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EN
Aristotle's expression is intended to direct investigation to the question of the possibility of securing for philosophy the status of an autonomous science. Attempts at the absolute self-justification of philosophy have been charged by antinomies, which suggest that a topical justification might be more appropriate. Such an approach allows a deeper insight in the problems of perception of reality as a whole, with which early forms of spirit, especially myth and religion, were confronted. It is, above all, about the possibility to perceive all things in their concrete determination. Being means: coming forth as something determinate. Opposed to metaphysical concepts of being, its categorial conception is applied here - categorial in the sense of a search for rules to which a particular adaptation of entities must be adequate in order that being and knowability may be ascribed to them. There is a tradition, going back at least to the late-Plato, which may be drawn upon when we basethe question of being on dialectics.
EN
The essay is a humble attempt at interpreting one sentence taken from Barbara Skarga's text 'On the Source and the Experience of Beginning' comprised in her book 'Metaphysical Quintet'. The sentence, which reads 'Let us, however, begin at the source', provides an excellent opportunity for considering the notion of 'beginning' as well as the moment and place of first appearances of beings. These concepts inevitably lead us towards experiencing whole sequences of events, i.e. they alert us to the immediate urgency of the question of time. Starting from Barbara Skarga's sentence the aurhor would like to demonstrate - with the help of poets (Hölderlin, Whitman), philosophers (Schelling, Derrida), and writers (Calvino, Calasso) - that the source only marks the beginning, does not coincide with it but functions as its sign. In consequence, in turn it also searches for its own 'beginning', for its 'source' in the depth of geological structures, thus becoming a threshold upon which the human experiences the non- and pre-human. Therefore, the experience of the source is not an affirmation of a radically separate and self-sufficient being, but just the opposite - it brings about the awareness of a profound connectedness of each individual being with, and therefore its thorough dependence on, the world which always precedes its appearance. While 'at the source', we only recognize the fact of being on the way towards it.
EN
The article presents the classical understanding of the good in the thought of St. Thomas Aquinas in the excellent and original interpretation of the contemporary German philosopher Josef Pieper. It also presents his discussion with modern ethics (Kant, Sartre, Camus). The importance of the issue is emphasized and then the ontological issue of the good is presented under the following five aspects: 1) The meaning of the thesis that every being is good mean; 2) The meaning of the term "good"; 3) The final interpretation of the thesis that every being is good; 4) The issue of the good from the perspective of empiricism, natural science, and the theory of Kant; and 5) The negation of the thesis that "every being is good", its consequences (nihilism), and the problem of suicide. The article also considers the existence of a direct relationship between the ontological and the moral good. Finally, the relationship between the two types of good is shown in the context of happiness.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2023
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vol. 78
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issue 5
321 – 337
EN
In his influential series of lectures on Nietzsche in the 1930s and 1940s, Heidegger claimed that Nietzsche had failed to escape metaphysical thinking and had remained a metaphysician despite his own self-understanding. At the centre of Heidegger’s charge is his interpretation of Nietzsche’s doctrine of “the will to power.” The argument in this paper is that Heidegger has misinterpreted what Nietzsche means by a “philosophy of the future,” and that Nietzsche’s revolution in philosophy is, somewhat ironically, much closer to Heidegger’s own attempt to recover the question of the meaning of being.
EN
The article analyses the Heidegger works with regard to their significance for phenomenology of space. Heidegger outlined certain concepts for pregeometric meaning of space. At the same time, however, by means of his works in their entirety, he has reached beyond the phenomenological issue of source experience of spatiality, thus creating an entirely new philosophy of space. The issue of space is there in the centre of his philosophy of being. On the one hand, the thinking of the truth of being determines the space anew, whilst on the other, space becomes of essence for a new non-metaphysical way of speaking about being. The present article shows in what a way Heidegger radically changed the philosophical thinking about space. In our contemporary times, physical sciences have assumed revolutionary approaches in their concepts of time and space. So has philosophy, and completely independently so. Heidegger has reached beyond the Cartesian stretch or extent, as well as beyond the Kantian notion of an a-priori form of insight into things.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2019
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vol. 74
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issue 6
440 – 455
EN
This article investigates Heidegger՚s and Hegel՚s understanding of Being. The main focus is on Heidegger՚s late work and on his thinking conversation with Hegel. However, in Hegel՚s understanding of metaphysics there is a significant absence of the notion of being as such in its unity with the highest being, but also a desire to identify Being itself as opposed to Being of being. In Hegel՚s ontology Being exists always just as a Being of being. The ontological difference, which Heidegger aims to fill in all of his work, turns out to be the dead end of his thinking. Heidegger՚s efforts to answer the question of Being itself therefore ends in failure.
Filo-Sofija
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2012
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vol. 12
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issue 3(18)
103-124
EN
In spite of the apparent opposition to Plato, Aristotle accepted a lot from the thought of his master. The intuition, which plays the key role in the system of Plato, was understood by Aristotle in terms of how we grasp the middle term of syllogism. It is not, therefore, the intuition of being, but the reasoning, departing from the experience (nature’s “intention”), which is the way of the cognition of the ultimate. The teleology of being, which Plato was so keen on finding, was found by Aristotle in the physical world as a counterpart of motion. Alas, Aristotle lost sight of what is most valuable in Plato: the sense of being that transgresses the categories. According to Thomas, being is what is the most perfect in things; so, consequently, what is the proper effect of the Ultimate Cause, and what is Its primary aim. It is better to be, i.e. to exist. Each thing craves for being. Being, however, is, in the Dionysius’ sense, a problem; it might guide us to God, but veil Him before us as well. It is a perfection, but not the Perfection itself, Plato was right at this point.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2017
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vol. 72
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issue 10
800 – 812
EN
The article draws on Tugendhat’s idea of the twofold character of truth resulting from the twofold structure of self-conciousness. When asking the question Who is a person?, there is always our implicit self-evidence present. And from Kant on we also ask explicit questions, such as How do we want to understand ourselves? And What is better for us? This articulation of the problem – a product of Enlightenment – involves a rejection of the traditionally shared truth about a person. Therefore, Tugendhat’s project includes the transformation of an implicitly valid universe of meaning into explicitly justified positions. Wittgenstein’s arguing that when thematising the limits of language we cannot transcend these limits is used to show that Tugendhat’s efforts to explicitly articulate the universal structure of understanding of the concept of a human being as a whole does have its implicitly shared cultural determinations, too.
EN
The author of the paper asks basic questions about being and meaning and the relation that occurs between them. Taking as his point of departure the Leibnizian question 'Why there is something rather than nothing', he asks about reasons of being's existence, ways of this existence and justification for certain ways of existence. In particular, he deals with the question of the meaning of human existence. His view is that for none of these questions a satisfactory solution for all can be found. Philosophy remains in the face of such problems relatively helpless. Looking at philosophy's boundaries, one can say 'I don't know' or become absorbed into holy books that promise an answer.
10
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Heideggerowska filozofia drogi

80%
Filo-Sofija
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2010
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vol. 10
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issue 1(10)
37-72
EN
The purpose of this paper is to present Heidegger’s philosophy of the way. The term of way is common in the history of philosophy. Heidegger does not use this term as a useful “metaphor”, but treats it as a fundamental figure of his thoughts. The term of way can be understood twofold: 1. way as a place used for traveling, 2. way as being-on-the-way. Heidegger joints these two meanings to create his own way of thinking. From these two meanings there come to being fundamental oppositions: hiddenness and unhiddenness, falling and raising, openness and closeness, distance and closeness, vanity and fullness. Since the shape of Heidegger’s way is a circle, we get further categories: circle of understanding, reminder, coming back, turning. Characteristics of Heidegger’s way is described by such terms like dialectics, trichotomy and being-between. All the presented categories make the questioness of being itself.
11
70%
Filo-Sofija
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2012
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vol. 12
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issue 1(16)
127-148
EN
This paper presents the beginnings (1912–1916) of Heidegger’s philosophy from the perspective of his early interest in the issue of question as such. The result of this focus was Heidegger’s little-known lecture delivered in 1915 at Heinrich Rickert’s seminar, entitled Frage und Urteil (Question and judgment). Without going into the details of Heidegger’s presentation, the present paper gives a broad introduction to the issues discussed there. It does this in several steps. First, it considers the spiritual motives of Heidegger’s interest in logic. Second, it attempts to systematize Heidegger’s early views on logic and its subject. Third, it draws attention to the importance and development of Heidegger’s phenomenologica of questions. Fourth, it points out that Heidegger’s interest in the question as such is closely linked with numerous (in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century) attempts to consider the problem of question in the framework of the philosophical study of the essence of cognition and being. These four issues create a starting point for understanding the specifics of Heidegger’s question of being.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2023
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vol. 78
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issue 10
865 – 878
EN
The article presents Eric Voegelin’s legal-philosophical thought in the context of his efforts to reflect on the transcendent dimension of being. According to Voegelin, the law provides a prospect for a symbolic expression of one’s attunement to the transcendent. The experience with transcendence empowers man to discern the normative Ought and to create its representative model in the form of legal political order. At the heart of this concept is the premise of the transformative conversion of the human soul, leading to insight into the true order of being. Finally, the paper reflects on Voegelin’s unique interpretation of the relationship between law and Gnosticism, defined by the rejection of transcendent reality.
EN
Numenius of Apamea was a thinker who aimed at revivifying Platonism by purifying it of skeptical and stoic influences. Primarily, he tried to reassign transcendent status to being. Clearly influenced by Philo of Alexandria, he uses the term “being” with reference to god (understood as to on or autoon). In his treatise On the Good, he puts forth a theory of three gods (or minds), which heralds Plotinus's three hypostases (an influence Plotinus himself confirms). Numenius was the first to come up with the triadic structure of the deity, which influenced Porphyry’s triadic structure of Oneness and through him in a sense the trinitarian doctrine of Marius Victorinus.
14
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Marionov projekt vyslobodenia Boha z metafyziky

70%
Studia theologica
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2007
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vol. 9
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issue 3
9-16
EN
In God without Being, Marion explores various ways of thinking of God as 'beyond being'. In fact, he sees both philosophers and theologians as often 'idolatrous' in the sense of postulating God as the highest 'Being'. Marion is trying to reverse the very way in which philosophy and theology have usually operated and to push them in a truly radical direction. Instead of beginning with our categories and ways of thinking, he is attempting to turn the whole approach around. The question is whether he can do this: the paper presents Marion's project with some critical remarks. It seems there is something inherently problematic with this Marion's project.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2016
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vol. 71
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issue 4
292 – 303
EN
This paper offers a systematic overview of the aspects of Heidegger’s Being and Time that are concerned with the understanding of human sociality. Three dimensions of Heidegger’s analysis are distinguished: self-being, caring-with and being-with-one-another. These dimensions can be enacted in different modalities on the spectrum of unownedness and ownedness. To keep matters simple, the author focuses on the unowned and owned extremes, distinguishing anyone-self and owned self, leaping in and leaping ahead solicitude, as well as the anyone and a people. His discussion of these key terms of the analysis in Being and Time focuses on investigating Kierkegaard’s role in the development of Heidegger’s thought.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2010
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vol. 65
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issue 2
110-119
EN
The history of philosophy is an essential element of Heidegger's philosophy. The paper raises the question: Could Heidegger have successfully completed his 'Being and time' as he proclaimed in its first edition? In the author's view, the fact that the second part of the book remained unwritten was an inevitable consequence of the turn: The question of being in the second part of 'Being and time' remained unresolved, therefore Heidegger later focused on the understanding of being in Hegel, Leibniz, Heraclites and Parmenides. The author argues, however, that even this important re-orientation could not lead to a successful accomplishment of Heidegger's original intention. i.e. to conceive being without existence, what would have enabled him to pass on from the metaphysics of existence to the metaphysics of being.
Konštantínove listy
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2017
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vol. 10
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issue 1
83 - 97
EN
The study is based on the Berdyaev’s philosphy. The fundation of personalism is supremacy of person before its being. While being is a product of an abstract mind and is deprived of its existence, the person is associated with freedom. Therefore if there is freedom, it can not be determined by being. The spirit is not being but it is freedom. The spirit can not be tied to the order of being, but to a personal existence. Supremacy of person to its material needs has been defined by the founder of a philosofical movement, Berdyaev companion, Emmanuel Mounier. According to these principles it is necessary to redefine the person not on the base of individuality but on the base of existentialism. So far has dominated the definition of a person in substacial definition according to Boëthius. We propose here non substantial determination. Because the spirit, pneuma, is the fundament of the personal identification and self-indentification. We develop this based on the authentic legacy of the Byzantine anthropology. According to it the fundamental characteristic of personal existence is that a person enters into relationships. The nature and characteristics of the person are manifested only in the relationship. Individuality is not able to create relationships. A person is determined to develop such relationships in vertical and horizontal directions hence to divine and human being. The prototyp is the Trinitarian and divine- human concept of a person developed by Kappodocia church fathers. Based on this holistic understanding of a person we show a contrast to a noetic and anthropological reductionism within Latin (western) concept of defining a person whose result is a disoriented man. Suggested outcomes of this study may contribute to recovery of the holistic approach in uderstanding of the human person. Such new understanding of human being is as contradiction to deformed definition of human person according to natural, social or psychological determinism.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2012
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vol. 67
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issue 6
460 – 471
EN
Like his one-time teacher, Heidegger, Levinas makes a distinction between Being (Sein) and beings (Seiendes), but prefers to speak of ‘existence’ and the ‘existent’. Again, like Heidegger, Levinas understands existence in its verbal sense as the self-unfolding act of Being that is attested to in the manifestation of particular beings. Unlike his teacher, however, existence signals for him the unbearable heaviness of Being, as if being a Jew as opposed to being a German in Europe in the years preceding WWII cast a different light on the human existential condition, through which alone we have access to Being. Levinas’s particular conceptualisation of existence, forged at a particular world historical juncture, forms the basis for his particular ‘metaphysical’ account of the conditions of possibility of ethical action. Although Levinas’s early essays present us with an extensive mediation on the nature of existence, only a few commentators offer it more than a mere cursory sketch. My aim in this essay is therefore to throw some light on Levinas’s conceptualisation of Being from its root in Plato’s understanding of essence as ‘ousia’, its indebtedness to Heidegger’s ontological difference, and its ultimate departure from the latter’s understanding of Sein as generosity and Lichtung. As we shall see, existence for Levinas is a two-sided coin that encapsulates the empowering verbal sense of Being as dynamism and the overpowering stultifying sense of irremissible contract in which is inscribed the exigency of an impossible escape. It is this very conceptualisation that informs Levinas’s lifelong trans-ontological quest for a path otherwise and beyond Being.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2015
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vol. 70
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issue 6
429 – 439
EN
Patočka considers Heidegger’s dealing with the question of Being in his famous Being and Time as a premature problem; and he thinks similarly about the solutions which Heidegger offered in his later thought. Being is always a Being of beings and Patočka is in the right contrary to Heidegger. Heidegger’s attempt at re-thinking Being as Being without beings undermines philosophy in a substantial way. Heidegger’s later reducing philosophy to metaphysics is acceptable; it doesn't follow, however, that we should accept also all its consequences assumed by Heidegger. There is a key difference between Patočka’s concept of philosophy, with man and history as its focus, and Heidegger’s concept of philosophy focused on the problem of Being. Patočka offers the insight according to which Being, when thought in itself, is a hypostatized Being. Therefore, it should be completely abandoned, simply because there is no such Being. This insight questions the fundamental thesis of Heidegger’s philosophy, which should unconditionally be rejected as groundless.
EN
Freedom or responsibility, which of these is the main ethical characteristic of human being? In this matter Heidegger's 'Sein und Zeit' obviously favors freedom while responsibility is only of Dasein's possibilities of being.. It is absolutely fundamental, however, that from the very beginning of his philosophical journey Heidegger is convinced that there is one original obligation of human being's fate as a 'shepherd' of Being. The questioning of Being (from 'Sein und Zeit') finds its mirror image in the answering of Being. Heidegger's philosophy after 'the turn' (Kehre) accents the unity of being and thinking. Heidegger describes total closeness, when a man and Being are given to each other, as 'event' (Ereignis). The truth of Being, which appears in 'Ereignis' is no longer the object of human questioning. The man no longer can say: 'I ask', all he can say is: 'I am called'. Free from metaphysical thinking, he can reach his own essence in this relation and claim his being-himself (Selbstsein). First un favor of the existential freedom of Dasein, Heidegger gradually approaches the attitude of primary role to responsibility in human being's ethical characteristics.
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