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EN
The article describes some of the important events of the years 1945 – 1947 which led to the conviction and death of Jozef Tiso – a former Slovak President of the Slovak state during the World War II and who cooperated with Nazi Germany. In particular, the article focuses on the role of Edvard Beneš - the President of Czechoslovakia in this process, and the defendant's private political rival in the pre-war period.
EN
On 18th December, 1935 Foreign Minister Edvard Beneš was elected by an overwhelming majority of MPs and senators to become the second President of the Czechoslovak Republic. Beneš’s candidacy for President was supported by the legislators, members of all Czechoslovak parties, i.e., the Agrarian Party, Social Democratic Party, National Socialist Party, People’s Party, Hlinka’s Slovakian People’s Party, as well as by the political tradesmen and Communists. Beneš’s candidacy for President was also supported by the MPs and senators of the German “activist” parties, namely the German Social Democratic Party, the German Christian Social Party and the German Agrarian Party. For the first time ever in the Presidential election in the Czechoslovak Republic also legislators-members of the Hungarian minority political parties took an “activist” position, although during the previous Presidential elections they had expressed their negativist attitude to the state’s constitutional system by abstaining from voting, i.e., by returning blank ballots. Their position during the Presidential election was supposed to be uniform, as proved by a public declaration of their representatives. A negativist position during the election was only shown by the MPs and senators representing Henlein’s Sudetengerman Party and Kramář’s National Unification Party. The constructive position of the Hungarian minority political parties at the Presidential election was appreciated also by the new President after the election, who through his secretary thanked the Hungarian parties for their “knightly behavior, sincerity and straightforward position before and during the Presidential election”.
EN
The second part of the study goes into details of the attitude of Hungarian minority parties, namely the Provincial Christian Democratic Party (Országos Keresztény Szocialista Párt; OKSzP) and the Hungarian National Party (Magyar Nemzeti Párt; MNP), to the election of President Masaryk’s successor in December 1935. Much attention is paid to the important closing meeting of thein leaders on the eve of the election, i.e., 17th December 1935, which resulted in a joint declaration in support of the Presidential Nominee Edvard Beneš, Minister of Foreign Affairs at that time. The second part of the study recapitulates in detail the final meetings of the leading Hungarian minority politicians and tries to answer as precisely as possible the question whether really all OKSzP and MNP legislators complied in the Vladislaus Hall of the Prague Castle on 18th December 1935 with the communique adopted on its eve 17 December 1935 by the joint Parliament clubs and voted at the election session for Beneš.
EN
The study analyses how the prevailing situation in Slovakia during the first months of 1919 was reported in part of the official or more informal correspondence between Ivan Markovič and Vavro Šrobár on the one hand and Edvard Beneš on the other. Some specific material problems occurred and the Czechoslovak authorities faced the reluctance of part of the civilian population. They also had to cope with the Italian military mission that was widely considered unreliable and Hungarian-leaning. The core of the correspondence is made up of considerations on the material and political uncertainties arising from the lasting shortages, the weakness of the nascent Czechoslovak apparatus and the latter’s difficulties stabilizing the situation in the whole region (and more specifically in some counties). As the weeks went by, the importance of a final decision regarding the borders with Hungary was firmly underlined, while the Slovak authorities were poorly informed on the overall diplomatic and political situation in Paris. Meanwhile, Slovak political Catholicism remained ambiguous and led agitation challenging and potentially weakening the Czechoslovak authorities. Markovič’s correspondence expresses the instability of the Czechoslovak authorities’ positions, shifting between partial improvements and lasting difficulties. At the end of April 1919, the overall situation remained precarious.
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