This article presents the results of studies – conducted in various countries around the world, including Poland – on the cognitive, personality, and social characteristics of a president that differentiate the effects of a presidency and how their office is exercised. The types of changes that presidents undergo while in the process of exercising their authority (i.e. the so-called metamorphic effects of power) and the mechanisms of those changes are also shown, along with the factors that determine the magnitude and speed at which those mechanisms operate. The author provides evidence for the complexity of how presidential style and execution are conditioned, and warns against committing the so-called fundamental attribution error, i.e. overestimating the role of personality in regulating the behavior of politicians. Interdisciplinary studies indicate that a president’s effectiveness is significantly ameliorated first and foremost by their openness. The weight of a president’s psychological characteristics increases in difficult situations, while the strength and extent of power’s metamorphic effects are dependent on the certainty and stability of their position in the power structure and its transparency.
The aim of the two studies was to assess relations between the type of preferred life-goals (extrinsic goals, including material success, power, achievement and career vs. intrinsic goals, including love and friendship, family, being useful for others and obeying rules of religion), interpersonal trust, level of subjective somatic health and level of general life-satisfaction. The data was collected by means of standardised interviews conducted in a representative random sample of adult inhabitants of Warsaw (n = 1004) and by e-mail – in a sample of students (n = 112). The results of multiple regression analyses showed that extrinsic life-goals were not a significant predictor of the level of general life-satisfaction. Preferences for intrinsic life-goals were a significant predictor of general life-satisfaction level: those persons who strongly accepted intrinsic life-goals had higher level of life-satisfaction, even when levels of interpersonal trust, subjective somatic health, educational level and age of respondents were controlled. The results are consistent with research conducted by Kasser and Ahuvia (2002) and by Skarżyńska (2002), suggesting that some types of values (or life-goals) may be associated with well-being.
This article outlines the reasons for the aversion of young Polish women and men to politics, expressed in a lack of interest in politics, distrust of politicians and political institutions, and the low turnout of young people in most democratic elections in the Third Republic. The young generation did not feel political support for the realisation of aspirations and needs, and were less enthusiastic about democracy than their parents' generation. They also felt an intergenerational dissonance in terms of values and lifestyles. The young are more oriented towards secular values and self-expression than their parents. Particularly evident is the increased importance of these values among young women, as evidenced by analyses conducted by the researchers quoted in the text (e.g.: M. Marody and J. Raciborski). The Constitutional Court's ruling of 22 October 2020, delegitimising and criminalising abortion, prompted hundreds of thousands of young Polish women to stage almost two months of protests. These protests gained the support of more than 50% of the population, yet the authorities ignored them, using the police to disperse them and the party media to harshly criticise the participants. Despite the lack of expected impact among the participants, they left behind a good memory of a supportive community, which young people have rediscovered in various democratic opposition actions, meetings with leaders, Campus Poland, opposition programmes and most recently in the Million Hearts March. The numerous pro-frequency campaigns were also not insignificant. A post of active hope was created and this led to the mass participation of young people in the last elections.
PL
W artykule przedstawiono powody niechęci młodych Polek i Polaków do polityki, wyrażającej się brakiem zainteresowania polityką, nieufnością wobec polityków i politycznych instytucji, a także niską frekwencją młodych osób w większości demokratycznych wyborów w Trzeciej RP. Młode pokolenie nie czuło politycznego wsparcia dla realizacji aspiracji i potrzeb, mniej entuzjastycznie odnosiło się do demokracji niż pokolenie ich rodziców. Odczuwało też międzypokoleniowy dysonans w zakresie wartości i stylów życia. Młodzi są bardziej nastawieni na wartości świeckie i ekspresji siebie niż ich rodzice. Szczególnie wyraźne jest zwiększenie wagi tych wartości wśród młodych kobiet, czego dowodzą analizy prowadzone przez cytowanych w tekście badaczy (np. M. Marody i J. Raciborskiego). Orzeczenie Trybunału Konstytucyjnego z 22 października 2020 r., delegitymizującego i penalizującego aborcję, skłoniło setki tysięcy młodych Polek i Polaków do niemal dwumiesięcznych protestów. Protesty te zyskały poparcie ponad 50% społeczeństwa, mimo to władza je zlekceważyła, używała policji dla ich rozpraszania a partyjnych mediów – do ostrej krytyki uczestników. Mimo braku oczekiwanych skutków wśród uczestników pozostawiły po sobie dobre wspomnienie wspierającej wspólnoty, które młodzi ludzie odkrywali ponownie w różnych akcjach demokratycznej opozycji, spotkaniach z liderami, Campusie Polska, programach opozycji i ostatnio w Marszu Miliona Serc. Nie bez znaczenia pozostały też liczne akcje profrekwencyjne. Powstało poczcie aktywnej nadziei i ono doprowadziło do masowego uczestnictwa młodych ludzi w ostatnich wyborach.
Celem prezentowanego badania jest poznanie psychologiczno-społecznych korelatów poparcia udziału Polski w ewentualnej militarnej interwencji NATO i UE, wspierającej Ukrainę w konflikcie z Rosją. Teoretyczną podstawę hipotez stanowią teorie schematów poznawczych oraz „ramowania” zjawisk politycznych przez media, czyli prezentację ich interpretacji przez pewne analogie historyczne. Testowano rolę negatywnych schematów świata społecznego i polityki oraz trzy różne ramy konfliktu Rosja – Ukraina. Pierwsza odwoływała się do analogii między działaniami prezydenta Rosji, Władimira Putina wobec Krymu a postępowaniem Hitlera wobec Austrii (najczęściej obecna w polskich mediach). Druga wskazywała, iż zaangażowanie Polski w konflikt między Rosją a Ukrainą przyniesie nam poważne straty i będzie nieskuteczne, tak jak zaangażowanie USA w konflikt w Wietnamie. Trzecia rama wskazywała, że Rosja nie zamierza prowadzić wojny z całym Zachodem. Badanie prowadzono metodą indywidualnego wywiadu, wspomaganego komputerem (CAPI) na reprezentatywnej losowej próbie dorosłych Polaków (N = 971). Okazało się, że najsilniejszymi predyktorami stopnia akceptacji zbrojnej interwencji są ramy ujmowania konfliktu Rosja – Ukraina. Im bardziej respondenci zgadzają się z interpretacją zawierającą analogię postępowania Putina i Hitlera, tym bardziej akceptują udział Polski w zbrojnej interwencji. Im bardziej zgadzają się z dwiema pozostałymi ramami konfliktu, tym mniej popierają nasz udział w interwencji zbrojnej. Natomiast akceptacja każdej z ram jest w odmienny sposób związana z indywidualnymi schematami świata społecznego i polityki.
EN
The aim of this study is to understand the psychological and social correlates of support for Polish participation in potential military intervention of NATO and the EU to support Ukraine in the conflict with Russia. The theoretical basis for hypotheses are the theories of cognitive schemas and the „framing” of political phenomena in the media, that means the creation of their interpretation by certain historical analogies. We tested the role of negative patterns of social and political world, and three different frames of the conflict Russia–Ukraine. The first referred to the analogy between Putin’s actions against the Crimea and Hitler’s proceedings against Austria (the one most often present in Polish media). The second indicated that the Polish involvement in the Russia–Ukraine conflict will bring Poland heavy losses and will be ineffective, similar to US involvement in the conflict in Vietnam. The third frame indicated that Russia does not intend to wage war with the whole West. The study was conducted with computer assisted personal interview (CAPI) on a representative random sample of adult Poles (N = 971). We found that the strongest predictors of the acceptance for military intervention are frames in recognition of the Russia–Ukraine conflict. The more respondents agree with the interpretation containing the analogy of conduct Putin and Hitler, the more accepting for Polish participation in military intervention they are. The more respondents agree to one of the two other frames of the conflict, the less they support Polish participation in military intervention. In contrast, the acceptance of each of the frames is related in a different way to the individual schemas of the social world and politics.
This article is concerned with the relationship between adult attachment styles and generalized negativistic social beliefs (i.e. pessimistic expectations concerning human nature and interpersonal relations). Two general dimensions of attachment styles, avoidance and anxiety, are considered to be manifestations of an individual’s image of other people and of the self, respectively. We suggest that both dimensions may be a substantial basis for formulating negative beliefs about the social world. Firstly, we believe that a high level of negativistic social beliefs can be positively predicted by the growth of avoidance (negative image of others) and anxiety (negative image of self). Secondly, we formulate an expected interaction effect. Although the nature of such an interaction is ambiguous, it may be argued as having a synergistic as well as antagonistic pattern. These hypotheses were tested and supported (in favor of an antagonistic pattern of interaction in the case of the second hypothesis) on a representative sample of adult Poles (N = 853).
This article is concerned with the relationship between adult attachment styles and generalized negativistic social beliefs (i.e. pessimistic expectations concerning human nature and interpersonal relations). Two general dimensions of attachment styles, avoidance and anxiety, are considered to be manifestations of an individual’s image of other people and of the self, respectively. We suggest that both dimensions may be a substantial basis for formulating negative beliefs about the social world. Firstly, we believe that a high level of negativistic social beliefs can be positively predicted by the growth of avoidance (negative image of others) and anxiety (negative image of self). Secondly, we formulate an expected interaction effect. Although the nature of such an interaction is ambiguous, it may be argued as having a synergistic as well as antagonistic pattern. These hypotheses were tested and supported (in favor of an antagonistic pattern of interaction in the case of the second hypothesis) on a representative sample of adult Poles (N = 853).
The present study investigated a hypothesis that the pro-social values differentiated by S. Schwartz's model of basic human values - universalism and benevolence - would positively predict civic involvement. Most importantly, authors expected that the type of pro-social value that would play a dominant motivational role would depend on moderating role of the level of self-expression and benevolence - cultural value dimension developed by R. Inglehart. Based on discriminant function analyses performed on the data gathered in 17 European countries through the European Social Survey conducted in 2002, authors found that universalism predicts civic involvement only in self-expression countries, whereas the role of benevolence is rather neglectable and independent of the cultural context. The results are discussed with reference to cross-cultural differences in Europe.
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