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1

Patočkův projekt revize Husserlovy fenomenologie

100%
Slowikowa K.
Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)
|
2007
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vol. 55
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issue 4
511-536
EN
The article presents a critical analysis of Patocka's attempt to revise Husserlian phenomenology. The considerations are divided into four sections. In the first section, Patocka's critique is presented, the core of which consists in the accusation of Cartesianism. From this critique Patocka's concepts of intention, intuition (Anschauung), reflexion and the subject, resp. consciousness emerge. Within this conceptual framework the problem of perception arises, as a meeting of inside and outside, intention and intuition, all of which have been strictly separated by Patocka. The concept of immanence of the presence, which sets out to clarify the problem, is shown to only further exacerbate it. In consequence two irreconcilable motifs are distinguished, which have been named as Cartesianism in the proper sense and physicalism. Their intertwining within Patocka's thought results most firstly, in a disintegration of the concept of object into a double meaning, secondly, in a shift between the concept of consciousness and the concept of subject, and finally in the ambiguity of the argument of Cartesianism itself. In the following third section several of Patocka's concepts are analyzed in order to illustrate this mutual intertwining and its consequences: the problem of continuity of consciousness and the assertion that consciousness is an object, which further results in a misinterpretation of Husserlian concepts of immanence and overlapping (Deckung). On this basis the thesis is put forward that Patocka's conception is a contradictory one. Finally, three possibilities of how to proceed with this conception, if it is not to be abandoned, have been formulated: the first two of them have resulted in concepts which, according to the criteria given by us, must be considered non-phenomenological. The third possibility amounts to a cancellation of Patocka's revision, thus turning us back to Husserlian phenomenology.
2

EXPRESSION, SELF-KNOWLEDGE AND AUTHORITY. WITTGENSTEIN AND SUBJECTIVITY

100%
Varga S.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2008
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vol. 63
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issue 9
830-838
EN
The author will undertake the attempt to outline Wittgenstein's account of subjectivity by focusing on the central notion of expression, emerging from the rejection of the false alternative between Cartesianism and Behaviourism. Although allowing us to rethink the relationships between inner and outer and self and other, the notion of expression does not seem to provide a plausible explanation of first-person authority. His main point will be that by differentiating the term knowledge (utilizing Polanyi's and Shoemaker's accounts), we can expand Wittgenstein's model in a way helps us understand self-knowledge and first person
3

O pewnych problemach racjonalistycznej filozofii umysłu i filozofii języka. Uwagi na marginesie Rozprawy fizykalnej o mowie Geraulda de Cordemoy

88%
Święczkowska H.
Białostockie Archiwum Językowe
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2014
|
issue 14
261-276
EN
The deliberations contained herein concern the issues touched upon in a short work titled A philosophical discourse concerning speech written by Geraud de Cordemoy (1626-1684), a French philosopher and thinker who – in his own words – was a firm believer in the philosophy of Descartes and claimed to be a Cartesian. Apart from Logic and Grammar from Port-Royal, Cartesian literature of the 17th does not present a single other separate work devoted to the philosophy of language and the properties of speech. Aside from several interesting topics discussed by the author, one particular issue deserves special attention – namely, the occasionalistic interpretation of the mechanism of human communication. Still, this concept does not tower over other issues which, when reflected upon within the framework of Cartesian doctrine, gain new meaning in the context of contemporary discussion on the phenomenon of speech, its ontogenesis, and social functions. These include Coremoy’s thoughts on the social aspects of language and the mechanism of speech acquisition in childr
4

MOLIÈRE, DESCARTES, GÉNÉROSITÉ

88%
Boros G.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2009
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vol. 64
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issue 2
133-143
EN
The article deals with the notion of generosite, an important concept of the 17th century moral philosophy, as well as with the metamorphosis of the meaning of this passion and/or virtue. The starting point of this metamorphosis is generosite as a virtue of the late medieval and early modern French noble man, whereas the end point is generosite as the passion/virtue of Descartes' (equally) rational beings. The paper analyses this phenomenon in Moliere's play Don Juan, and in Descartes' and Spinoza's texts
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