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EN
Berkeley and Klima agree that for the sake of god the existence of the external world is to be rejected. While Berkeley replaces the eliminated external world with god, who is the source of our sensations and in whose mind all things exist, Klima's concept of god is a triumph over the deception of intentionality. Berkeley introduces a new concept of existence - to exist means to be perceived - things therefore really exist, either in our minds or in the mind of god. For Klima the elimination of the external world means that the world is an illusion. This illusion is the result of intentionality, which is the uneliminable structure of consciousness; by breaking with the deception of intentionality Klima arrives at the concept 'I am God.'
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Natura języka i język natury w filozofii Berkeleya

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EN
The main scope of the essay is to give a short description of the role of language in Berkeley’s philosophy. Berkeley points out that language does not refer to the experience as such (as Locke maintained), but is always a tool to construct a model of the experience. Many of the best known motifs of Berkeleyan philosophy (such as his negation of abstract ideas, and his denial of distinction between primary and secondary qualities of bodies) serve the same goal: a new conception of language, in which the language plays quite a different role in human experience – the role of changing human attitudes. In turn the impressive function of language is essential for apprehension the Berkeley’s conception of nature understood as the language of God.
EN
The aim of the paper is a critical reconstruction and comparison of the philosophical positions of John Locke and George Berkeley on the problem of cognition as a reflection (Abbildtheorie) of reality. The article argues that Berkeley rejects the theory of transcendental reflection, but he does not refute any theory of reflection, because he recognizes the theory of immanent reflection. It is the background for the philosophy of Immanuel Kant that he has more connections with the realism of Locke than the idealism of Berkeley.
Filo-Sofija
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2007
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vol. 7
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issue 7
141-162
EN
This article intends to bring up the very core of Edmund Husserl’s philosophy, it means the issue of the transcendental reduction, which, according to the idea of the creator of phenomenology, could solve the problems like: the correlation between subject and object, the issue of transcendence, and the precision of philosophy as well. The present text is tied only to showing the transcendental reduction, conducted by Husserl by the Cartesian way. This method of doing reduction is the most fundamental, because of the fact that philosopher intends to break the new ground of sure, imperturbable, irreducible and resistant to any doubt base of recognition. Similar searches were conducted by René Descartes. The author shortly describes the issue of the correlation between subject and object in the point of view of George Berkeley and Immanuel Kant; these philosophers concentrated on the pretences of recognition. Edmund Husserl was inspired by their philosophy. Then, author describes the way to the transcendental reduction, the pretence of the “natural world” and concentrates on showing the issue of reduction- the most controversial point in Husserl’s philosophy. The article is finished by the short philosophical meditation, which is the try of realization the theoretical think.
Kwartalnik Filozoficzny
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2011
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vol. 39
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issue 4
25 - 41
EN
The present essay is concerned with George Berkeley's theory of mind. An outline of his (sketchy) immaterialist theory of mind is presented and some of the principal (and well-known) difficulties are pointed out. The main problem seems to be that his attack on materialism can be easily converted into an attack on his concept of (immaterial) soul. Moreover, Berkeley offers no principle of the identity of minds; hence it is possible to argue that a troublesome consequence of his theory of mind is the possibility of an agnostic conclusion (the paper outlines an analogy between Berkeley's concept of mind and Kant's theory of the transcendental unity of apperception). In the present paper I show that it is possible to overcome these difficulties by formulating Berkeley's philosophy in pragmatic terms.
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