Full-text resources of CEJSH and other databases are now available in the new Library of Science.
Visit https://bibliotekanauki.pl

Results found: 3

first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last

Search results

Search:
in the keywords:  CARNAP
help Sort By:

help Limit search:
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
1

CARNAP AND LANGUAGE: FROM VIENNA TO SANTA FÉ

100%
Hanzel I.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
|
2007
|
vol. 14
|
issue 4
470-497
EN
The paper reconstructs three main stages in the development of Carnap's approach to language in the years 1931-1947. It starts with Carnap's approach to metalogic in his Viennese 'Zirkelprotokolle' (1931) and his 'Logische Syntax der Sprache' (1934) from the point of view of one-level approach to the relation between metalanguage and its object-language. It then analyzes Tarski's turn to semantics in his paper presented at the Paris conference in September 1935, as well as the implications of his view for Carnap's approach to semantics from 1935 until 1943. Finally, it analyzes Church's rediscovery of Frege and its impact on Carnap's shift to the extension/intension distinction in his semantics in the years 1943-1947.
2

NEUKONČENÝ PROJEKT TRANSPARENTNEJ INTENZIONÁLNEJ LOGIKY

75%
Hanzel I.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2019
|
vol. 74
|
issue 2
126 – 138
EN
In my paper I present a new view on the Transparent Intensional Logic (TIL), namely, from the point of view of Carnap’s so-called logic of science understood by him as logic of the language of science and, to be more specific, logic of the language of empirical science. First, I present Carnap’s project of the logic of science and show that it was not realized on the basis of Carnap’s semantics of intension and extension. Next, I show the negative effects of the absence of this realization for the philosophy of empirical science as it became apparent in the dispute between P. K. Feyerabend and C. G. Hempel. Finally, I indicate the set of issues that TIL could solve in the future by realizing Carnap’s (reformed) project.
3

STRUCTURAL REALISM WITHOUT METAPHYSICS: NOTES ON CARNAP’S MEASURED PRAGMATIC STRUCTURAL REALISM

63%
Beni M. D.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
|
2015
|
vol. 22
|
issue 3
302 – 324
EN
Carnap’s re-invention of the Ramsey-sentence approach to scientific theories has been at the centre of a new debate in recent years. Following Grover Maxwell, Psillos (2000a) argued that Carnap’s re-invention of the Ramsey-sentence had failed to lead to the desired neutral stance in the realism-instrumentalism debate, and ended, instead, to a form of structural realism which happened to be liable to Newman’s objection to Russell’s version of structural realism. The objection held that without putting suitable restrictions on the range of the variables of the Ramsey-sentence, a Ramsey-sentence approach to theories renders trivial and a priori true all ontological commitments to unobservable entities issued by scientific theories. By arguing that Carnap achieved the neutral stance, Friedman (2011) counter Psillos claim. He denied that any form of realism could be attributed to Carnap. In this paper, the author provides a middle ground, where an unorthodox form of structural realism could be attributed to Carnap. He highlights parts of Carnap’s work which deal with the problem of designation of abstract terms and the relation of the language to the facts of the matter (in Carnap 1934; 1950; 1966), to argue that it was Carnap’s view about the practical methodological considerations, being at work in the construction (or choice) of the linguistic systems, which led him to the unorthodox form of structural realism. The author claims also that the same practical considerations constitute the nub of a viable Carnapian answer to Newman’s objection.
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
JavaScript is turned off in your web browser. Turn it on to take full advantage of this site, then refresh the page.