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EN
Perturbations in the Eurozone justify the question concerning not only the condition of public finances in the countries belonging to this zone, but also force us to think about the form of budget support policy of the Eurozone countries implemented by the European Union. It is not difficult to realize that the aforementioned policy is, since May 2010, both an object of criticism, also in a scientific aspect, and the (not only) source of the current financial difficulties of the European Union. Although these problems do not (yet) threaten the common European market, it is impossible to ignore that they weaken to a great extent the union binder, which consists both of the economic and monetary European union. With the purpose of showing the legal and political implications of this process, it becomes necessary to remind first of all of the adequate regulations of the European Union law. All this, referring to the bon mot of John Kenneth Galbraith that one of the recession’s benefits is that it reveals what the accountant has overlooked, in order to be able to present the new political and legal shapes of the indicated problem. The shapes and also, specifically speaking, the political and legal challenges, which emerge from the analysis of the present budget support policy of the Eurozone countries implemented by the European Union.
PL
Zapewne nie pomylimy się tutaj, gdy stwierdzimy, że jedną z najgoręcej dyskutowanych kwestii w niemieckiej doktrynie prawa pozostaje nadal problematyka delimitacji granic prawotwórstwa sędziowskiego (Richterrecht). Inaczej mówiąc, najzwięźlej, prawa sędziego do stanowienia prawa. Prawo sędziowskie jest, i trudno się z taką opinią nie zgodzić, jednym z najciekawszych, ale i zarazem kontrowersyjnych zagadnień we współczesnym prawodawstwie. A pytanie, czy sędzia ma być jedynie „ustami ustawy”, czy też jednak wolno mu wnosić twórczy wkład w jej odczytanie, nie sposób uznać, także dzisiaj, za mało poważne, bądź wręcz nawet przestarzałe. Stąd próbę udzielenia nań odpowiedzi przez Karla Engischa (1899–1990), jednego z najwybitniejszych niemieckich teoretyków prawa karnego XX stulecia3, można i należy widzieć nie tylko w kategoriach kazuistycznych popisów, ale również (a kto wie, czy nie głównie) jako świadectwo badacza odrzucającego widzenie sędziego w roli swoistego automatu działającego wedle dogmatów poznawczych. Z polskiego punktu widzenia świadectwo to pozostaje przy tym o tyle przekonywujące, o ile uwzględnić odrzucenie przez Engischa narodowosocjalistycznych uroszczeń w badaniu i stosowaniu prawa. Postawa, która – jak wiemy – nie była typową dla tego środowiska w okresie Trzeciej Rzeszy.
EN
We are probably not mistaken when we state here that one of the most heatedly debated issues in German legal doctrine remains the problem of the delimitation of the limits of judicial lawmaking (Richterrecht). In other words, and in the most succinct terms, the judge’s right to legislate. For the judicial law is, and it would be difficult not to agree with such an opinion, one of the most interesting but also controversial issues in contemporary legislation. The question as to whether a judge is merely the „mouthpiece of the law”, or whether he or she is allowed to make a creative contribution to its interpretation, cannot be regarded, even today, as not serious or merely outdated. Hence, the attempt of Karl Engisch (1899–1990), one of the most prominent German criminal law theorists of the 20th century, to answer this question can and should be seen not only in terms of casuistic demonstration, but also (and who knows if not primarily) as the evidence of a scholar who rejects seeing the judge as a kind of automaton acting according to cognitive dogmas. From the Polish perspective, this account remains convincing insofar as one takes into consideration Engisch’s rejection of National Socialist delusions in the study as well as in the application of law. An attitude which, as we know, was not typical of this milieu during the Third Reich.
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