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1

Laudan vs. Lakatos: kilka uwag na temat ostatecznej oceny demarkacjonizmu

100%

Koterski A.

Annales Universitatis Mariae Curie-Sklodowska, sectio I – Philosophia-Sociologia

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2017

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vol. 42

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issue 2

EN

The paper reconstructs and examines the meta-criterion of demarcation between science and pseudo-science as proposed by Laudan (1983). The analysis shows that Laudan’s meta-criterion overlooks a crucial demand that any reliable criterion should satisfy. This, in turn, opens up a possibility of a non-ad hoc modification of Laudan’s proposal. When the meta-criterion finally meets the requirement which states that any reliable criterion of demarcation has to enable a comparison of any two scientific theories with regard to the degree of their progressiveness, it is possible to point out at least one advanced theory which gives an acceptable definition of science, i.e. Lakatos’s methodology of scientific research programs – strangely enough, not attended to by Laudan. Therefore, the skeptical conclusions of his paper can be refuted; furthermore, after such a modification the meta-criterion of demarcation acquires a homogenous form what makes it stable in a way originally intended by Laudan.

ES

El artículo reconstruye y examina el metacriterio de demarcación entre ciencia y pseudociencia como fue propuesto por Laudan (1983). Este análisis demuestra que el metacriterio de Laudan pasa por alto requisitos cruciales que cualquier criterio aceptable debería cumplir. Lo que a su vez posibilita una modificación no ad hoc de la propuesta de Laudan. Cuando el metacriterio finalmente se enfrenta al requisito que establece que cualquier criterio de demarcación aceptable tiene que posibilitar la comparación de dos teorías científicas cualesquiera con respecto a su grado de progresividad, es posible señalar al menos una teoría avanzada que dé una definición aceptable de ciencia, es decir, la metodología de los programas de investigación científica de Lakatos, omitidos en el artículo de Laudan, por extraño que parezca. Por esto pueden refutarse las conclusiones dudosas de su artículo; y lo que es más, tras la modificación, el metracriterio de demarcación adquiere una forma homogénea que lo hace estable, tal y como Laudan pretendía originariamente.

PL

Celem artykułu jest rekonstrukcja i analiza przedstawionego przez Laudana (1983) metakryterium demarkacji między nauką a pseudonauką. Okazuje się, że Laudan przeoczył kluczowy warunek, który powinno uwzględniać każde godne uwagi metakryterium. Otwiera to z kolei możliwość wprowadzenia do jego propozycji poprawek, które nie będą miały charakteru ad hoc. Kiedy tym sposobem metakryterium obejmuje również wymóg, by kryterium demarkacji umożliwiało porównanie teorii naukowych co do stopnia ich postępowości czy naukowości, można wskazać przynajmniej jedną teorię podającą akceptowalne kryterium demarkacji, mianowicie Lakatosową metodologię naukowych programów badawczych, którą w swej pracy Laudan pominął jednak milczeniem. Wtedy też można odrzucić sceptyczne wnioski jego artykułu. Dzięki tej modyfikacji metakryterium demarkacji otrzymuje dodatkowo jednolitą postać, za sprawą której staje się ono stabilne, tak jak tego pierwotnie chciał Laudan.

2

Science, Racism, and Post-racism

100%

Koterski A.

Filozofia Nauki

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2015

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vol. 23

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issue 2

123-139

PL

The paper presents three strategies used nowadays against the so-called scientific racism. The first one is that since there are no biological grounds to discern races, the very concept of race - as the key concept in the body of socially harmful doctrines -should be eliminated from any kind of discourse. According to the second strategy, while the racial claim has no biological justification, the concept of race is, nevertheless, useful if it is only made clear that races are social constructs. Thirdly, it is believed that a biologically correct redefinition of the concept of race is feasible, but it by no means supports racism. Furthermore, the paper considers the following two questions: (a) do these strategies allow us to say that the hereditary program in the IQ debate fails to provide scientific support for racism? (b) does any of these arguments show the irrationality of "racism without races"? The answer to (b) is in the negative. I will argue, however, that if post-racism is not reducible to biological racism, then "post-racism" is a misnomer. If it is so, it can still be maintained that science and philosophy of science overcomes normative racism and falsifies its descriptive counterpart.

3

Quine’s “Two Dogmas” as a Criticism of Logical Empiricism

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Koterski A.

Filozofia Nauki

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2012

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vol. 20

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issue 1

45-58

PL

‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism’ has quickly become a classic of analytical philosophy and has invoked the since lasting discussion about possibility of analytic/ synthetic distinction. It has been also considered a nail to the coffin of logical positivism. Accordingly, Quine tried to show that logical positivism was possible solely due to assumptions taken without justification in terms of standards preached by neopositivism itself. Quine aimed to point out that since they functioned as dogmas, the rescuing of empiricism was possible only if another approach was accepted, the one characterized as holism. The results obtained by Quine are still presented as an argument for the internal decay of logical positivism. However, Quine’s article was anachronistic already at the time of its publication. It was years before ‘Two Dogmas’ appeared that leading representatives of logical empiricism (1) rejected both dogmas, and (2) advanced holistic version of empiricism. Already in 1930 Tarski started convincing Carnap that the analytic/synthetic distinction must be relativised. Further argumentation was presented by Tarski in Paris (1935). Carnap, who found his remarks ‘very deep’, never abandoned the distinction but he was aware at least since then that it could not be absolute. Carnap’s case was not exceptional. It may be argued as well that relativised analyticity is the only option for Neurath’s encyclopedism if he in fact needed this notion. With relativised analyticity logical positivists did not need to ground synonymity in a verificational theory of meaning. Therefore, they were not forced to accept reductionism either. Carnap, whom Quine accused of ‘radical reductionism’, abandoned the Aufbau theory altogether with its alleged reductionism at the very beginning of the thirties. His newly accepted physicalism did not admit strict verificationism either. This view, as well as his conventional approach to analyticity, was reinforced in his Syntax. Within Neurath’s physicalism both reductionism and verificationism were classified derogatorily as metaphysical theories. In the mid-thirties Neurath’s physicalism started turning into a sophisticated conception, ‘encyclopedism.’ It was a holistic and naturalized theory of science, strongly opposed to older types of positivism. Although in some respects different from Quine’s own proposal, it is its equivalent. The postulate of ‘empiricism without the dogmas’ was put forward in the Vienna Circle long before Quine. Neurath’s turn to encyclopedism was catalyzed by a Poznański-Wundheiler paper, ‘The Notion of Truth in Physics’ (1934). Its main task was to examine the possibility of retaining the notion of truth in science. There they sketched a theory depicting science in terms of radical fallibility, anti-foundationalism, and holism. Their standpoint is a counterpart of Neurath’s later encyclopedism. Because science had encyclopaedic structure there, they could opt solely for relative analyticity; being physicalists they obviously could not accept reductionism. Thus, they realized Quine’s postulate and advanced empiricism or theory of science without the dogmas. The aim of this paper is twofold. Firstly, I am going to sketch Quine’s argument against the background of the views held by Carnap and Neurath at the peak of the Vienna Circle activities; they will be supported by philosophers from the Lviv- Warsaw School (Tarski, Poznański and Wundheiler). It will be claimed that Quine’s criticism was late more than fifteen years. Secondly, I am going to examine Quine’s postulate of empiricism without the dogmas and compare it briefly with theories advanced by Neurath, Poznański and Wundheiler. It will be claimed that it came to its realization and that Quine was late again.

4

Popper ant the Vienna Circle: Behind the Scenes

63%

Koterski A.

Filozofia Nauki

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2003

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vol. 11

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issue 2

65-78

PL

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3 Filozofia Nauki

1 Annales Universitatis Mariae Curie-Sklodowska, sectio I – Philosophia-Sociologia

4 Koterski A.

1 2017

1 2015

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1 2003

Laudan vs. Lakatos: kilka uwag na temat ostatecznej oceny demarkacjonizmu

Science, Racism, and Post-racism

Quine’s “Two Dogmas” as a Criticism of Logical Empiricism

Popper ant the Vienna Circle: Behind the Scenes