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EN
The present contribution looks into selected aspects of the Bundesverfassungsgericht’s request for a preliminary ruling regarding the European Central Bank’s OMT Decision of September 2012 and the subsequent ruling in that regard by the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU). The author focuses not exclusively on the legal and economic ramifications of the judicial dialogue between the German court and the CJEU on the ECB’s OMT programme, but attempts to foreground political and societal anchoring behind the argumentation developed by both Courts. The main contention of this paper is that the instances of legal leveraging eminent in the CJUE’s jurisprudence stem from the mismatch between the ‘conventional’ legal reading of relevant provisions on the economic and monetary union on the one hand and most recent developments in EU/Eurozone economic governance, notably in response to the economic crisis, on the other. The author also points out that by its OMT Decision the ECB effected a qualitative change in the function it has vis-à-vis bondholders, namely, given the restrains of EU law, that of shadowing a lender of last resort.
PL
Niniejszy artykuł przybliża wybrane aspekty pytania prejudycjalnego skierowanego do Trybunału Sprawiedliwości UE (TSUE) przez Niemiecki Trybunał Konstytucyjny (Bundesverfassungsgericht) dotyczącego decyzji Europejskiego Banku Centralnego z września 2012 roku w sprawie bezwarunkowych transakcji monetarnych Eurosystemu na wtórnych rynkach obligacji skarbowych (decyzja w sprawie OMT), jak też późniejsze orzeczenie TSUE w tym zakresie. Autorka omawia prawno-ekonomiczne aspekty dialogu między niemieckim sądem i TSUE w sprawie programu OMT, zwracając jednocześnie uwagę na polityczno-społeczne uwarunkowania wykładni prawa sformułowanej w argumentacji obydwu sądów. Główną tezą artykułu jest twierdzenie, iż zastosowanie dźwigni prawnej (legal leveraging) w argumentacji sformułowanej przez TSUE wynika z rozbieżności pomiędzy „tradycyjną” wykładnią przepisów dotyczących unii gospodarczej i walutowej a stale zmieniających się realiów zarządzania gospodarczego w UE/strefie euro, w szczególności w odpowiedzi na kryzys gospodarczy. Autorka akcentuje ponadto jakościową zmianę w funkcji EBC wobec posiadaczy obligacji skarbowych w efekcie decyzji OMT. W percepcji tych ostatnich EBC będzie funkcjonował jako de facto pożyczkodawca ostatniej instancji, jednakże, zważywszy na ograniczenia wynikające z obecnie obowiązującego prawa UE, EBC będzie pełnił tę funkcję jedynie nieoficjalnie.
EN
For Poland, the "Warsaw Treaty between the Federal Republic of Germany and the People's Republic of Poland" brought legal certainty: The Polish western border was now recognized by both German states under international law. For the Federal Republic of Germany, the tough domestic political struggle for ratification of the treaty marks a turning point. The essay describes this struggle between the social-liberal government and the conservative opposition against the background of the German constitution (Basic Law), which should ensure the stability of the democratic system based on the experiences from the Weimar period. It shows how the conflict parties used instruments of the no-confidence vote and the dissolution of parliament and what role the Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) played in this conflict: The leading decision of the court is analysed in detail. Last but not least, the surprising role of the GDR in this conflict is also examined.
EN
The Eurozone Crisis is not just a monetary and economic challenge. It is as well the first tremendous challenge of the European Community and as well the national institutions and constitutions of the member states not only within the Eurozone. On one side the European Commission, the European Parliament and the ECB with its endeavours to safeguard and stabilize the single currency EURO within the Eurozone, to support the suffering countries in the south (PIIGS) with its struggle against speculative hedge funds, to render financial relief measures to those countries and its financial industry. Irrespective the fact governments and citizens within that countries, less appear to appreciate or honor that measures (Troika, Financial checks and budgetary control) as efficient help to stabilize but condemn as form of European paternalism and patronage. On the other hand the countries and its citizenship especially in the north of the Eurozone to set a stop sign to the EU and the ECB. Therefore they stress the Maastricht criteria and cite the Art 125 of the TEU, which prohibits one nation to stand for or to be liable for the Government debts of another nation (no bail out). Especially in the German perspective the demarcation line appears to run along between the European Commission, European Central Bank and European Court on the European side and the Bundesverfassungsgericht, the Bundesbank on the national German side. Each of the institutions feels to be bound to its origin functions and principles and save the respective constitution and the task rendered by that constitution. For a better understanding it is essential to get aware of and to reinforce the constitutional role which the Grundgesetz awarded to the Bundesverfassungsgericht and the Bundesbank and the German citizenship placing their confidence in these institutions. Es soll konkret das Verhältnis zur Nichtbeistandsklausel No-Bail-out Klausel Art 125 AEUVertrag, den Europäischen Fiskalpakt / dem ESFS, ESM / dem OMT-Programm der EZB, möglichen Entwicklung des EU zur Haftungs- und Transferunion mit einem zukünftigen Haftungsautomatismus der Mitglieder, der Unterscheidung von gemeinsamer Währungspolitik und nationaler Wirtschaftspolitik, der drohenden Vergemeinschaftung von Staatsschulden einzelner EU-Länder, die Budgethoheit des nationalen Parlaments als freie Entscheidung über die Verwendung des nationalen Haushaltes untersucht werden. Mit allen diesen Fragen mussten sich das höchste Deutsche und Europäische Gericht in jüngster Vergangenheit intensiv beschäftigen.
EN
Metaphorizing the Holocaust: The Ethics of Comparison    This paper focuses on the ethics of metaphor and other forms of comparison that invoke National Socialism and the Holocaust. It seeks to answer the question: Are there criteria on the basis of which we can judge whether metaphors and associated tropes “use” the Holocaust appropriately? In analyzing the thrust and workings of such comparisons, the paper also seeks to identify and clarify the terminology and concepts that allow productive discussion. In line with its conception of metaphor that is also rhetorical praxis, the paper focuses on specific controversies involving the metaphorization of the Holocaust, primarily in Germany and Austria. The paper develops its argument through the following process. First, it examines the rhetorical/political contexts in which claims of the Holocaust’s comparability (or incomparability) have been raised. Second, it presents a review (and view) of the nature of metaphor, metonymy, and synecdoche. It applies this framework to (a) comparisons of Saddam Hussein with Hitler in Germany in 1991; (b) the controversies surrounding the 2004 poster exhibition “The Holocaust on Your Plate” in Germany and Austria, with particular emphasis on the arguments and decisions in cases before the courts in those countries; and (c) the invocation of “Auschwitz” as metonym and synecdoche. These examples provide the basis for a discussion of the ethics of comparison. In its third and final section the paper argues that metaphor is by nature duplicitous, but that ethical practice involving Holocaust comparisons is possible if one is self-aware and sensitive to the necessity of seeing the “other” as oneself. The ethical framework proposed by the paper provides the basis for evaluationg the specific cases adduced.
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