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EN
The article is a review of a book by the Swedish writer and journalist Göran Hägg entitled Mussolini. En studie i makt published in Poland in 2015 as Mussolini. Butny faszysta [Mussolini. An Arrogant Fascist]. By focusing on elements which distinguished Mussolini’s dictatorship from Adolf Hitler’s Third Reich and Joseph Stalin’s Soviet Union, Hägg subscribes to the view, present in contemporary historiography, that the Italian version of totalitarianism was “incomplete”. Stressing the mass support for the regime in 1925–1936, the author links the Duce’s gradual fall from power to mistakes in internal and foreign policy in the second half of the 1930s, especially to the adoption of the racist laws of 1936 as well as Italy’s accession to the Anti-Comintern Pact and participation in the Second World War on Germany’s side. What the author considers to have been unquestionably misguided moves which sealed the fate of the Italian leader on 25 April 1945 were his decisions taken during the existence of the Italian Social Republic, namely: 1) creation of internment and concentration camps for Italian Jews; 2) ruthless fight against the anti-fascist resistance movement; and 3) massacres of civilians by SS troops and fascist republicans in northern Italy in 1944–1945.
EN
The study deals with the advance of Italian fascism between 1919 and 1922. It follows its emergence in March 1919 in Milan, North Italy, the preconditions for its rise, important figures of the movement, national congresses, and program manifestos until the “March on Rome”, when B. Mussolini became Prime Minister of the Italian government in the autumn of 1922. It presents the fascist movement as a diverse platform that, with its pragmatic approach, responded to immediate social events, absorbing them into its program. The study analyses the personality of B. Mussolini, particularly his socialist and journalistic past, which he was able to skilfully utilize for the mobilization of masses after 1919. It points to the wider context of political situation in post-war Italy that contributed to the growth of the fascist movement (G. D’Annunzio, the squadrists etc.). The study thus presents fascism as a phenomenon of post-war Italy, which, despite being on the side of the victorious countries in WWI, found itself in a very complicated situation, such as the financial exhaustion of the country, frequent strikes of workers in industrial North-Italian cities, agricultural hardship, difficult integration of former soldiers into everyday life, growing violence and political radicalism, and the growing political and economic differences between the North and the South. It therefore shows that the advance of fascism was at the same time caused by the retreat of democratic elites from the positions that they should have fiercely protected against the aggressive authoritarian movement.
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Studie se zabývá nástupem italského fašismu v letech 1919–1922. Sleduje jeho vznik v březnu 1919 v severoitalském Miláně, předpoklady jeho vzniku, významné osobnosti hnutí, národní kongresy i programové manifesty, až do tzv. pochodu na Řím, kdy se stal na podzim 1922 B. Mussolini předsedou italské vlády. Prezentuje fašistické hnutí jako pestrou názorovou platformu, která svým pragmatickým přístupem reagovala na bezprostřední společenské dění a aktuálně je do svého programu vstřebávala. Analyzuje osobnost B. Mussoliniho, zejména jeho socialistickou a novinářskou minulost, jíž dokázal vůdce fašismu obratně využít k mobilizaci mas po roce 1919. Poukazuje na širší kontext, který přispíval k vzestupu fašistického hnutí (G. D’Annunzio, squadristi atd.), jejž zasazuje do politických poměrů poválečné Itálie. Studie tak prezentuje fašismus jako fenomén poválečné Itálie, která se, ač na straně vítězných států v první světové válce, ocitla ve značně složitých poměrech, jako byly finanční vyčerpání země, časté stávky dělníků v továrnách v průmyslových severoitalských městech, zemědělské těžkosti, obtížná integrace někdejších vojáků do každodenního života, růst ná- silí a politického radikalizmu obecně i prohlubující se politické a hospodářské rozpory mezi severem a jihem. Plně tak ukazuje, že nástup fašismu byl současně ústupem demokratických elit z míst, která měly urputně proti agresivnímu autoritativnímu hnutí bránit.
PL
Włoska Republika Socjalna (znana również jako Republika Salo) była marionetkowym państwem faszystowskim pod protektoratem III Rzeszy utworzonym w końcowych latach II wojny światowej. Z Benitem Mussolinim jako formalnym przywódcą RSI istniała od rozpoczęcia niemieckiej okupacji części Italii we wrześniu 1943 r. aż do kapitulacji Wehrmachtu w północnych Włoszech w końcu kwietnia 1945 r. Celem artykułu jest analiza polityki, propagandy, instytucji partyjnych i państwowych oraz różnorodnych formacji wojskowych i paramilitarnych RSI, które u boku sił niemieckich walczyły na froncie włoskim z aliantami. Ponadto przedstawiono zagadnienie tzw. włoskiej wojny domowej w tym okresie, brutalnego bratobójczego konfliktu, podczas którego ruch oporu (głownie komunistyczni partyzanci) wraz z armią włoską sprzymierzoną z aliantami walczył o wyzwolenie kraju z rąk państw Osi. Włoska Republika Socjalna funkcjonowała zaledwie 19 miesięcy, a mianowicie do 28 kwietnia 1945 r., kiedy partyzanci rozstrzelali Mussoliniego i kilku innych faszystów, gdy ci próbowali ocalić życie i zbiec z kraju.
EN
The Italian Social Republic (also known as Republic of Salo) was a fascist puppet state under the protection of the Third Reich that was created in the last years of World War II. With Benito Mussolini as the formal leader, it existed from the beginning of German occupation of Italy in September 1943 until the surrender of Wehrmacht in northern Italy by the end of April 1945. The aim of the article is to analyse the politics, propaganda, state and party institutions, as well as various military and paramilitary formations of the RSI, which fought along German troops against the allied forces on the Italian front. Furthermore, another mentioned subject will be that of the so-called Italian Civil War in that period, a brutal fratricidal conflict, in which the Italian Resistance (mostly communist partisans) and the Italian Co-Belligerent Army joined the allies in order to eventually defeat Axis forces and to liberate the country. The Italian Social Republic existed for slightly more than nineteen months, until on 28 April 1945 the partisans shot Mussolini and several other fascists while they were attempting to save their lives and escape from Italy.
PL
The article sets out to profile the results of preliminary research into the stances taken by two Warsaw Yiddish daily newspapers, Haynt and Der Moment, on the phenomenon of Italian fascism. These ranged from guarded and benevolent interest, and even a certain fascination, to categorical rejection, depending on the official stance of the fascist movement towards the Jews. The article discusses the initial ad hoc judgments on fascism made in the 1920s, opinions on Polish and Jewish emulators of Mussolini, with particular attention to Vladimir Jabotinsky and the Revisionist movement, and the opinions of Jewish political journalists on Mussolini’s volte-face regarding the Jews in the 1930s. A separate section is devoted to a series of 1938 reportage features showcasing the life of the Italian Jews in Fascist Italy.
EN
The study deals with the diplomatic relations between the Holy See and Fascist Italy over the period of 1922–1929. In the period of the dramatic events in the 1920s, it follows up on the final phase of the so-called Rome question, which was opened after World War I. It describes each of the meetings and analyses the requirements of both sides, which resulted in the signing of Lateran Treaty in February 1929. By means of this treaty, Mussolini’s Italy recognized the sovereignty of the Holy See over the Church, accepted the right to send and receive legates, issue passports, own a post office and coin their own money. Furthermore, the Italian state returned property to religious persons, reintroduced obligatory religious education regulated by the Church, declared the Catholic Church as the state Church, forbid all anticlerical magazines, books and films, and imposed penalties for criticism and insults to the Catholic Church. In addition, the Pope was financially compensated. The head of the Catholic Church, in return, accepted the Italian kingdom with its capital city Rome, thereby indirectly contributing to the legitimation of Fascist Italy, which as a result, gained recognition in an international context. Despite every goodwill gesture of the Fascist state, Benito Mussolini began to break with his promises during the 1930s. It soon became apparent that B. Mussolini only saw concordat as a formal matter which should manifest the unity of the state and Church in the Apennine peninsula at least externally and assure support for the young authoritative figure from a powerful institution, the Catholic Church.
EN
As the successful coup d’etat of Rome in October 27 – 29, 1922, successfully unfolded and Benito Mussolini emerged into power, the threat of invasion and spread of fascism was looming over southeastern Europe and North African countries of Ethiopia, Libya and Somalia. Mussolini’s intentions would not be perceptible until October, 1935, the invasion of Ethiopia and consequently almost four years later with the invasion of Albania in April 7th, 1939, which is considered by many as the prelude to World War II. Italy’s role and support towards the implementation of infrastructure projects and economic development initiatives in Albania proved to be essential. The fascist regime of Benito Mussolini was also a strategic ally for King Zog I who was in a desperate need to establish a stable government and secure his monarchy. Although King Zog I came to power with the immense help of Yugoslavia, months later he established strong ties with Italy and worked tirelessly to foster strategic bilateral relations with Mussolini’s administration. Italo-Yugoslav Relations improved greatly after the signing of a bilateral agreement in March 25, 1937, therefore Benito Mussolini had the green light from the Yugoslav government – which brought King Zog I into power in December, 1924 – to storm with loans, equipment and human assets the newly created Albanian government which later would become a Kingdom under the rule of Zog I. The focus of this Essay will be the impact of Italian – Albanian Strategic Alliance, a detailed analysis on the pact of Tirana (1926), the Italian Strategic Interests on western Balkans and its subsequent invasion in April, 1939.
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PL
Faszyzm szczególnie w pierwszej połowie XX w. obecny był w poglądach wielu przedstawicieli totalitaryzmów Europejskich i nie tylko. Miał swoich zwolenników, m.in. w: Hiszpanii za czasów sprawowania władzy przez Francisco Franco , Portugali za rządów António de Oliveira Salazara , rumuńskiej Żelaznej Gwardii Corneliu Zelea Codreanu, Belgii wśród zwolenników faszystowskiego Christus Rex, Polsce , Wielkiej Brytanii , Francji oraz przede wszystkim we Włoszech Benito Mussoliniego. Idea faszyzmu towarzyszyła wielu dyktatorom i przedstawicielom ugrupowań politycznych na świecie, jednak jej fundamenty stworzył Benito Mussolini. Jak trafnie stwierdził Jerzy W. Borejsza Mussolini był pierwszy. Zatem przedmiotem artykułu jest włoski faszystowski ideał wychowania. Są to wstępne refleksje nad obrazem jednostki kreowanym przez włoskich ideologów. Pozwala to prześledzić rozprzestrzenianie się idei faszyzmu do nauk o wychowaniu, a także pokazać różne aspekty tak zdefiniowanej doktryny. W artykule przedstawiono ogólną koncepcję i definicję ideału wychowania, która pozwoli uporządkować zdobytą wiedzę z perspektywy teoretyków włoskiego faszyzmu. Celem jest przedstawienie koncepcji Nowego Człowieka dotyczącej stworzenia, podporządkowania i wychowania idealnej jednostki.
EN
Fascism, especially in first half of the twentieth century, was to be found in the beliefs of many of the representatives of European totalitarianism. It had his supporters in Spain when Francisco Franco was in power, in Portugal during the reign of António de Oliveira Salazar, in the Romanian Iron Guard of Corneliu Codreanu Zelea, in Belgium among supporters of the fascist Christus Rex, and even in Poland, Great Britian, and France, but first and foremost in Benito Mussolini's Italy. The idea of fascism accompanied many dictatorships and political parties around the world, but its foundations was laid by Benito Mussolini. As Jerzy W. Borejsza rightly atates, Mussolini was the first. The subject of the article, therefore, is the Italian fascist ideal of upbringing. It is a preliminary reflections on the image of the individual as created by Italian ideologists. This allows us to trace the spread of the ideas of fascism to science and education, and show different aspects of such a doctrine. The article presents a general concept and definition of the ideal of upbringing, which allows us to organize the reulting knowledge from the perspective of the theorists of Italian fascism. The aim is to present the concept of the New Man concerning the creation, sujection, and upbringing of the ideal individual.
EN
This study presents an analysis of German-Italian relations in the time before World War II. It traces their diplomatic relations following the conclusion of the so-called Rome Protocols of 1934 via signing the treaty on the Berlin-Rome Axis (1936) towards the occupation of Austria in 1938 to analyze the difficult position of Vienna during those dramatic years. At the same time, it reveals to what extent the Austria of Dollfuss and Schuschnigg became political putty in the hands of Germany and Italy, and how Benito Mussolini was getting more and more willing to exchange his close links with Vienna for an alliance with Berlin, and thus shift his interest from Central-European politics towards the Mediterranean. The study also deals with one significant detail in Italian-German relations, namely with the arrival of Adolf Hitler, Chancellor of the German Reich, in Rome in May 1938, and with a reflection on fascist elites› attitudes as well as those of the Vatican towards his person. It also examines what the relations between him and the Holy Father were, and explains why he failed to meet Pope Pius XI in Rome, and what stand the Pope took on that occasion.
CS
Tato studie je analýzou německo‑ italských vztahů v období před druhou světovou válkou. Sleduje jejich diplomatické vztahy od uzavření tzv. římských protokolů v roce 1934 přes podepsání Osy Berlín‑ Řím (1936) k anšlusu Rakouska v roce 1938, aby analyzovala složité postavení Vídně v těchto dramatických letech. Současně odhaluje, nakolik se Dollfussovo a Schuschniggovo Rakousko stalo mocenskou hříčkou v rukou Německa a Itálie a jak byl Benito Mussolini postupně ochotnější vyměnit své úzké vazby k Vídni za spojenectví s Berlínem a přesunout svůj zájem ze středoevropské k středomořské politice. Studie se současně zabývá významným detailem z italsko‑ německých vztahů, a to příjezdem říšského kancléře Adolfa Hitlera do Říma v květnu 1938 a reflexí postojů jak fašistických elit, tak vatikánských špiček k jeho osobě. Analyzuje, jaké vztahy mezi ním a Svatým otcem panovaly a vysvětluje, proč nedošlo v Římě ke schůzce se Svatým otcem Piem XI. a jaký postoj papež při této příležitosti zaujal.
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EN
When the Great War came to an end, Europe was opened to various possibilities how to keep and ensure the peace. The concept of the collective security and disarmament won, despite of wishes and ideas of some politicians. Not every country was to keen to disarm its army capacity for the future uncertain promise of the collective security. For that reason, many politicians were eager to obtain special guarantees of their security, or security of all Europe. As the years went by, statesmen begun to realize that the Versailles Peace Treaty was not a sufficient element which should have to assure the peace in Europe. Many supplementary projects, treaties have been made to follow the path of maintain the peace after the war. None of them were fully realised. And some of them pursued another hidden targets. That is also an example of the Four-Power Pact. It is understandable some politicians wanted to reflect national interests into the international projects, like the Four-Power Pact. Benito Mussolini himself supported national feelings of unsatisfied results of the Great war for Italy, no matter how they were justified. The Four-Power Pact should have been the chance for Italy to be in an active role in a field of European politics. And what is the most important — to be a determinant of that politics and to change European order according to the Italian vi
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