Full-text resources of CEJSH and other databases are now available in the new Library of Science.
Visit https://bibliotekanauki.pl

Results found: 7

first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last

Search results

help Sort By:

help Limit search:
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
EN
The article considers the issue of sailing licences which include: a sailor licence, a steersman licence and a captain licence. The legal character of sailing licences and the procedure in which they are issued is analysed. The judicial control of sailing licences is also considered. The granting of a sailing licence is an act confi rming that a person indicated therein has certain qualifi cations required for sailing. The legal character of the licence is similar to an administrative certifi cate. Granting the sailing licence can be conditional upon passing a formal examination by a person requesting the licence to be issued. The examination itself is regarded as an administrative act in law. The study proves that the Polish Sailing Association performs a function of a public administration unit issuing sailing licences. This means that it acts as a an administrative body in a functional dimension.The sailing licence is granted in the form of a declarative decision issued by the Polish Sailing Association. The proceeding for issuing such a decision is an administrative proceedings governed by the Code of Administrative Proceedings. The actions of the Polish Sailing Association as well as its failure to act are controlled by administrative courts.
EN
The right to education which is guaranteed in Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 to the European Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms is deemed to be fundamental, and provides grounds for formulating the rights of an individual and, corresponding to them, duties of a public government. The right to education includes 3 elements: the right to access the existing institutions and learning programs, the right to receive real and effective education, and the right to have the education completed within the existing recognised educational systems. These three rights also refer to higher education, including the private one, at all levels: bachelor studies, master studies and doctoral studies. As can be noticed in the ECHR decisions, access to education can never be limited on the grounds that are illegal, arbitral, irrational or simply discriminatory. This access must be framed and realised in a manner respecting the principle of equality, which follows from the conviction that everyone is entitled to have not only access to education but also to have this access provided on the same terms as it is provided to all individuals in an analogical situation. The similarity in this context is measured i.a. by comparing the levels of candidates’ capabilities and qualifications, which constitute a justified and objective set of criteria. These directives were taken into consideration in the judgment of the ECHR of 2 of April 2013 in the case of Tarantino and others v. Italy. The Tribunal has ruled that the Italian regulation introducing the limit of admissions (numerus clausus) in higher education is in accordance with the right to education stated in the Convention. It was recognised that making the admission to the higher education conditional on the intellectual capabilities of a candidate is justified and consistent with the essence of the right to education. The Tribunal’s ruling has a substantial importance for Polish regulations which are similar to those in the analysed case under consideration. The remarks made by the ECHR exceed the issue of numerous clauses and address the whole substance of the right to education, including the right to gain benefits of education or the influence of the conditions of the access to education on the nature of the right stated in the Article 2.
PL
Gwarantowane przez art. 2 Protokołu nr 1 do Europejskiej Konwencji Praw Człowieka i Podstawowych Wolności prawo do nauki (edukacji, kształcenia, oświaty, wykształcenia) uznawane jest za fundamentalne. Daje ono podstawy do formułowania praw jednostki i – odpowiadających im – obowiązków władz publicznych. Wskazane prawo obejmuje trzy elementy: prawo dostępu do istniejących instytucji i programów nauczania, prawo do uzyskiwania realnego i efektywnego nauczania oraz prawo do uznania wykształcenia już zdobytego w ramach istniejących systemów nauczania. Odnosi się ono także do szkolnictwa wyższego, w tym prywatnego, i dotyczy wszystkich trzech szczebli: studiów licencjackich, magisterskich oraz doktoranckich. Jak zauważa się w orzecznictwie Europejskiego Trybunału Praw Człowieka (ETPCz), dostęp do nauki nie może nigdy zostać ograniczony na podstawie powodów sprzecznych z prawem, arbitralnych, nieracjonalnych lub dyskryminacyjnych. Musi być on ujęty i realizowany przy poszanowaniu zasady równości, gdyż każdemu przysługuje nie tylko dostęp do nauki, ale też taki sam dostęp i na tych samych warunkach, jaki mają inni znajdujący się w analogicznej sytuacji. Analogiczność tę mierzy się zaś między innymi poziomem zdolności i kwalifikacji kandydatów, bo są to kryteria uzasadnione i o obiektywnym charakterze. Z uwzględnieniem tych dyrektyw zapadł wyrok ETPCz z 2 kwietnia 2013 r. w sprawie Tarantino i inni przeciwko Włochom, w którym sąd strasburski stwierdził zgodność regulacji wprowadzających limit miejsc (numerus clausus) w szkolnictwie wyższym z konwencyjnym prawem do nauki. Uznał on uzależnienie wstępu na studia od warunków intelektualnych kandydata za uzasadnione i zgodne z treścią prawa do nauki. Rozstrzygnięcie Trybunału ma istotne znaczenie dla regulacji polskich, które są analogiczne do analizowanych we wskazanej sprawie. Uwagi poczynione przez ETPCz wykraczają jednak poza ten problem, odnosząc się do całokształtu prawa do nauki, w tym do prawa czerpania korzyści z wykształcenia czy wpływu na prawo do nauki warunków jego pobierania. Omawiany wyrok stanowi zatem wskazówkę do analizy uregulowań rodzimych.
Radca Prawny
|
2022
|
vol. 31
|
issue 2
307-320
EN
The subject of this article is the status of the self-government of attorneys-at-law analysed in the light of the Code of Administrative Procedure from the perspective of addressing complaints, requests, and petitions. The analysis leads to the conclusion that based on the Code of Administrative Procedure, the self-government of attorneys-at-law is a social organization. Thus, its bodies are the bodies of a social organization, unless they handle administrative cases. The paper distinguishes four categories of situations connected with the application of the provisions on complaints and petitions as part of the activities of the self-government of attorneys-at-law.
Radca Prawny
|
2022
|
vol. 31
|
issue 2
95-108
EN
The subject of this article is the status of the self-government of attorneys-at-law analysed in the light of the Code of Administrative Procedure from the perspective of addressing complaints, requests, and petitions. The analysis leads to the conclusion that based on the Code of Administrative Procedure, the self-government of attorneys-at-law is a social organization. Thus, its bodies are the bodies of a social organization, unless they handle administrative cases. The paper distinguishes four categories of situations connected with the application of the provisions on complaints and petitions as part of the activities of the self-government of attorneys-at-law.
PL
Przedmiotem artykułu jest status samorządu radców prawnych, analizowany w świetle Kodeksu postępowania administracyjnego z perspektywy rozpatrywania skarg, wniosków i petycji. Analiza prowadzi do wniosku, że na gruncie Kodeksu postępowania administracyjnego samorząd radców prawnych jest organizacją społeczną. Tym samym jego organy są organami organizacji społecznej, chyba że załatwiają sprawy administracyjne. W opracowaniu wyróżniono 4 kategorie sytuacji związanych ze stosowaniem przepisów o skargach i wnioskach w ramach działalności samorządu radców prawnych.
EN
The article discusses the scope of application of the Code of Administrative Proceedings in the supervisory proceedings conducted by the voivod on acts of local government bodies. This issue is examined in the context of given by the Code of Administrative Proceedings guarantees of procedural fairness and self-reliance of local governments. The article analyses also the elements of described proceedings conducted by the voivod and practical problems connected with it, especially for the administrative courts.
EN
The paper concerns the application of illegal regulations by public administration authorities. This issue is presented in relation to regulations introduced to prevent the spread of COVID-19. The authors believe that the adoption of these regulations and their application prove that ‘the real constitution’ – as it was described by Ferdinand Lassalle – prevails over the written constitution, which in practice becomes only a ‘piece of paper’. The analysis leads to the conclusion that the epidemic regulations were enacted in clear violation of law as they: (i) crossed the limits of statutory delegation; (ii) violated the constitutional principle of the exclusivity of the statute on limiting civil rights and freedoms; and (iii) violated the constitutional prohibition against impairing the essence of rights and freedoms. Therefore, the public administration authorities should refuse their application. The authorities must observe the hierarchical rule regarding the sources of law. Consequently, they have to refuse the application of every regulation which manifestly violates a statute, a treaty or the Constitution. In cases other than a direct contradiction between the regulation and the higher-level source of law, in order to decide whether there is indeed a manifest violation, the authorities should refer to case law (consuetudo secundum legem principle) or the opinio communis of legal scholars. Moreover, applying a regulation despite the fact that it manifestly violates a statute, a treaty or the Constitution leads to the criminal liability of a public office-holder (e.g. an official, a police officer) under Article 231 of the Polish Criminal Code.
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
JavaScript is turned off in your web browser. Turn it on to take full advantage of this site, then refresh the page.