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SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS AND SELF-KNOWLEDGE. EPISTEMOLOGICAL POINT OF VIEW. (Samoswiadomosc i samowiedza z punktu widzenia epistemologii)

100%
Zieminska R.
Analiza i Egzystencja. Czasopismo Filozoficzne
|
2008
|
issue 7
33-51
EN
Self-consciousness is the source or set of information about our own present mental states. My self-knowledge is the set of all my information about myself, not only about my present mental states, but also my past mental states, my personality, my body or even my unconsciousness. Many philosophers thought that self-consciousness data are certain knowledge (Brentano, Husserl, Ingarden) but many contemporary philosophers claim that the first-person knowledge does not exist (Wittgenstein, Ryle, Dennett). Davidson refutes both behaviorism and subjectivity myth and takes some moderate position: first-person knowledge is dependent on third-person knowledge but third-person knowledge is dependent on first-person knowledge. There are some problems to reduce consciousness to physical states and to know about it. So, first-person knowledge is not certain and autonomous but it does exist and play important role. The two interdependent kinds of knowledge are two pillars of human knowledge. According to Davidson there is also some third pillar and it is the second-person knowledge.
2
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WITTGENSTEIN ON KNOWLEDGE AND OBJECTIVE CERTAINTY (Wittgenstein o wiedzy i pewnosci obiektywnej)

100%
Czesna E.
Analiza i Egzystencja. Czasopismo Filozoficzne
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2009
|
issue 9
EN
In 'On Certainty' Wittgenstein describes the valid uses of 'I know'. On the one hand, he criticizes Moore for relating 'I know' to certainties (hinge propositions) of our world picture (certainties such as 'I have two hands', 'The earth existed long before my birth', 'Cats do not grow on trees'). He argues (against Moore) that saying 'I know that I have two hands' in standard circumstances is nonsensical since it yields no information. On the other hand, Wittgenstein himself occasionally uses the verb 'to know' with reference to the said certainties. The author argues that it is not a contradiction on the account provided in his investigations. The critique of Moore's utterances in 'On Certainty' focuses on Moore's attempt to make assertions about reality, i.e. to voice empirical knowledge, while being hardly concerned with grammatical or practical knowledge. The author reckons that apart from some epistemic uses of 'to know' (know-that), Wittgenstein allows some non-epistemic uses of this verb (know-how). In the second listed meaning, 'I know' could be replaced by: 'You can absolutely rely on it; there is no doubt about it', 'It makes, in this case, no sense to talk of a doubt', 'I shall act with a certainty that rules out all doubt, in accordance with my belief'. Shortly speaking, 'I know' can express objective certainty (if, of course, there is a grammatical place for such an expression in our practice). Objective certainty, which is the subject of Wittgensteinian investigations, can be interpreted in terms of practical knowledge (know-how).
3

Upór – nowe oblicze pewności. Luter a nowoczesność

84%
Bartoś T.
Kwartalnik Filozoficzny
|
2017
|
vol. 45
|
issue 4
37-55
EN
Stubbornness – a new mode of cognitive being in the world. Resolve (Entschlossenheit), decisiveness – this is how we can philosophically characterize Luther’s attitude, which is in fact a continuation of medieval disputes, and of the Franciscan and Ockhamist nominalist priority of will over reason, decision over cognition. This is linked with the modern passion for certainty – first, religious certainty (Reformation, Counter-Reformation) and then philosophical certainty, in the new Cartesian/Leibnizian paradigm of philosophizing more geometrico. Finally, there is the scientistic illusion of possessing the philosopher’s stone. All these changes thoroughly modified the notion of truth and how it is employed, giving rise to a new doctrinairism as an invention of modernity. The first to take a stand against this trend was Nietzsche, writing of truth as “a mobile army of metaphors, metonyms, and anthropomorphisms,” fretting poetically over his own thoughts: at first joyous and soaring, they coagulate in deadly earnest and harden into – God forbid – truths. Here the notion of truth as being right is fundamentally shaken. This work was continued systematically and effectively in the 20th century by Martin Heidegger.
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