The topic of this essay is an analysis of perceptual experience based on the effort to define its primitive component. Sensations as discussed in the article are considered to be elementary units of the perceptual experience. Although Russell’s concept of sense-data seems to be highly problematic, it provides rich material for analysis of direct perceptual experience. By looking behind Russell’s metaphysically burdened understanding of sense-data as an objective basis of perceptual experience, we can get more plausible picture of the immediate perceptual experience. Lively debate on direct perceptual experience as a source of knowledge raises the question of how far can be analyzed the experience itself. This paper tries to define the primitive component of subjective perceptual experience that is made up of sensations and the act of sensation exclusively. These sensations are units being closest to the real world. They are nonconceptual, experiential, immediately accessible and uncorrectable.
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