielu lat, poszukiwania modelu firmy doskonałej. Dzięki osiągnięciu dużej dojrzałości biznesowej, której składowymi są: wrażliwość, świadomość, odpowiedzialność i zdolność, firmy takie wcześniej od konkurentów dostrzegają nadchodzące zmiany nawet in statu nascendi. Mogą także opracować dojrzałą strategię, wykorzystując własne zasoby przedsiębiorczości oraz model kreowania strategii przedsiębiorczej, zaprezentowany w niniejszym opracowaniu.
EN
Searching for a perfect company model which is a long-lasting process has been intensified due to dynamic changes in the business environment. Thanks to the achievement of high business maturity, which includes sensitivity, awareness, responsibility and ability, such companies sooner than their competitors notice the upcoming changes even in the state of birth. They can also develop a mature strategy using their own entrepreneurial resources and the entrepreneurship strategy creation model presented in this study.
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