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Plato – The Motto of Delphi of the Alcibiades I: Between Emphases and Retractions of the Socratics?

100%
Mazzara G.
Peitho. Examina Antiqua
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2014
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vol. 5
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issue 1
13-42
EN
The present article aims to examine whether this Platonic dialogue can be regarded as polemical and competing with the similar educational proposals put forward by Xenophon and Antisthenes for the young  Alcibiades aspiring to power in the city of Athens. The present article has been divided into two major parts. In the first one, I propose to unify the two opposing points of view that are reflected in the interpretations of the motto: the one that takes it to be a solitary dialogue of a soul talking to itself (Platonic origin) and the one that takes it to be an intersubjective dialogue (Socratic origin). In the second part, I try to highlight a few points of contact and conflict between Plato, Xenophon and Antisthenes, arguing that it is the latter two that may be alluded to in the dialogue, albeit indirectly, as competing and polemical targets.
IT
The present article aims to examine whether this Platonic dialogue can be regarded as polemical and competing with the similar educational proposals put forward by Xenophon and Antisthenes for the young Alcibiades aspiring to power in the city of Athens. The present article has been divided into two major parts. In the first one, I propose to unify the two opposing points of view that are reflected in the interpretations of the motto: the one that takes it to be a solitary dialogue of a soul talking to itself (Platonic origin) and the one that takes it to be an intersubjective dialogue (Socratic origin). In the second part, I try to highlight a few points of contact and conflict between Plato, Xenophon and Antisthenes, arguing that it is the latter two that may be alluded to in the dialogue, albeit indirectly, as competing and polemical targets.
2
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Platone, Prm. 133b4-c1 / 134e9-135b2. Quali logoi nella gumnasia per un tis refrattario alla persuasione e sensibile alle contraddizioni come Antistene?

100%
Mazzara G.
Peitho. Examina Antiqua
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2022
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vol. 13
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issue 1
83-124
EN
In this study, I show how Plato in the Parmenides reprises the encounter with the Phaedo’s Antisthenes, whom I elsewhere assumed to be one of the various tis that get examined in the dialogue. Now, with the Parmenides’ tis, a similar situation arises: this Antisthenes embodies such characteristics as being “an expert in many areas”, “not without natural gifts” and “capable of following with critical intelligence” the logoi taken from “distant premises.” In the four logoi of the gumnasia, I highlight how Plato, in developing his exercise, proceeds on his own way without openly arguing with any tis and how, despite his detached attitude, his hodos, while interweaving with that of his colleague Antisthenes, enters into a conflict. I then demonstrate how the two paths, despite having a common aporetic beginning (the objections of Gorgias to Parmenides and the testimony of Proclus against Antisthenes), at times overlap and at times are mutually exclusive. From this, I also argue that whoever wrote the dialogue must have been aware that the path, although apparently linear and rectilinear, was in fact bumpy and tortuous.
3
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Plato: Smp. 212e4-223a9. Alcibiades: An Eulogy of Which Socrates? That of Plato, That of Antisthenes and Xenophon or That of All Three?

100%
Mazzara G.
Peitho. Examina Antiqua
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2016
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vol. 7
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issue 1
25-54
EN
In the Symposium, there are two revelations: one is that of the woman of Mantinea, the other that of Alcibiades. The former (201d 1–212e 3) proposes a Socrates reshaped by Plato, but what Socrates does the latter (216a 6–217a 3) express? Can the praise for Socrates contained in the latter also be considered a tribute by Plato to his teacher? The opinions are divided. I looked at two scholars: Michel Narcy (2008) and Bruno Centrone (20142), whose judgments, as they are set out and argued, are irreconcilable. The contrast may be determined by a certain ambiguity in Plato’s attitude towards Alcibiades. Part One – In order to clarify this ambiguity and to overcome the contrast between the two scholars I have tried to show how in the praise of Alcibiades there overlap different portraits of Socrates that refer to the tradition, to different experiences of various Socratics and of Plato himself in Apologia, and how this differs from the others and from himself by proposing a whole new portrait of Socrates as a representative of an Eros megas daimōn, revealed by the woman of Mantinea, in contrast to an Eros megas theos. Part Two – As instead regards the accusation of hybris, the hypothesis is this: for Plato his colleagues, and especially Antisthenes and Xenophon, offering an image of Socrates founded exclusively on his way of life and not also on the erotic aspects alluding to the super-sensible world, seem to end up arousing laughter and looking like “fools” (nēpioi), like Alcibiades, who at the end of his speech, after making the audience laugh, is unmasked by Socrates for his clumsy attempt to impart a “life lesson” to Agathon, which he did not need at all, paying at his own expenses for his ignorance of the revelation through arriving late at the party.
IT
In the Symposium, there are two revelations: one is that of the woman of Mantinea, the other that of Alcibiades. The former (201d 1–212e 3) proposes a Socrates reshaped by Plato, but what Socrates does the latter (216a 6–217a 3) express? Can the praise for Socrates contained in the latter also be considered a tribute by Plato to his teacher? The opinions are divided. I looked at two scholars: Michel Narcy (2008) and Bruno Centrone (20142 ), whose judgments, as they are set out and argued, are irreconcilable. The contrast may be determined by a certain ambiguity in Plato’s attitude towards Alcibiades. Part One – In order to clarify this ambiguity and to overcome the contrast between the two scholars I have tried to show how in the praise of Alcibiades there overlap different portraits of Socrates that refer to the tradition, to different experiences of various Socratics and of Plato himself in Apologia, and how this differs from the others and from himself by proposing a whole new portrait of Socrates as a representative of an Eros megas daimōn, revealed by the woman of Mantinea, in contrast to an Eros megas theos. Part Two – As instead regards the accusation of hybris, the hypothesis is this: for Plato his colleagues, and especially Antisthenes and Xenophon, offering an image of Socrates founded exclusively on his way of life and not also on the erotic aspects alluding to the supersensible world, seem to end up arousing laughter and looking like “fools” (nēpioi), like Alcibiades, who at the end of his speech, after making the audience laugh, is unmasked by Socrates for his clumsy attempt to impart a “life lesson” to Agathon, which he did not need at all, paying at his own expenses for his ignorance of the revelation through arriving late at the party.
4
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Plato and Antisthenes in the Phaedo: A Reflexive Reading. Part Two

100%
Mazzara G.
Peitho. Examina Antiqua
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2020
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vol. 11
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issue 1
33-66
PL
The purpose of this study is not so much to show the presence of Antisthenes in the dialogue, but rather to examine that to which Plato alludes. The controversy over ideas between the two Socratics is histori­cally very well-attested, as can already be seen in the Cratylus. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that this controversy must have affected Plato when he was writing the Phaedo: a dialogue in which the importance of ideas and his new logic is undeniable. Hence, this paper will investigate the following question: what impact could Antisthenes’ denominative and definitory logic have on the equally denominative and definitory logic presented in the Phaedo, given that the latter work in all prob­ability preceded the Sathōn? In light of what is said in the dialogue, the answer focuses primarily on what would not be said. Thus, this study is divided into two parts: Part one shows how the so-called “second navigation” emerges as an objection to the insufficiency of the responses given by the physiologists. Tellingly, certain “common opinions” are regarded as perplexing and individuals holding them are referred to with the indeterminate tis, which – as is argued – must have included Antisthenes. Indeed, Tht. 108c7–8 reports the latter to have made common opinions a cornerstone of his denominative logic. Part two, on the other hand, is devoted to examining the so-called “final argument.” Here, Antisthenes’ presence seems somewhat more nuanced, given his incomplete knowledge of the new logic of irreversible opposites which was worked out by Plato for the purpose of demonstrating the immor­tality and indestructibility of the soul. On the other hand, Antisthenes is likely to have prompted Plato to specify the relationship between ideas and things in the definitory logic, since the proponent of the theory of oikeios logos refused to distinguish between the substance and its attrib­utes, the differences and their opposites, and the opposites of opposites.
5
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Plato and Antisthenes in the Phaedo: A Reflexive Reading. Part One

100%
Mazzara G.
Peitho. Examina Antiqua
|
2019
|
vol. 10
|
issue 1
13-44
EN
The purpose of this study is not so much to show the presence of Antisthenes in the dialogue, but rather to examine what Plato alludes to. The controversy over ideas between the two Socratics is historically very well-attested, as can already be seen in the Cratylus. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that this controversy must have affected Plato when he was writing a dialogue in which the importance of ideas and his new logic is undeniable. Hence, this paper will investigate the following question: what impact could Antisthenes’ denominative and definitory logic have on the equally denominative and definitory logic presented in the Phaedo given that the latter work in all probability preceded the Sathōn? In light of what is said in the dialogue, the answer focuses primarily on what would not be said. Thus, this study has been divided into two parts: Part one shows how the so-called “second navigation” emerges as an objection to the insufficiency of the responses given by the physiologists. Tellingly, certain “common opinions” are regarded as perplexing and individuals holding them are referred to with the indeterminate tis, which – as is argued – must have included Antisthenes. Indeed, Tht. 108c7–8 reports the latter to have made common opinions a cornerstone of his denomi­native logic. Part two, on the other hand, is devoted to examining the so-called “final argument.” Here, Antisthenes’ presence seems some­what more nuanced given his incomplete knowledge of the new logic of irreversible opposites which was worked out by Plato for the purpose of demonstrating the immortality and indestructibility of the soul. On the other hand, Antisthenes is likely to have prompted Plato to specify the relationship between ideas and things in the definitory logic, since the proponent of the theory of oikeios logos refused to distinguish between the substance and its attributes, the differences and its opposites as well as the opposites of opposites.
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