Greek tragedy, as an expression shaped in the course of a performance, requires not only extending the field of investigation to include extra-philosophical interpretations, but also searching for its sources within the framework of the Greek thinking, described most profundly by Aristotle. The tradition of the Aristotle is inducing us to the reply to numerous questions, concerning Dionysus, as well as composition of the tragedy. Adopting his intellectual perspective provokes us to seek the genesis of tragedy in Greek logos. Apart of being a language (it referred to the notional structure of the Greek universe, defined the way of thinking, and provide a set or rules regarding presentation) it was also an order organizing the sense of action. It combined with doing, provokes action and constituted a reflection of the gestures made on stage.
With the support of recent scholarship the author proposes an understanding of the Aristotelian Corpus inspired by the biological works. He points out that this understanding is bound up with other current philosophical discussions, especially on biology, rationality, realism, the knowledge of an individual, metaphor, and poetics. The author concludes that Aristotle offers the most promising ontological, epistemological and anthropological basis not only for undertaking a series of urgent reconciliations (of facts and values, of theoretical and practical reason, of understanding and sensation, and of intelligence and emotion), but also for solving many dualisms of modern times, in their Platonic or materialist varieties.
Our interpretation of Aristotle‘s examination of place attempts to take seriously its dialectic character and thus to defend it against criticism that alleges an internal inconsistency. Any such inconsistency results from the ambiguity of the object of examination, an ambiguity that may be overcome by a succession of gradual distinctions. According to these, a place surrounds that of which it is the place, and does not constitute any of the surrounded thing. A surrounded thing’s own place is not bigger or smaller that that thing, and is separable from the surrounded thing. Each place has its up and its down, and according to these differences each body either moves naturally or remains where it is. Enumeration is an important part of the dialectical examination, the methodology of which Aristotles describes here in a general way, in a single passage. According to this passage, when we delimit the nature of a thing, each definition must resolve the difficulties arising from prior knowledge of the thing – albeit while agreeing with evident facts – and must clarify doubts which might result from it itself. In order that we may specify a definition of place, we must first draw a distinction within local motion between that which moves on its own accord and that with moves only accidentally. Only then can we approach the formulation of a definition of place. At first this definition will be negative, denying other possibilities of what place might be – showing that place is neither shape, extension nor matter. Then we arrive at a positive formulation, according to which place is the limit of the surrounding body. This is, however, not yet adequate from the point of view of the description of motion, and therefore it is necessary to qualify the definition by a final, necessary, requirement – that such a limit must be unmoving.
For Aristotle, the bond of a valuable friendship was created for the sake of its own value of giving friendship or the experience it furnishes, and not for the sake of expediency or the sheer joy of sharing friendship. A sustainable friendship basically finds its roots in what a human being is. Hence, it is loving rather than being loved that makes people real friends, ethically perfect. Biblical authors knew that a true friendship was difficult to obtain and that it could easily be lost. Thus, for their readers, to observe their advice means to obtain valuable hints and guidelines and to be protected from disillusionment. These guidelines had been drawn by them from the experience of everyday life, as a result of watching and drawing conclusions from what they saw following different man’s response to different situations. Might they have been victims to unjust action themselves, or had they committed something that made them feel ashamed, but kept that it in their mind as a warning to their prospective readers? Whatever the answer is, they managed to draw conclusions from the experience that, ultimately, could be helpful in making those who would perpetrate something that would hurt or kill a friendship repent.
Ancient catalogues of Aristotle’s writings (Diogenes Laertius, Hesychius) mention Symposium in one book, but this does not seem to be a dialogue analogical to that of Plato. Aristotle raised the sympotical and wine-drinking issues differently, as Plutarchus, Macrobius, Philo of Alexandria, Ps. Julian, and first and foremost, Atheaneus relate in their works. In his The Sophists at Dinner, Atheaneus quotes Aristotle’s title Συμπόσιον only once, while the title Περὶ μέθης is cited six times. Some scholars and editors of Aristotle’s fragments combine both titles as belonging to one writing (Laurenti, Zanatta), while others (Gigon, Breitenberger) separate them as their identity is not confirmed by the sources. Irrespective of whether it was a dialogue, just one or two related works, the few extant testimonies and citations from Aristotle provide an interesting source of information concerning the then customs and drinking effects in Greek culture, which, however, should not be directly associated with contemporary drunkenness and alcoholism. Aristotle’s approach to wine-drinking and feasting was in fact investigative, natural, medical, and analogical to the arguments presented in the third book of Problemata, where the matters On the drinking of wine and drunkenness are touched upon.
PL
Ancient catalogues of Aristotle’s writings (Diogenes Laertius, Hesychius) mention Symposium in one book, but this does not seem to be a dialogue analogical to that of Plato. Aristotle raised the sympotical and wine-drinking issues differently, as Plutarchus, Macrobius, Philo of Alexandria, Ps. Julian, and first and foremost, Atheaneus relate in their works. In his The Sophists at Dinner, Atheaneus quotes Aristotle’s title Συμπόσιον only once, while the title Περὶ μέθης is cited six times. Some scholars and editors of Aristotle’s fragments combine both titles as belonging to one writing (Laurenti, Zanatta), while others (Gigon, Breitenberger) separate them as their identity is not confirmed by the sources. Irrespective of whether it was a dialogue, just one or two related works, the few extant testimonies and citations from Aristotle provide an interesting source of information concerning the then customs and drinking effects in Greek culture, which, however, should not be directly associated with contemporary drunkenness and alcoholism. Aristotle’s approach to wine-drinking and feasting was in fact investigative, natural, medical, and analogical to the arguments presented in the third book of Problemata, where the matters On the drinking of wine and drunkenness are touched upon.
The task of corrective justice in Aristotle’s ethics is the rectification of harms or injuries resulting from voluntary or involuntary interactions between persons. However, the scope of this form of justice is not clear. In its widest conception it would include all harms done to a person against her will and without her fault. According to a narrower conception, instead, it is only an injury caused by an unjust or wrongful action that requires compensation. But in fact Aristotle distinguishes several concepts of unjust action. As a result, the narrower conception appears in various versions which are discussed in this paper.
The article discusses the concept of normative criticism and the objective value of artworks by Daniel D. Kaufman. He has established both the notion of artistic value grounded on Aristotelian virtue ethics and the idea of artistic purpose which expresses „the interest of civilization in culture”. It seems that if we refer to the purposes of culture, different meanings of culture should be taken into account. I attempt to show the possibility of applying this view to the axiological (culture as a cult of values) and the pluralistic (culture as a cult of fluctuation) sense of culture. Kaufman denies art criticism the right to ask moral questions. This appears to be slightly reductive on account of his references to the philosophy of Aristotle, which is deeply rooted in ethics.
The article deals with the question of the value of the history of philosophy for philosophical research. In the first part, it proposes a classification of possible functions realized by references to the philosophical tradition in a philosophical treatise. The proposed typology is meant as a practical tool for identifying and comparing the usage of the past in philosophical texts of any historical period. The second part of the paper illustrates how the classification can be employed by applying it to determine the functions of Aristotle’s discussions of the pre-Socratic doctrines in Metaphysics A.
The author suggests that pity, fear, and catharsis are experienced not only by the audience but by the playwright and actors as well. This, of course, inevitably involves him in the old problem of whether the actor himself must feel the emotions that he is trying to portray. Furthermore, Brunius suggests that the three elements are already inevidence in the original story behind the trage.
This article attempts to shed more light on a problem addressed in a previous work by the same authors, namely the nature of Empedocles’ Sphairos, which is taken for a structured whole and not – according to the usual interpretation – as an amorphous mixture. This article does not concentrate on the fragments of Empedocles himself, but focuses on the further reception of the Sphairos by ancient Greek writers. First, the paper attempts to show that the interpretation prevalent today is actually due to Aristotle’s equation of the Sphairos with his concept of ‘underlying matter’ conceived as an indeterminate substratum. The only ancient author who seems to hold the interpretation of the Sphere as an amorphous mixture is, however, John Philoponus, and, moreover, only in some of his commentaries on Aristotle. Philoponus’ notion of the Sphairos was then adopted by Friedrich Wilhelm Sturz, author of the first substantial modern study on Empedocles, published in 1805. The current article then examines the Neoplatonic explanation of the Sphairos, in which it is regularly equated with the intelligible word of the Forms. Although its transcendence is clearly at odds with the Empedocles’ original intentions, this interpretative approach assumes that the Sphairos is as clearly structured as the Forms are.
Principlism, a most prominent approach in bioethics, has been criticized for lacking an underlying moral theory. We propose that the four principles of principlism can be related to the four traditional cardinal virtues. These virtues appear prominently in Plato's Republic and in Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics. We show how this connection can be made. In this way principlism has its own compelling ethical basis.
The present paper analyses the methodology adopted in the ancient Greek grammatical tradition to define and describe the nominal inflectional categories, i.e. gender, number, and case. The main source for the said analysis is the treatise Tekhne grammatike attributed to Dionysius Thrax, but references are also made to the works of Aristotle and some other authors. The research shows that semantic (functional) criteria played the principal part in describing the nominal inflectional categories, and especially that of the case. This does not mean, however, that the formal factor was completely absent: Aristotle’s determination in searching for formal criteria of gender classes of nouns is noteworthy in this respect, as well as the attempt to associate the number category with some formal factors, evidenced in the Tekhne.
The article discusses the problem of natural justice which has been considered by Aristotle in his (1) Nicomachean and Eudemian Ethics and (2) Magna Moralia. In his Nicomachean and Eudemian Ethics Aristotle says of natural justice that it is changeable and not the same everywhere. The implication seems to be that no action, not even murder, is always wrong. But, as is evident especially from his Magna Moralia, Aristotle distinguishes justice into the “what” (equality), the “in what” (proportion between persons and things), and the “about what” (what things are exchanged with which persons). The article concludes that Aristotle allows for variability only in the “about what,” while in the “what” and the “in what” he allows for no variability.
According to Aristotle, philosophical knowledge consists in the discovery of the first causes that occur in reality. For this reason, the quantitative and essential analysis of the causes was the fundamental task for philosophical reflections. Aristotle considered it a priority to show the ways the causes are discerned in the aspect of questions that occur in the cognitive process. The question “why” is the question that Aristotle regarded as fundamental for the acquisition of philosophical knowledge. The phenomenon of this question is revealed when we indicate that it corresponds to the causes that occur in reality. The causes discerned in this way become the foundation for building the method of causal knowledge.
The text considers problems associated with sensible cognition. The author focuses on the problem mentioned by Stagirite who, recalling his predecessors, states that there are two concepts of cognition: one maintains that the similar knows the dissimilar, and second that the similar knows the similar. These two concepts meet in a position that at the beginning of the cognitive process the subject and object are dissimilar, but then they become similar. Such an explanation is made possible by distinguishing two kinds of the possible. The first one may be illustrated by the image of a man at the beginning of his education. The second type of the possible may be illustrated by the image of a scholar who at any time can start to contemplate the truth.
When studying various aspects of art and aesthetic tastes, contemporary evolutionists have no doubt that art is part of human nature, we have it in the brain and in the genes, as we might say today. Following the path set out by Aristotle, Hume, Darwin and his followers, evolutionary aesthetics (inspired by evolutionary psychology) develops in its three main branches: (1) anthropological ethological (E. Dissanayake, 1890s Darwinian art theorists: H. Balfour, A.C. Haddon, F. Clay), (2) evolutionary aesthetics (Dutton and continuators) and (3) literary Darwinism (B. Boyd, J. Carroll, J.Gottschall, D.S. Wilson). The article examines the theoretical proposals of D. Dutton, the author of The Art Instinct as well as the views of his predecessor, E. Dissanayake.
The article deals with Physics III,5, 205a25–28 and examines its function in Aristotle’s argumentation against the existence of an infinite sensible body. Since attempts to connect this passage with the preceding argument (205a23–25) have so far proved unsuccessful, scholars have resorted to transposing this text after Ph. 205a19 or 205b1 or to postulating a lacuna directly before it (205a25). This paper shows why those proposals are unsatisfactory and instead proposes anoth- er, less radical solution which consists in interpreting the passage in its transmitted context. More precisely, instead of trying to connect it with 205a23–25 it suggests treating the text as elliptical and seeing in 205a25–28 an important step in an argument based on Aristotle’s theory of natural place, one that is directed against the existence of an infinite heterogeneous body composed of a finite number of constituents (205a22–28).
In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle has given a tableau of the desirable virtues and their infringement through the surpassing of their limits. Thus, every virtue is framed or delimited by vices that represent either its excess or its deficiency. However, this type of defining is related to deep, metaphysical reasons: since every being, especially the liv-ing one, has its telos. Man’s telos is to practise and fulfil his human specificity, i.e. reason, and reason is the measure/quality of virtue as such; the excess or deficiency in his behaviour perverts and even stops the realisation of the humanity of man. And this humanity is, in turn, in accordance to the telos of nature, the good in and for the preser-vation of all things. If, hypothetically, persons would not be virtuous at all, this accord-ance would not be realised and man would be an accident in the logic of nature: and accidents are removed, sooner or later. The criterion of the “quantitative” moral evalua-tion is thus qualitative: a quality, the good aimed at by mindfulness applied to the con-crete particular moral relations and learned from experience.
“Politeness” appears to be connected to a quite disparate set of related concepts, including but not limited to, “manners,” “etiquette,” “agreeableness,” “respect” and even “piety.” While in the East politeness considered as an important social virtue is present (and even central) in the theoretical and practical expressions of the Confucian, Taoist and Buddhist traditions, (indeed politeness has been viewed in these traditions as central to proper education) it has not featured prominently in philosophical discussion in the West. American presidents Thomas Jefferson, Benjamin Franklin and George Washington all devoted discussion to politeness within the broader ambit of manners and etiquette, as too did Erasmus, Edmund Burke and Ralph Waldo Emerson but on the whole sustained philosophical engagement with the topic has been lacking in the West. The richest source for philosophical investigation is perhaps afforded by the centrality of the concept of respect in Immanuel Kant. However in this paper we will instead draw on the writings of Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas to defend the centrality of “politeness” as an important and valuable moral virtue. Starting with an analysis of the broader Aristotelian arguments on the virtues associated with “agreeableness,” namely, friendliness, truthfulness and wit I will argue that “politeness” should be thought of as an important moral virtue attached to social intercourse (and by extension the vice of impoliteness). I then move to identify an even broader and more important account of politeness, drawing on the work of Aquinas, as intimately connected to the notion of pietas (piety) as a fundamental part of the virtue of justice.
Epideictic rhetoric has been traditionally stigmatized as flattery or empty show without any practical goal. Where does such attitude towards epideictic come from? To answer this question, we explore the ancient debate about the nature and the function of the epideictic genre. In the second part of this paper, we discuss the recent reappraisal of the epideictic among classical scholars and fi nally focus the attention on a promising fi eld of research: epideictic speeches in honor of women.
JavaScript is turned off in your web browser. Turn it on to take full advantage of this site, then refresh the page.