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Bergsonismus Cazamianova pojetí humoru

100%
Sevcik M.
Estetika: The Central European Journal of Aesthetics
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2007
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vol. 44
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issue 1-4
57-84
EN
Louis Cazamian develops Henri Bergson's concise remarks, which show humour as a special sort of comical transposition of language. Cazamian stresses that humour is based on transposition, which is inevitably conscious, and he is concerned with the division of humour into four different species according to the modes of transposition. Cazamian focuses especially on the complexity of humour and its impact. Even if a certain view of the world and life, that is, a kind of 'matter' of humour, is obviously suggested by the mechanism of transposition, that is, by the 'form' of humour, it is impossible to determine any universal rule describing the relationship between matter and form. In that sense Cazamian emphasizes the indefinability of humour, and points to the indeterminability of the humorous effect. These arguments demonstrate the essential influence that many important themes of Bergson's aesthetics and philosophy have had on Cazamian's conception of humour, a conception that proves to be integrally Bergsonian.
2

PAMÄŤ A MOZOG: BERGSONOV OMYL

88%
Petit J.-L.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2019
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vol. 74
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issue 7
530 – 542
EN
This article is dedicated to the area at the interface of philosophy and neuroscience and it focuses on the critical examination of some of Bergsonʼs ideas. Neuroscience in its effort to strengthen the role of body in relation to mental processes and especially memory, cannot avoid discussing Bergson, namely his classic work Matter and Memory, in which he leaves the research of habitual memory to psychologists, while privileging the “pure memoryˮ that surpasses psychophysical and psychocerebral parallelism, since it does not need any material substrate or location in space. However, new research in neuroscience puts this thesis into doubt, even denying it. The author takes into account research both in neuro-science (especially A. Berthoz) and in phenomenology and refers to works in this field that prove that the individualization of events, the subject of “episodic memoryˮ, on the contrary, is a matter of space – and admits that Bergson was wrong, albeit not entirely, as confirmed by recent discoveries about the neural bases of memory. Moreover, neuroscience has so far read Bergson selectively, so the author intends to return to him and examine in particular the hippocampal function in the light of the cited work.
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