In the Dominican reputable publishing ‘Cerf’ was published a book of father Adriano Oliva OP. The aim of this book is ‘pastoral’ reinterpretation of traditional teaching of the Church about second marriage of people who are divorced (les divorces remariés) and homosexual couples (les couples homosexuels). A. Oliva is basing his suggestions on texts of St. Thomas Aquinas. Father Oliva his considerations about marriage begins (p. 7) from quotation from Thomas’ Summa contra Gentiles where Thomas says that between husband and wife there is occured amicitia maxima (the largest friendship). The sign of amicitia maxima is not only sex life (actus carnalis copulae) but also the co- -existence in the household (domestica conversationis consortium). The analysis of ontological structure of marriage broadly is unanimous with the text of Aquinas but the consequences formulated from it are contradictory with his moral teaching about marriage and family. According to father Oliva the method of reinterpretation of Thomas’ teaching consists in separating one sentence from wider context and ‘commissioning’ its justifying conclusions. These conclusions are absolutely contradictory with Thomas Aquinas’ views which are voiced expressis verbis. Father Oliva uses this method also in respect of homosexsuality. The sentence quoted above about marriage’s friendship as the biggest friendship between people is in Thomas’ text one of the arguments for inseparably (indivisibilitas) of marriage and it is taken from chapter on the topic. Father Oliva takes a sentence from the text of the inseparably of marriage and in his book this inseparably is weakened in some way. Father Oliva used a statement of Thomas Aquinas’ – if a nature of some man is corrupted (natura corrupta), for this man it will be connaturale this what is contra nature (contra naturam). Thomas gives as examples cannibalism, bestiality and homosexuality. On the basis of that father Oliva writes that homosexuality being incompatible with the generally understood nature is natural for homosexual people because of their individual nature. Dominican scholar as if he had forgotten that the ‘individual nature is the result of corruption (corruptio). The way out of corruption is either repair or destruction the nature. Meanwhile father Oliva proposes the third way: the acceptance of corruption. In Thomas’ works we will not find basis for that acceptance. The book of Adriano Oliva, rather proclaimed in its views, are complete misunderstanding in the sense that it completely inaccurately selected basis for the proclaimed views. St. Thomas’ views are not good to justify to let to the Church’s sacraments divorces remariés and institutional acceptance of homosexual couples
Bernard of Clairvaux’s account of mystical love was already famous in the 12th century and it gained many followers, among whom Bernard’s first biographer, William of Saint-Thierry, should be given first mention. The doctrine had also its opponents, for example in Peter Abelard, who argued that it presented a concept of egoistic love; he himself tried to put forward his own view of charitable and selfless love. In Bernard’s writings, the influences of Greek Platonism from the works of Pseudo-Dionysius and Saint Augustine’s version of western Platonism are joined in a coherent unity. The distinct novum is Bernard’s stress on freedom. He clearly states that love arises from freedom; freedom is a condition of the beginning of love, and it relies on the rejection of enslaving fear and overpowering lust. What is more, this freedom of will (liberum arbitrum) constitutes the dignity of man. “Dignitatem in homine liberum arbitrium dico” – this statement from "De diligendo Deo" is reminiscent of the characteristics of dignity that can be found in Renaissance humanists like Coluccio Salutati, Marsilio Ficino, Nicholas of Cusa, Petro Pomponazzi, Carolus Bovillus, Erasmus of Rotterdam, and first of all Giovanni Pico della Mirandola. Bernard’s doctrine of love can be described as mystical, because it refers only to God, and it is completed only with God and through God. Bernard’s favourite subject for commentary, and that of his Cistercian followers, was the Song of Songs. He wrote many homilies on it, which were gathered, after his death, into an impressive commentary, where the final expression of Cistercian “nuptial mysticism” can be found. In its essence, it draws the ultimate conclusions of the biblical statement that God is Love (1 J 4,8). Bernard calls love the law (lex) that is the internal life of God, and which externalizes itself in the act of creation. It is total love, all-encompassing, available to everyone, almighty, salvific and beatifying. Man has a special place on this scale of love, as he is a rational and free being created in the image and likeness of God. This 'imago' and 'similitudo Dei' entails above all the possibility of love.
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Koncepcja mistycznej miłości św. Bernarda stała się słynna jeszcze w XII wieku i zyskała licznych zwolenników, z których przede wszystkim należy wymienić pierwszego biografa Bernarda, Wilhelma z Saint-Thierry. Doktryna ta miała też swoich przeciwników, do których zaliczał się przede wszystkim Piotr Abelard, zarzucający jej egoizm i usiłujący przeciwstawić jej swoją koncepcję miłości bezinter esownej. W pismach św. Bernarda uzyskują pewną postać spójnej jedności wpływy greckiego platonizmu z pism Pseudo-Dionizego oraz wpływy platonizmu zachodniego w wersji św. Augustyna. Wyraźnym novum jest to akcent, który pada na wolność. Cysters wyraźnie stwierdza, że miłość rodzi się z wolności; warunkiem jej zapoczątkowania jest właśnie wolność, polegająca na odrzuceniu zniewalającego człowieka strachu lub równie obezwładniającej pożądliwości. Co więcej, ta wolność woli (liberum arbitrum) stanowi o godności człowieka. Dignitatem in homine liberum arbitrium dico – ta formuła z "De diligendo Deo" przypomina bardzo określenia godności, jakie znajdujemy u renesansowych humanistów, takich jak chociażby Coluccio Salutati, Marsilio Ficino, Mikołaj z Kuzy, Petro Pomponazzi, Carolus Bovillus, Erazm z Rotterdamu, a przede wszystkim Giovanni Pico della Mirandola. Doktrynę miłości opata z Jasnej Doliny możemy określić mianem mistycznej, gdyż odnosi się ona wyłącznie do Boga, dokonuje się dla Boga i dzięki Bogu. Można też powiedzieć, że była to „mistyka miłosna”. Z tego też względu ulubionym przedmiotem komentarzy Bernarda, a następnie jego cysterskich kontynuatorów, była Pieśń nad pieśniami. Sam Bernard przez całe życie pisał homilie na jej temat, skomponowane już po jego śmierci w imponujący komentarz. Tam też znajduje się ostateczny wyraz cysterskiej „mistyki oblubieńczej”. W swej istocie stanowi ona wyprowadzenie ostatecznych konsekwencji z biblijnego stwierdzenia, że Bóg jest miłością (1 J 4,8). Bernard nazywa miłość „prawem” (lex), które jest wewnętrznym życiem Boga i które uzewnętrznia się w akcie stwórczym. Jest to miłość totalna, wszystko ogarniająca, wszystkim dostępna, wszechmogąca, zbawcza i uszczęśliwiająca. Szczególne miejsce na tej skali miłości ma człowiek, byt rozumny i wolny, stworzony na obraz i podobieństwo Boga. W tym 'imago' i 'similitudo Dei' zawiera się przede wszystkim możność miłowania.
Thomistic personalism against modernand postmodern anthropologySummaryThe article is divided into four parts which discuss the following subjects:1) Anthropology of the late 19th and mid-19th century – consisting in the evolutionaryunderstanding of not only the genesis of man but also his personality,psyche, culture and morality. This approach contrasted with the Thomistictheory of man as a person, which was developed also at this time. Man understoodas a person can be characterized by the intellectual perception ofthe surrounding reality, the freedom to act, and the love for others which goesbeyond purely physical relations. A human being understood in such a waystands in opposition to every form of reductionism: biological, sociological,cultural, economic, and legal. Man as a person grows above the physical, alsoabove his body which – despite being an integral part of human existence –does not fall within the definition of a person. According to this view, mancannot be reduced to his body, which is obvious, but also carnality does notconstitute a central theme of anthropology, that being a person. As a consequence,the problem of the origin of the body becomes secondary and fromthis perspective, even the acceptance of the evolutionary origin of the bodilyorgans does not constitute a ground for negating the creative role of God inthe formation of man.2) Anthropology of postmodernism is characterized by the “fluidity” of thedefinition of man. This is caused by the “contingency” of man, which pointsto individuality, diversity and lack of one metaphysics that could cover allobjects. A postmodern man believes in historicism (looking at phenomenafrom the point of view of their historical evolution) and nominalism (thereare only individuals and their conventional names), so he can abandon anymetanarrative attempts to describe the essence of things. He creates hisown language of metaphors which he can use absolutely freely. Accordingto the theory of man as a person, postmodernism appears as a reaction to thebiological and socio-cultural reductionism that the science of the 19th and20th century – with its scientism and technocracy – offered to man. It seemsthat in this context one can pay attention to the typical characteristics of a person (constitutiva personae), such as individuality, intellectual characterand freedom of the human being, which all give rise to its subjectivity andfar-reaching autonomy.3) Anthropology of transhumanism advocates the widespread use of medicalscience (including manipulation of the DNA code) and advanced technologyin human development, leading to the transformation of man into theposthuman and beginning a new epoch of history called posthumanism.Posthumans will be beings with far greater capabilities than human beingstoday. In a discussion with transhumanism, the article referred to the fundamentalparadigms of philosophical thinking – Platonism and Aristotelianism.It was considered that transhumanism is a form of Platonism with itsdream of making man angelic or divine. It results from the concept of manas only the set of attributes and relations “mechanically” added to each other.According to Aristotelianism, the form of human being is immutable in itsessence, and it is only the properties and relationships of a human being thatchange. The Thomistic theory of a person belongs to a group of philosophiesoriginating from the Aristotelian school and – allowing for a great variabilityof features and relationships – it does not consider them to be able to changetheir subject – a human being into something else.4) Social philosophers and philosophical sociologists record a number of negativeanthropological phenomena related to the already existing postmodernand transhumanist “project”. These include primarily nihilism, scientism,materialism, and identity loss, all of which results in the infantilization ofthe human culture, and – in the economic field – in the economy of excessand lack, i.e. the continuous deepening of financial differences (fortificationsof the rich and ghettos of the poor), while in the area of health it leads to thedeterioration of the mental condition of man. It is suggested that the subjectiveand personal approach to man be opposed to extreme scientism, nihilism andthe objective and utilitarian use of man for the benefit and pleasure. Findingoneself as a person can be a way for people to get to know themselves andovercome a deepening identity crisis. Emphasizing the dignity of the personand concern for the common good may be an attempt to leave the civilizationof excess and lack. Establishing personal relationships and caring for otherscan inhibit the breakdown of interpersonal relationships, loneliness and theloss of a sense of security, and it may help improve the deteriorating spiritualcondition of the postmodern human.
The „second way” in the famous third article of Summa theologiae most closelycorresponds to all of Thomas’s own investigation into the existence of God. Onseveral occasions, when referring to its conclusion („there is a first effective cause”),Aquinas adds that the first cause is its own esse. The attributes of God are the consequencesof His structure as the esse itself. The first is that God is a one-elementbeing, in which existence is the only ontic material, and it has the nature of an act.It follows that existence is identified with an essence of God, His nature, life andall that God can be predicted („divinity” – deitas). God is understood to be thecause of all other beings, and He is not caused. This is what we call „subsistence”(ipsum subsistens). God’s immutability and eternity are simple consequences of Hissubsistent existence. God’s infinity and omnipresence are the derivative attributesof His existence. The whole group of such attributes can be recognized as theconsequences of his structure of the subsistent act of existence.The second group of attributes of God is the attributes which manifest theexistence of being. As such, they concern every being. However, the existence ofGod has absolute character as well as its attributes which manifest the existence.In relation to God, Thomas mentions here such attributes as the good, the truth, theunity, but there is no doubt that we can attribute to God the rest of transcendentals:reality, distinctiveness and beauty. Aquinas – basing here on metaphysical principleof proportionality of cause and effect – sees the source of perfection in God. Fromthis perspective we can talk about the personal nature of God, that is, His reasoning,freedom and love. Also, Thomas does not reject the existential perspective. Withinits framework, he solved the paradox of the omnipotence of God (can God createsomething more perfect than Himself?). Aquinas associates the concept of God’somnipotence with existence and states that it consists in the possibility of creatingevery being that can exist. This means that God does not contribute contradictoryontological internal structures.Thus, we can say that Thomas Aquinas in Summa theologiae outlines a coherentand quite complete conception of the essence of God, which is built within hisexistential theory of existence.
Książka Anny Mandreli dotyczy filozofii tomistycznej w wersji Reginalda Garrigou-Lagrange’a, skonfrontowanej z ujęciami Piotra Teilharda de Chardin. Z początku czytelnika może dziwić tak niezwykłe zestawienie całkowicie różnych postaci, jednak po bliższym przyjrzeniu się rozprawie trzeba uznać trafność tego wyboru, gdyż tomizm Garrigou-Lagrande’a był zdecydowane polemiczny. Artykuł jest naukową recenzją książki: Anna Mandrela, Tomizm Garrigou-Lagrange’a wobec wizji filozoficznej Teilharda de Chardin, Kraków 2018, stron 249.
The answer to the question what being means for Thomas Aquinas in his Summa contra Gentiles is: a composition of existence and essence. Such definition refers in a way (analogously) even to God because Thomas Aquinas says that in the case of God essence is existence, thus expressing the one-elementality and simplicity of His structure. All other beings are composed of existence as an act and essence as potency. Therefore, existence and essence are being’s principles and their relation is like that of act and potency. Existence makes being exist and essence determines what it is. The concept of being according to St. Thomas Aquinas is usually rightly associated with Aristotle’s metaphysics. Thomas Aquinas adopted from Aristotle the concept of act and potency but his view on the structure of being was different than that of the philosopher, who considered form and matter as being’s principles. Together they constituted being understood as what something is. In this structure, form was the act shaping it and matter was potency being shaped. Their effects were limited to determining the identity of being, that is, whether or not it is. Thomas Aquinas recognized that the first principle of being must be the factor that makes being real and only then can one speak of its identity. That is why he proclaimed that the basic structure of being is: existence as the cause of the reality of being and essence as the cause of its identity. Thomas’ proposal is thus different metaphysics than Aristotle’s “first philosophy.” Therefore, Thomism is not Aristotelianism. Composition of form and matter applies to the essence of material beings, determining what they are, i.e. their identity. Thus, one can say that form is an essential act, and matter is essential potency. Therefore, it can be further stated that Aristotle’s metaphysics is a theory of being as essence while Thomas Aquinas’ metaphysics would be the theory of existing being. Thus, it is right to call Stagirite’s approach essentialism in contrast to Thomas’ existential metaphysics
The term “nature” in the Middle Ages was used (not to say: overused) commonly to denote a lot of things, often mutually exclusive. The source of this confusion seems, at least in the thirteenth century, the “educational” heritage of Boethius, from whom the divisions of nature and the Aristotle’s metaphysics were taught. They were studied diligently at the beginning of this century. Analyzing the views of nature in the texts of Saint. Thomas, it’s hard not to get the impression that Aquinas is not talking much about it. Not only does he not incorporate the concept of nature into his existential metaphysics, but he does not even do anything to sort out the terminological confusion that Aristotle and Boethius have introduced to the problems of nature. Calling „natural” the things that are mutually exclusive is causing trouble to himself. In the Treatise of Man he recognizes reason and the freedom resulting from it as the most important distinguishing features of a human being. As far as the freedom derives from rationality, obviously state of slave is totally unnatural. However, in the Treatise on Marriage, Thomas writes about slavery as a punishment imposing for original sin, which has been prescribed by law, but comes from natural law, as something determined from the determining.
Liber de causis, à savoir Le Livre des Causes c’est une suite d’extraits d’Éléments de théologie de Proclos commentés par un auteur arabe anonyme. Traduit du latin par Gérard de Crémone avant l’an 1187 ce texte était jusqu'à la parution en 1272 de son commentaire effectué par Thomas d’Aquin, attribué à Aristote. Le texte en version arabe a paru probablement à Toledo au début du XIIe siècle ou peut-être encore plus tôt à « l’époque des traductions » initiée par le calife abbasside al-Mamun, fondateur de la « Maison de la sagesse » à Bagdad (vers 830). Pourtant ce n’est pas ça ce qui est le plus important – la grande « carrière » de ce texte résultait du fait que l’on avait attribué à Aristote même. Dans ce fait il n’y aurait rien de spécial si on ne savait pas que le véritable auteur des idées contenues dans Liber de causis – Proclos (412–485) était l’un des plus éminents philosophes néoplatoniciens, disciple de Plutarque, réformateur de l’Académie de Platon, bref quelqu’un se situant presque aux antipodes du Lycée d’Aristote. La genèse de Liber de causis et de son commentaire Thomasien influence le texte. En effet, la philosophie que nous découvrons dans ce texte est extraordinaire. Dans la première couche, celle de Proclos, nous retrouvons le classique néoplatonisme grec, polythéiste et radicalement païen, mais considérablement émoussé par le choix approprié de thèses de Stoichéosis theologiké et le commentaire arabe écrit dans un ésprit monothéiste et créationniste. C’est ce texte néoplatonicien que commente par le suite Thomas d’Aquin – le plus célèbre partisan de l’école d’Aristote au Moyen Age, à qui la doctrine contenue dans Liber de causis devrait être extrêmement étrangère. Thomas ne le dissimule pas en exposant dans l’introduction ses constatations concernant l’attribution de Liber de causis. Néanmoins, il trouve dans le Livre des questions qui l’intéressent. L’une des questions qui intéressent Aquinate est sûrement la problématique d’esse – de l’existence. Aquinate interprète esse du Livre des causes dans l’esprit de sa propre métaphysique ce qui nous apporte la couche suivante du texte – philosophique. Il est pourtant très rare que l’on puisse en un seul texte passer par plusieurs sphères de la pensée et de la langue ainsi que quelques frontières qui les séparent. Nous pouvons aussi examiner comment la problématique qui nous intéresse se transformait depuis la classique version grecque dans Stoichéiosis theologiké de Proclos, à travers les transformations d’un auteur arabe anonyme dans Liber de causis, jusqu'à la version de Thomas d’Aquin dans son commentaire latin. Nous avons aussi « chemin faisant » deux, peut-être trois traductions de l’œuvre de Proclos : du grec à l’arabe (il n’est pas exclu que « entre » elles il existait aussi une version syrienne) et ensuite une traduction de l’arabe au latin (et une version polonaise du latin).
Gilsonowska koncepcja historii filozofii, określana jest też mianem „filozoficznej” koncepcji historii filozofii. Wynika bowiem z przekonania, że dzieje filozofii mają swój filozoficzny sens. Polega ona zatem na badaniu właśnie problematyki filozoficznej w dziejach filozofii z akcentem na położonym na jej filozoficzności, a nie historyczności. Tak rozumiana historia filozofii należy do dyscyplin filozoficznych, a nie historycznych. Z tego punktu widzenia też odkreśla się specyficznie filozoficzne kompetencje historyka filozofii, uzupełnione dodatkowo o określony warsztat historyczny. Z tego punktu widzenia możemy wyróżnić cztery badań historyczno-filozoficznych: nurt edytorski (chodzi o krytyczne wydawanie tekstów); nurt badań nad dziejami piśmiennictwa filozoficznego; nurt interpretacyjny, dotyczący autorów; nurt interpretacyjny, dotyczący problemów filozoficznych. Każdy z tych nurtów charakteryzuje się odmiennym przedmiotem i własną metodologią. Z tych rozważań wynikają dwa wnioski praktyczne. Pierwszy z nich dotyczy kolejności badań historyczno-filozoficznych. Ta kolejność jest specyficzna, gdyż warunkiem koniecznym każdego z etapów jest dokonanie poprzedniego. Nie może być bowiem odpowiedzialnej interpretacji problemów filozoficznych, szczególnie w takiej wersji, jaką zaproponował Gilson, czyli badania ich źródeł i konsekwencji, jeśli nie będziemy mieli solidnej wiedzy o filozofach, które te problemy formułowali. To zaś wszystko wiemy z tekstów, wobec czego musimy dysponować zarówno poprawną ich wersją, jak i znać związaną z nimi historię. Drogi wniosek praktyczny dotyczy samego historyka filozofii – jego warsztatu i kompetencji. Wydaje się, że muszą być to przede wszystkim kompetencje filozoficzne, uzupełnione o warsztat historyczny i ewentualnie dodatkowe umiejętności, związane z charakterem wykonywanej pracy (językowe, techniczne). Wynika więc z tego, że historyk filozofii jest przede wszystkim filozofem, a historia filozofii jest bardziej filozofią niż historią.
The notion of history of philosophy is initiated by Bocheński by presentation of the notion of history itself which, according to him for the fact of treating the past („that what happened”), has two meanings: subject meaning (past events) and object meaning (historiosophy). Both of them can be further divided into two parts: history of facts and history of doctrines. History of philosophy is a typical history of doctrines. The second element of the name „history of philosophy”- which is philosophy-is etymologically linked to wisdom, present in numerous meanings: in antiquity its was simply a synonim of science. In the Middle Ages we observe division of human knowledge to revealed knowledge and natural knowledge, the latter one, in its aspect of exploring the ultimate principles and causes is called philosophy. In modern times philosophy was questioned at all or the entire science was included in its scope. For that reason Bocheński establishes the set of topics which are constantly present in the history of philosophy and which can be classified as strictly philosophical issues. They are: 1) the question of cognition (can we cognize truth?); 2) the question of science; 3) ontological issues (universalities, existence or non-existence of plurality); 4) questions of relation of science and psychic; 5) axiological issues (ethics, esthetics, philosophy of religion); 6) the question of absolute (God, eternal matter). Bocheński stresses that questions proper to philosophy can not be classified as one of the science and, what is more, contemporary methodology of science will rather not change this situation. Striking in that presentation is the lack of issues regarding philosophy of being (existence, essence, substance, accidental properties, relations, causes) with little exemption of philosophy of being inc-luded in the question of absolute. When it comes to division of history of philosophy, we may say that according to Bocheński it should follow analogically the traditional division of the European history such as classic, medieval, modern and contemporary times
Już kilka razy w „Roczniku Tomistycznym” pojawiały się recenzje opracowań, wydanych w ramach projektu badawczego zatytułowanego „Polska filozofia chrześcijańska” poświęconego najwybitniejszym postaciom filozofii w Polsce w XX i XXI wieku.
Książka Bartłomieja Krzycha jest pierwszym tak obszernym opracowaniem poglądów przede wszystkim filozoficznych ks. Augustyna Jakubisiaka, polskiego filozofia, pracującego i działającego we Francji, twórcy koncepcji ontologicznej, nazywanej konkretyzmem oraz intersującej koncepcji wolności osoby ludzkiej pomiędzy determinizmem i indeterminizmem, którą nazwał autodeterminizmem.
Książka Anny Mandreli dotyczy filozofii tomistycznej w wersji Reginalda Garrigou-Lagrange’a, skonfrontowanej z ujęciami Piotra Teilharda de Chardin. Z początku czytelnika może dziwić tak niezwykłe zestawienie całkowicie różnych postaci, jednak po bliższym przyjrzeniu się rozprawie trzeba uznać trafność tego wyboru, gdyż tomizm Garrigou-Lagrande’a był zdecydowane polemiczny. Artykuł jest naukową recenzją książki: Anna Mandrela, Tomizm Garrigou-Lagrange’a wobec wizji filozoficznej Teilharda de Chardin, Kraków 2018, stron 249.
Józef Bocheński was born on 30th August 1902. He graduated from the Secondary School in 1920 and immediately after the final exam (matura) he joined the 8th Ulhan (light cavalry) Regiment and took part in a final part of a Polish-Bolshevik war. After the war, in 1922, he joined studies in law at the University of Lwów and after two years he attended the University in Poznań in order to study political economy. These studies were interrupted in 1926 when Bocheński joined the Seminary in Poznań which he left when moving to the Dominican novitiate in Cracow. There he adopted names Innocenty Maria. After one year of a novitiate he was sent to philosophical studies at the University in Fribourg in Swizerland, he graduated in 1934 . Two years earlier however, he was ordained a priest and in 1936, along with Jan Salamucha, Franciszek Drewnowski and Bolesław Sobociński, he organised the so called Cracow Circle. After receiving a doctorate in theology he was appointed a professor of logic at Angelicum, and he officially remained there until 1940. In 1938 he got habilitation in philosophy at the Faculty of Theology at the Jagiellonian University in Cracow. Along with the Polish Corpus of Gen. Władysław Anders he took part in the Italian campaigne. He fought in the battle at Monte Cassino (May 1944). After the end of the Second World War he became a professor of philosophy at Fribourg University and remained at that position until the retirement (1945-1972). He occupied a position of a Dean of Faculty of Philosophy (1950-1952) and a Rector. There he initiated soviet studies which brought him recognition and political significance. He visited Poland in 1987 for the first time since he left in 1939. In the next year he was awarded doctorates honoris causa at the Jagiellonian University and at the Academy of Catholic Theology (ATK) in Warsaw. Moreover, during his emigration he co-operated regularly with the Polish University Abroad established in Londyn. He died in Fribourg on 8th February 1995. During his lifetime Józef Bocheński was changing philosopical schools and views. In his youth he was a Kantian, next, he „converted” to neo-Thomism in its most traditional (handbook and essential) version, which actually was more Aristotelian than Thomistic. The next step was an attempt to „modernise” this sort of Thomism by tools of mathematical logic in order to make Thomas - as Bocheński said himself - no longer his „guru”. In the result, Bocheński ceased to explore the problems and style of classical philosophy in favour of analytical mode of philosophying. He himself divided his scientific work into four periods distinguished as follows, according to interest and passions (and views as well) dominated in particular time: 1) neo-Thomistic (1934–1940), 2) historical- logical (1945–1955) 3) sovietological (1955–1970) 4) systematical- logical (1970–1995).
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Z miłością-dilectio, czyli miłością właściwą dla bytów rozumnych, wiązać się będzie w tekstach Tomasza z Akwinu ciekawy i rzadko podejmowany przez tomistów temat aktów woli analogicznych do uczuć, które Tomasz zazwyczaj nazywa affectiones. W ten sposób odróżnia je od uczuć – passiones – które stanowią zareagowanie pożądania zmysłowego na ujęcie w poznaniu zmysłowym takiegoż samego, czyli zmysło-wego, dobra lub zła. Affectiones są reakcjami woli na dobro lub jego brak, czyli zło, ujęte intelektualnie. Jednakże, zgodnie z podstawowymi tezami Tomaszowej antropologii, dotyczącymi duchowo-cielesnej jedności osobowego bytu ludzkiego, tak strukturalnej jak i funkcjonalnej, affectiones zazwyczaj to-warzyszą passiones i – jak się wydaje – albo to one pociągają za sobą zmysły, albo też zmysły skłaniają wolę do skierowania się ku postrzeganemu przez nie dobru. Same affectones są prostsze od uczuć, tak jak wola jest prostszą władzą pożądawczą od appetitus sensitivus – pożądania zmysłowego. Zasługą Akwinaty jest zwrócenie uwagi na różnorodność aktów woli. Miłość-dilectio stanowi simplex motus voluntatis, ale funkcjonując na sposób miłości, wyzwala wszystkie właściwe zareagowania podyktowane stosunkiem pożądania do pożądanego dobra. Pragniemy naszego dobra, gdy jest nieobecne, radujemy się, gdy je posiadamy i smucimy, gdy zostanie utracone. W przypadku człowieka to przeżywanie ma również swój aspekt organiczny. Nie jest on jednak oddzielony od całości ludzkiego compositum. Wola wpływa na uczucia, pociąga je za sobą, wprzęgając w swoje cele. Może być też odwrotnie: wola ulega uczuciom, dążąc swoją mocą do wskazywanych przez nie celów. Wszystkie te trzy sytuacje Tomasz określa mianem affectiones. Oczywiście miano to dotyczy w nich ich wolitywnego komponentu.