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EN
Relying on two works - 'Matter and Memory' and a study on dreams - the author traces implications of Bergson's metaphysical assumptions. They seem to support not only Bergson's epistemological tenets but also his neurobiological hypotheses. The entire structure of Bergson's philosophy is reviewed in this process - the conception of duration, critique of the spatial projection of mental imagery, the theory of surface and deep ego. Bergson's assumptions combine to make traditional epistemological debates on the character of mental images obsolete. They put in new light mechanisms of remembering, the difference between perception and recollection, the distinction between habitual memory and purposeful recollecting. In the end a new reading of Bergson's metaphysical assumptions is offered, in which the concept of unconsciousness plays a great role and the anti-reductionist stance seems to be vindicated. The author acknowledges his indebtedness to Barbara Skarga and her book 'Czas i trwanie' [Time and duration].
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2013
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vol. 68
|
issue 10
890 – 904
EN
This paper is devoted to Bertrand Russell’s criticism of Henri Bergson’s philosophy. It traces out the origins of that criticism and analyses its essence, reasons and development in Russell’s works. Because of the importance of the concepts of space and time for Bergson’s philosophy and, in turn, the importance of continuity and discreteness for the understanding of space and time, the central part of the analysis concerns the views of the both philosophers on continuity and discreteness, including Zeno’s paradoxes. The main thesis of the paper is that Russell’s criticism of Bergson’s philosophy comes, to a great extent, from Russell’s misunderstanding of Bergson.
EN
In the article I compare the psycho-physical dualism of Nicolas Malebranche and Henri Bergson. The study of these two systems is important because Bergson is often critical of modern theories claiming a parallelism of soul and body. Malebranche bases his system on the category of space, while Bergson rejects the spatial view of reality and bases his conception on the notion of duration. On the one hand, Bergson criticizes the Cartesian dualistic conception. Yet, on the other hand, he builds his system in reference to modern solutions. The comparison of these two significantly different conceptions gives a more profound understanding of the problem of psycho-physical dualism. Furthermore, it makes possible a better appreciation of the innovative character of Bergson’s proposal. I consider the relation between mind and brain by means of an analysis of sensation because in both theories it is here that soul and body meet.
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