In this article, the author analyses the provision of Art. 116 par. 5 of the Constitution of the Slovak Republic. As a result of the resignation of the Prime Minister, this provision enshrines the resignation of the entire government, but does not specify exactly how these processes should take place. In recent times (2018, 2021), the constitutional practice has twice produced a situation where the government ceased to exist due to the resignation of the Prime Minister. In both cases, there have been steps on the part of the government that can be assessed as illogical and incorrect. The aim of the author is to subject this course of action to a critical analysis, taking into account the constitutional definition and functioning of resignation in the conditions of Slovakia. On this basis, the main goal of the author is to formulate how all procedures should be conducted in a constitutionally compliant manner in the event that the government is resigned due to the resignation of the Prime Minister.
In this article, the author deals with the question of whether, in terms of the Constitution of the Slovak Republic, the Prime Minister should be considered as a member of the Government. The question may seem strange or unnecessary at first glance. However, the need for its thorough and correct analysis has emerged from an opinion presented in the theory, according to which, where the Constitution speaks of members of the Government, it means all its members except for the Prime Minister. This opinion has been repeatedly presented by Radoslav Procházka. This article is a response to the stated opinion, which the author considers legally untenable. Based on the analysis of the constitutional position of the Prime Minister, the author demonstrates in detail why, in Slovakia, the Prime Minister has the status of a member of the Government and is to be considered as such. In the paper, the author also explains some essential connotations of the constitutional position of the Prime Minister.
In this paper, the author deals with a highly topical constitutional law issue – the question of the conformity of the referendum on early general election with the Constitution of the Slovak Republic. The attempt to organize this type of referendum is not new in Slovakia. It has been held twice so far, in 2000 and 2004. Despite serious doubts about its constitutionality, the Constitutional Court has not yet had the opportunity to make a decision on this issue. The author takes a clear position that the referendum on early general election is unconstitutional. He supports this conclusion with arguments of legal theory, written law and case law, taking also some examples and inspiration from comparative constitutional law. According to the author, accepting this kind of referendum as part of the constitutional mechanisms can destabilize the Slovak constitutional system in a serious way. The author claims that the referendum on early election devalues, and therefore violates the importance of the right to vote, it violates the representative mandate, the sovereignty of the people and ultimately, also the principle of democracy and the rule of law.
In this article, the authors deal with several practical constitutional issues related to the creation of the Security Council of the Slovak Republic. In addition to the establishment and termination of individual membership in this body, the question of establishment and termination of this body as a whole appears to be particularly important. This issue is not addressed at all in the constitutional texts, although it is explicitly and clearly enshrined in the statute of the Security Council. However, in recent times, the practice has repeatedly brought some steps that directly contradicted the provisions of the statute. Therefore, from a theoretical and practical point of view, it is necessary to analyse the legislation and procedures related to the issue of creation of the Security Council, in an effort to find their constitutionally compliant solution. In this context, it will also be necessary to examine the question of whether there are any applicable legally binding constitutional customs related to the constitutional regulation of the creation of the Security Council, or whether their existence is, at least, prospectively conceivable. The main goal of the authors is to answer the question of whether the procedures implemented since 2018 when changing the appointed members of the Security Council are conform or not to the constitutional norms.
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