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THE THEORY OF INTENTIONAL OBJECTS VERSUS THE ADVERBIAL THEORY

100%
Chrudzimski A.
Analiza i Egzystencja. Czasopismo Filozoficzne
|
2005
|
issue 1
117-130
EN
AIn this paper the author presents a sketch of a theory of intentionality introducing special entities called intentional objects which can be found in the works of Franz Brentano and Roman Ingarden. Nowadays the philosophers that are sympathetic to intentional objects are accused of planting an ontological jungle. All the problems of the theory of intentionality, it is claimed, can be resolved within the framework of a theory assuming a much more parsimonious ontology, like the adverbial theory, a version of which is typically associated with Chisholm. However, he shows that this competitor of the theory of intentional objects faces serious difficulties. The most serious of them is that within the framework of the adverbial theory the relation between the representing entity ('adverbially specified' mental property of the subject) and the external target object has to be construed as primitive, while in the theory of intentional objects it can be easily defined. The consequence is that within the framework of the adverbial theory we are forced to require a distinguished kind of epistemic access not only to the representing entity but also to this 'representing relation'. This consequence, which is very seldom made explicit, seems indeed to be fatal. Intentional objects appear in this light not as products of an ontological extravagance but instead as entities that are indispensable, if we are to be able to explain the phenomenon of intentionality at all.
2

POČÁTKY FENOMENOLOGIE U BRENTANA A HUSSERLA

88%
Hlavinka P.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2012
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vol. 67
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issue 4
315 – 322
EN
The paper tries to shed light on the development of the phenomenological thinking of two founding fathers of phenomenology: Brentano and Husserl. Through the criticism of psychologism it approaches the classical modern thesis articulated already by Descartes in his Meditations, namely that our inner being and consciousness are given to us more directly than the being of nature. This psychic/physical dualism as well as holding the psychic independent of its physical environment (i.e. Husserlian preserving a transcendental position), were ever more inconsistent. It was approaching the objectified soul in the same exact way as the nature that paved the way to empirical psychology. Husserl’s aiming at so called “pure psychology”, even though underpinned by the transcendental subjectivity, resulted in the rise of a phenomenological stream, which hoped to justify its claims by recourse to the original encounter of humans with things within the pre-scientific frame of natural world.
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