Full-text resources of CEJSH and other databases are now available in the new Library of Science.
Visit https://bibliotekanauki.pl

Results found: 21

first rewind previous Page / 2 next fast forward last

Search results

Search:
in the keywords:  ACTION
help Sort By:

help Limit search:
first rewind previous Page / 2 next fast forward last
EN
In this paper, I argue that activities as crossing the road, riding a bike or going through a door involve body representations with non-conceptual mental content. Firstly, I discuss some key objections to the notion of body representations for action, in order to draw out their main consequences. Then I introduce an approach to the content of body representations involved in the guidance of everyday action, which seems to satisfy crucial demands in exchange for moving away from conceptual views on mental content. I conclude by discussing a potential objection to that proposal and presenting some thoughts on the relationship between conceptual and non-conceptual content in this field.
EN
The author of this article makes an attempt to point out that economy can be seen as an activity in praxiology. Moreover, the author explains the meaning of praxiology, economy and its connection with economics and then analyses some elements of an activity and presents their similarity to the economy. The main intention of the article is to show that achievements of praxiology can be a useful method of improvement in our daily economic life.
Filo-Sofija
|
2010
|
vol. 10
|
issue 1(10)
7-24
EN
The author distinguishes two attitudes toward the world: (1) the attitude of an action which involves engagement, care, values, and interests; (2) the attitude of a distanced observer (i.e. the theoretical-contemplative one). The paper assumes that the attitude of action precedes historically the attitude of observer. The latter has been born in ancient Greece of classical period due to the Platonic philosophy and the overcoming of magic-mythical thought. Since then, although they have changed and developed, both perspectives have been widely present in European culture and therefore should be considered to be a part of European cultural heritage. It is said that European modernism guarantees a coexistence of both attitudes. A modern European, thus, is able to act intentionally as well as to observe his own action from a distance. Modernism implies also an axiological priority of theoretical perspective (identified with the Kantian ‘universal reason’) over the perspective of action which is not free from prejudice. In comparison with earlier periods of European culture, the theoretical-contemplative perspective of Modernism is defined in terms of perception and sensual experience and their further reinterpretations.
EN
Placing Aristotle's ethical works in dialogue with the work of G.E.M. Anscombe, this paper outlines a functional definition of emotions that describes a meta-theory for social-scientific research. Emotions are defined as what makes the thought and action of rational and political animals ethical.
EN
The essay starts with Walter Biemel's report on the introduction of the concept of 'Lebenswelt' by Husserl who, in his lecture in Vienna in 1935, passed from accepting as basic the ideal world of science to stating that this world is grounded in the 'Lebenswelt', the world as we perceive it. The 'Lebenswelt' is for Husserl the topic of phenomenology as a discipline of the spirit - a discipline of a very special, not objectively-logical character. This leads to the problem of historicity, discussed by Ludwig Landgrebe in the context of its end. He argues that history may be understood as history only from the point of view of a teleological principle (Kant's regulative principle of action) mediating between expecting the Last Things and the actual consequences of actions. But this must be connected with understanding time as the time of 'action' as analyzed by Heidegger, not as a continuous linear process directed by causal laws. The continuity of history is achieved by the free actions of people and the unpredictability in question is one of the free actions themselves. An outline of a consistent philosophy of the human person acting and morally developing on the strength of his or her actions has been given by Karol Wojtyla's 'perfectiorism'. Wojtyla stresses as basic the seemingly trivial distinction between a free action and what merely happens in us. Thomistic metaphysics can express both of those dynamisms only by the same terms 'agere-pati'. This is due, argues Wojtyla, to its basically cosmological character. Thus, there exists a tension between the personalistic approach of Thomism and its alleged empiricism. Thomistic philosophy is based, in fact, not on experience as understood by empiricism, but precisely on the exploration of the 'Lebenswelt'; and this field of investigation, being the domain of free action and moral development, i.e. of what is basically human, is not that of scientific theories and demonstrations but one of vision, persuasion, and testimonies.
EN
One of the most original and creative French philosophers, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, who died 50 years ago, still remains to be discovered by contemporary readers. In his philosophical endeavour he developed a thought-provoking conception. Merleau-Ponty was one of the leading figures of the phenomenological movement. In the paper the author would like to draw the readers’ attention to some of his illuminating ideas. The paper mainly focuses on the first period of Merleau-Ponty’s philosophical development in which this outstanding French philosopher elaborated on a still valid idea concerning human action and the mind-body relation.
EN
As it is broadly accepted, typical uses of demonstratives are accompanied by demonstrations. The concept of demonstration, however, manifests the action–product ambiguity analogous to that visible in the opposition between jumping and the resulting jump, talking and the resulting talk or crying and the resulting cry. It is also a heterogeneous concept that enables demonstrations to vary significantly. The present paper discusses action–product ambiguity as applied to demonstrations as well as the heterogeneity of the latter. An account that acknowledges ambiguity and heterogeneity of demonstrations is sketched in the paper. It is argued that it has a rich explanatory and descriptive potential.
8
Content available remote

MORÁLNÍ DŮKAZ EXISTENCE BOHA PODLE KANTA

88%
Studia theologica
|
2012
|
vol. 14
|
issue 1
1–29
EN
Human (non-intuitive) thinking continues either in the order of causality or in the order of finality. The order of causality submits the particular to the universal according to the category of cause, which is ultimately founded on the transcendental subject. The order of finality submits the particular to the universal according to the final end, which is not determined through any category, but freely presupposed through the capacity of judging (Urteilskraft) as the transcendental object (concretely: transcendent person). Neither reflection reaches its ground in the transcendental subject, nor does devotion reach its final end in the transcendental object. Therefore causal thinking achieves things only as appearances (phaenomena); the final judging is open to the noumenal reality, but does not fulfill the conditions of reflection and disappears in the unconsciousness. It is the task of human existence to unite both directions of activity, contemplation and action. This proposition cannot be realized through the power of humanity alone. The presupposition and the aim of the unity of humanity is God. The problem of the existence of God may be placed in these terms. This problem – theoretical and practical – is not only gnoseological, but existential, as well. This paper would like to find certain indications of this direction by Kant himself.
9
Content available remote

Kultura a przyczynowość

88%
Filo-Sofija
|
2011
|
vol. 11
|
issue 1(12)
279-289
EN
The essay addresses the problem of how to link culture and causality. The starting point is an appeal to J. Kmita’s socio-regulative conception of culture where culture is given in terms of the propositional attitudes communally defined. Since human actions are physical events, one can ask if they can enter into the causal relationship with other physical events. The problem is that this relationship is given to an agent through the cultural mediation. The mediation in question is possible due to the symbolic relationship embedded in the so-called symbolic sphere presupposed by Kmita’s conception. The causal relationship is therefore derived from the symbolic relationship. It is also the communal language which expresses the attitudes in question that is of a symbolic nature. Kmita’s conception then allows one to understand not only the communal nature of culture. It also shows how the human beings culturally defined live in a world of causality.
EN
The study aimed at evaluating the influence of various types of mental simulations in goal achievement; process focused, goal (outcome) focused and failure and process focused simulations were investigated. The effectiveness of particular mental simulations was measured in computer task in which respondents were asked to follow the small square figure by the mouse courser on the screen, while the figure was moving in various and unpredictable directions. The indicator of persistence was served by the time devoted for work, measured in minutes. ANOVA analysis revealed main effect at the 'process simulation' level. In detail, subjects devoted significantly more time for executing the task after process focused simulation briefing comparing to all remaining conditions: F(1,32)=14,07; p -lower than 0,0007. The relationship between mental imagery operations and persistence in action showed to be undeniable. Importantly - not every mental simulation can be considered as activity facilitator. Especially goal focused simulations can inhibit the persistence and in consequence deteriorate goal achievement process. The role of failure and process focused simulations requires further investigation and analysis. The results of study above may find many practical applications in various fields of social sciences where increase of motivation to action is important.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2021
|
vol. 76
|
issue 2
125 – 136
EN
This paper applies Arendtian reflections to fundamental aspects of translation. We begin by considering linguistic diversity in connection with Arendt’s notion of human plurality and inquiring what that means for translation. As each person exists only as one of many, each language exists only as one of many languages. As human plurality necessitates mutual understanding among people, linguistic diversity necessitates translation. We go on to explain the relationship between a text and its translation through the concepts of ‘appearance’ and doxa (opinion). If the existence of the world is contingent on plural individuals and their doxa, a text exists fully through its different translations, or appearances of the text via the doxa of different translators. Finally, we analyse the nature of translational practice in terms of ‘labour’, ‘work’ and ‘action’. We argue that the task of the translator should not remain at the level of labour, which is driven solely by the need for survival and self-preservation, nor at the level of work, which serves instrumental purposes; we propose instead that translating should culminate in action, with a keen awareness of others and the good of the entire community.
EN
In the article, the author attempts to compare and confront Daniel Wegner's idea of a conscious will with the selected ethic doctrines in the context of relationship between intention and the moral evaluation of an action. According to the utilitarian doctrine, when one evaluates an action intention should not be considered because only the results of an action are relevant. On the other hand, Kant and the ethics of love for fellowmen claim that intention is a direct cause of action, therefore, it is intention that should really be evaluated. On the basis of Wegner's model of a conscious will, one may state that an utilitarian attitude is more justified in many causes. In the act of volition, intention serves only as a commentary, rather than as a cause (as it is commonly believed). In Wegner's opinion the main role of intention is to explain action in the context of the plans, desires and beliefs of an agent. It is all due to the fact that in social interactions, one should always have the ability to explain one's own behavior: ignorance of the causes of one's behavior is inadmissible in this context (odium of insane action). Moreover, when intention and action match, a specific kind of feeling - phenomenal will - is added to the act of volition. This particular feeling not only strengthens the relationship between intention and action. but it also helps the agent to distinguish his own actions from other actions of other agents. It means that the ultimate form of intention may be completely different from the actual causes of a particular type of behavior.To conclude, due to Wegner's work, the utilitarian doctrine gained strong support for the thesis that intention should not be considered during the moral evaluation of action.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2016
|
vol. 71
|
issue 7
583 – 594
EN
The study offers an interpretation of the political theory of Hannah Arendt identifying it as a specific phenomenological and ontological discourse. It then focuses on the aporia hidden in Hannah Arendt’s concept of political action, i.e. the antinomy between the fleetingness of an action and the identities born from it on one side, and the proclaimed permanency of action and its outcomes on the other. This particular aporia is examined on the background of her description of the loss of the common human world as a consequence of the development of the modern science and technology, the growth of totalitarianism, and the concept of history as outlined in Arendt’s study of American Revolution.
EN
This article focuses on the problems and contradictions of sociological theories of action. It investigates critically the development of the theory of action after the Parsonian synthesis, drawing attention to the limitations of articulating the concept of action systematically within a presuppositional framework of analytical theory. Having exposed Parsons general theory of action and some interpretations and criticisms, the paper addresses the so-called 'return of grand theory', spearheaded in the early 1980s by authors such as Alexander, Habermas, Giddens and Luhmann. The article analyses the conceptual innovations introduced by their theories according to Parsons own definition of theoretical work, which - as he said - consists in reconstruction and transformation of categories in the moments of their failure. While it is argued that sociological theory cannot do away with general concepts, it is also argued that these need not have the form of a synthetic theory of action of the kind outlined by Parsons and the Post-Parsonians.
Studia Psychologica
|
2021
|
vol. 63
|
issue 2
143 – 157
EN
The theory of action versus state orientation suggests that state-oriented people are more susceptible to sunk cost fallacy than action-oriented people because they ruminate about past costs and are reluctant to change their course of actions. However, research on the role of action versus state orientation in sunk cost fallacy is fairly limited. Therefore, the present paper aims to conceptually replicate the seminal study by van Putten et al. (2010) and verify whether action versus state orientation really matters in the susceptibility to sunk cost fallacy. We also examined the role of gender and goal internalization in the susceptibility to sunk cost fallacy. Participants (N = 205) filled an Action Control Scale and solved two sunk cost fallacy tasks in two experimental conditions. In the intrapersonal condition, the sunk costs belonged to a decision-maker. In the intrapersonal condition, an investor was not identical with the decision-maker. Eventually, our study failed to replicate the results of van Putten et al. (2010). Action versus state orientation did not predict the susceptibility to sunk cost fallacy. Moreover, neither gender nor internalization moderated the relationship between action versus state orientation and susceptibility to sunk cost fallacy. We suggest further replications to examine the roles of reluctance to change and rumination in the relationship between action versus state orientation and susceptibility to sunk cost fallacy. Our findings also highlight the importance of high-powered replications that are an essential part of good research practice.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2011
|
vol. 66
|
issue 9
890 – 905
EN
The present analysis of the evolution of the concept of freedom in Ernst Tugendhat’s philosophy aims to highlight several interesting facts. First, Tugendhat attempts to describe the meaning of Kant’s statement “I could have acted otherwise” from a non-transcendental perspective. Second, he makes an effort to avoid the classical Kantian dilemma of the relation of free will and determinism by posing the question differently. Third, he situates the issue of the relation of freedom and causality in the framework of the inner structure of freedom – examining it from the perspective of the human’s relation to him- or herself. Fourth, he attempts repeatedly to overcome the impossibility of considering freedom in the objective language of causality. The paper demonstrates why the issue of freedom remains a central problem of continental philosophy.
EN
Issues related to ethics and morality are constantly the subject of reflection and discussion at many levels of life of contemporary man. In the era of rapid technological development, which is far ahead of the development of ethics, it is extremely important to define its modern version. The issue is which tools to use and models to draw from. The theory of moral action itself is nothing new. On the contrary, it has a centuries-old tradition, dating back to ancient times. Today this tradition has become forgotten, considered inadequate for modern times. Meanwhile, by delving into ancient texts, one can find again in them a wealth of thoughts that are timeless and can serve for contemporary ethical considerations. It is, therefore, useful to refer to the sources of reflection on morality provided by ancient ethics, especially Aristotle’s texts. One of the key categories of Aristotelian ethics is virtue, i.e. excellence. Aristotle studies the good, how to live a happy life, how to achieve one’s ends, and how to be just. He formulates his ethics by analysing various virtues that a man can work on and develop and presents the conditions they must meet in order to be judged morally. It seems that a return to the classical concept of ethics and a new look at Aristotle’s virtue ethics may prove to be an inspiring proposal for contemporary ethical research.
Kwartalnik Filozoficzny
|
2011
|
vol. 39
|
issue 3
35-56
EN
When we ask about freedom in the most basic sense, we must turn to the primordial conditions of our volition. My will is born as forestalling a fellow human being’s gradual sinking in my inside. My primary challenge is a continuous struggle for self-improvement as well as making myself worthy of his trust. This, in turn, requires trust in his infinite value to endlessly bear him witness. The Creative Act consists the Creator’s in putting faith in his creature – a human being. It is the Creator who calls out of my depth for absolute entrusting a fellow human being and thus himself. Therefore, my actions and behaviour also affect him to some extent. The Creator’s faith in my person must be understood as an infinite love. And honestly, the notion of infinitive love is one for which I begin to fear. My anxiety becomes a part of the Creator’s. This is his fear of my fear, the fear which belongs to me as to a finite creature, and the fear of being paralysed by the infinite extent of his infinite love. The fear of the infinite Creator who puts his faith in a finite creature must be infinite. By trusting the Creator I begin to sense his love and his fear of my anxiety. Then his fear becomes my fear which turns out to be infinite as the fear of an infinite creature who trusts an infinite Creator also has to be infinite.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2014
|
vol. 69
|
issue 8
708 – 718
EN
This paper intends to demonstrate that, beginning with his analyses of dream and hallucination in Phenomenology of perception up to his definition of dehiscence as ontological principle in The Visible and the Invisible, Merleau-Ponty holds the audacious assumption that the subject is thrown into a dreamlike and bewitched world and the self is diffracted into many reflections. It is, the author will claim, a fundamental thesis in his philosophy in as much as it enables him to unveil and even radicalize the modern crisis and to pose a crucial ethical problem: if reason is not guaranteed and has to arise perilously from irrational depths, the self is threatened by inauthenticity, illusion and alienation; the existence is a strange dream which may anytime turn into a nightmare. He will also show that Merleau-Ponty reverses this crisis into an asset: a reality which includes a fundamental dimension of imaginary leaves us free to create new metamorphoses.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2015
|
vol. 70
|
issue 4
295 – 306
EN
The article deals with Ricoeurʼs idea of how we use reason in our praxis, i.e. with what in Kantian vocabulary is referred to as practical reason and in Aristotelian terminology as practical wisdom (phronesis). The question is whether this mode of reason, as incommensurable with the rigorous theoretical reason as it is, can be taken as valid. Can Ricoeurʼs approach, trying to reconcile the two incompatible conceptions mentioned above, be of help in resolving this question? Here we have to test the arguments in support of two Ricoeur’s ideas: 1) Practical reason is to be preserved as a specific mode of reason, which is irreducible to any other one. 2) The role of practical reason is not implemented by keeping its distance from practical experience (as demanded by Kant), but rather by being a prudent moral judgement in a particular situation. This, however, does not mean disregarding the morality of duty.
first rewind previous Page / 2 next fast forward last
JavaScript is turned off in your web browser. Turn it on to take full advantage of this site, then refresh the page.