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Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2020
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vol. 75
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issue 8
615 – 627
EN
According to a rather widespread view, the substantive aim of argumentation consists in resolving differences of opinion between disputing parties. This is the core of the pragma-dialectical definition of argumentation. It is argued that the definition is too narrow, if applied outside the scope of the Pragma-Dialectical Theory. It is not the case that every instance of argumentation has to be aimed at resolving an explicit or implicit difference of opinion. This claim is based on situations in which it does not make good sense to construe the instances of argumentation as having the above aim. An alternative definition of argumentation, which is broader in scope, is suggested. Accordingly, argumentation is aimed at giving reasons for a standpoint in order to reach the communicative objectives that are relevant in a given situation.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2010
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vol. 65
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issue 4
383-388
EN
The paper outlines a brief history of the role of logic as it has been conceived in the system of European science, scholarship and culture. It also tries to answer the question, in which of those roles logic approved itself and in which it did not. Further, it examines the role that logic plays in our times, as well as its relation to the contemporary philosophy.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2018
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vol. 73
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issue 8
636 – 646
EN
Can argumentation discover that statements are justified? Or can justification of statements originate in argumentation? In the paper it is argued that as far as epistemic justification is concerned, both questions have to be answered in the negative. Because of the regress problem, argumentation cannot reveal justification. And because of the fallacy of begging the question, argumentation cannot produce justification. Consequently, it is utterly wrong to claim that the purpose of argumentation is to justify statements that are being argued for.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2019
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vol. 74
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issue 9
754 – 767
EN
An argumentation is usually used to achieve a state in which one participant of a dialogue brings another participant to accept a belief the former presents. This idea is acceptable when it comes to disputes about (objective) facts. In the case of disputes about subjective tastes, however, the participants usually achieve a different kind of result; it often happens that they end their dialogue in a state in which they take their dispute to be resolved and, yet, retain their initial stand-points. If the disputes about tastes that end up in this state contain arguments, one may wonder what the proper use of argumentation in such disputes is. The present paper addresses this issue. The main idea consists in that the participants coordinate their positions by bringing their opponents to tolerate their respective subjective attitudes toward the items under discussion. This kind of response is framed by a contextualise semantics of predicates of personal taste.
EN
Folkloristics has traditionally focused on artistic expressions, which fulfil primarily aesthetic functions. The following paper, however, will be devoted to the genre of conspiracy theories, which I do not consider a folklore genre in the proper sense of the word but rather a narrative genre belonging to the category of rumours. The basic function of conspiracy theories is to mediate and to give a foundation of argument to a certain world-view model based on the motif of a group conspiracy. For the purposes of their genre analysis I have not consider the methods of ´´traditional“ folkloristics as a useful tool, and therefore I have tried to seek other methods proceeding from the distinctive qualities of these communication. As my research field I chose internet discussions, which meant concentrating on the written form of communication. The argumentative character and ideological anchoring of the texts being examined ultimately conditioned the selection of an appropriate research method in the framework of discursive analysis. The paper seeks to represent and offer for discussion the results of this experiment: a genre characterisation of conspiracy theories based on their typical argumentative strategies. My choice of theme in intended at the same time to evoke debate: to what extent is such a thematic and methodological purview acceptable within the bounds of folkloristic? Or if folkloristic paradigms are thus extended, what consequences may follow for Slovak folkloristics in the future?
EN
The aim of the paper is to explain the use of nominal tautologies by the speakers of the Slovak language. It focuses on a) the verification of propositional and pragmatic functions of nominal tautologies; b) the significance of lexical collocations for the contextual dependence of their interpretation. In the paper it is assumed that the semantic-pragmatic and illocutionary use of nominal tautologies forms the background of a conclusive character of practical (non-analytical) argumentation, and the acceptance of the corpus of operators, deictors and descriptive verbs has a crucial significance to the interpretation of the specific content. The article primarily studies the nominal tautologies from the pragmatic perspective; yet, it also considers the attitude and intention of the speaker, contextual significance of nominal tautologies in the case of individual use and the proportion of content between tautologies in the case of coordinative tautologies.
EN
The goal of this article is to explore the ways in which logic can contribute to study of rational argumentation. Basic concepts of valid, sound and rational argument are introduced. The concept of logical entailment is presented and its fundamental properties, i.e., necessity and formality, are explained. It is argued that these are essential properties of the entailment relation in all modern logical systems. It is mentioned that conclusions of most every day’s arguments are not entailed by their premises. This objection against identifying rational arguments with sound ones is even strengthened by presenting defeasible arguments, which cannot even be turned into valid ones with true premises by adding additional premises. Systems for describing defeasible argumentation are mentioned, but it is argued that they are neither formal logical system in the discussed sense, nor they can provide exhaustive description of rational argumentation. Such an exhaustive account is impossible and defeasible logics merely present a partial tool for bridging formal and informal logic and theirs accounts of argumentation.
EN
With the advent of the semantic web, the problem of ambiguity is becoming more and more urgent. Semantic analysis is necessary for explaining and resolving some sorts of ambiguity by inquiring into the relation between possibilities of predication and definition of a concept in order to solve problems of interpretation of natural language discourse. Computing is now confronting such problems of linguistic analysis (Diggelen et al. 2004), and it is worth inquiring into the development of linguistic studies that can be useful for developing the theoretical background of ontologies. Our proposal is to develop a workable solution that passes between the horns of the dilemma posed by the traditional metaphysical approach versus the modern relativistic account. We interpret the ancient notion of essential definition in a pragmatic perspective, and show how the dialectical definition by genus and difference corresponds to the semantic analysis of the definiendum.
EN
The aim of this paper is to show the dynamics of standards of the scientific knowledge argumentation in the classical, non-classical, and post-non-classical sciences. In the paper we focus upon ethical and axiological aspects of the modern science, upon its interdisciplinary character, dialogue of scientific and humanities knowledge.
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La causalité, l'argumentation et les connecteurs

88%
Linguistica Pragensia
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2011
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vol. 21
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issue 1
1-13
EN
The paper deals with the relation between argumentation and causality. After having defined causality (referring to D. Hume) and its language representation, we distinguish three types of argumentative discourse articulated by an argument-introducing connective (parce que, puisque, car, en effet etc.), i.e. argument for the utterance content, argument for the illocutionary act and argument for the act of enunciation. Afterwards, we examine the relation between argument and conclusion in these three types of discourse from the point of view of causality. We show that causality operates as a principle which the argumentation is based on only in the case of truth-conditional acts. We try to explain some restrictions concerning the distribution of the causally related entities which are observed.
EN
Deductivism is explained and defended. The thesis holds that logic generally, both formal and informal, is primarily concerned with the normative distinction between good and bad reasoning, and interprets good reasoning as minimally deductively valid inference. If deductivism is true, then it follows that all fallacies of reasoning, including the so-called informal or rhetorical fallacies, are deductively invalid. Deductivism as an ideology nevertheless cuts across the distinction between formal and informal logic. To defend deductivism against potential counterexamples, it is necessary to show that common fallacies are reconstructible as deductively invalid inferences. The present essay undertakes the groundwork of such a defense by arguing that even inductive argumentation, including inductive fallacies, along with circular reasoning, can be interpreted deductively. A large selection of other informal fallacies are also reconstructed as explicit deductive invalidities following a pattern that can be used to bring other fallacies under the deductivist umbrella.
EN
I characterize informal logic and argumentation theory as disciplines consisting of a great variety of research ideas, approaches, conceptual frameworks, and methods which allow to inquire into the complicated phenomenon of argumentation. Yet, the argumentative discourse constitutes a key subject of inquiry for disciplines which deal with various forms of language and reasoning. Among those disciplines there are: formal logic, semiotics, methodology of science and informatics. The articles included in this volume support the thesis that various approaches in the study of argumentation, despite of differences in methods of inquiry, try to realize a common research goal: elaborating tools, in particular (1) language and (2) methods, for analyzing and evaluating common-sense reasoning performed in an argumentative discourse. After discussing the content of the present volume I make some remarks on popularizing informal logic and argumentation theory in Poland.
EN
The purpose of this paper is to precisify and compare three relationships between definition and argumentation: argumentation about definition, argumentation from definition and argumentation by definition. Some modification of the standard understanding of these relationships is suggested. Additionally, it is argued that although real definitions are fallible and subject to revision and change, this does not imply that they have to be persuasive, manipulative definitions.
EN
I characterize the deductivist ideal of justification and, following to a great extent Toulmin's work The Uses of Argument, I try to explain why this ideal is erroneous. Then I offer an alternative model of justification capable of making our claims to knowledge about substantial matters sound and reasonable. This model of justification will be based on a conception of justification as the result of good argumentation, and on a model of argumentation which is a pragmatic linguistic reconstruction of Toulmin's model of argument.
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