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Stanislaw Antoni Szczuka as the Crown Referendary in 1688-1699

100%
Zielinska T.
|
2004
|
vol. 111
|
issue 3
5-22
EN
Stanislaw Antoni Szczuka (about 1654-1710) appeared frequently in sources for the reign of Jan III Sobieski and the beginnings of the reign of King Augustus II. The author presents his career from the time he assumed the office of the Crown Referendary in 1688 to his transference to the office of Vice-Chancellor of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania (1699). The competence of the office of a referendary who, for all practical purposes, fulfilled court functions, was not distinctly defined in the legislature of the Commonwealth. One could have expected that Szczuka's copious correspondence from the period when he held this post would contribute to its further characterisation. The authors of the letters, written in 1688-1699, were numerous representatives of the prosperous middle gentry and magnates. The letters concerned primarily requests for royal privileges relating to public offices, and sometimes for other forms of benefiting from state revenues. Upon certain occasions, they promised both him and the king (sometimes also the queen) suitable 'fees', whose level depended on the rank of the desired office. The letters almost never mention problems associated with holding the office of a referendary. The poll conducted upon the basis of the letters addressed to Szczuka at the time when he was a regent of the Crown Chancery (1684-1688) made it possible to ascertain that his correspondents were representatives of the same environments and sometimes the same people who later on wrote to him in his capacity as a referendary. The topics of the letters are identical, the only difference being that Szczuka received many more letters as a regent of the Crown Chancery than as a referendary. The reason probably lay in the fact that as the chancery regent he enjoyed direct impact upon the editing and rate of issuing documents. Hence, his protection was much more important for the interested parties than the influence of his formal superiors. All authors dealing with Szczuka's public career stress the part played by the favours of King Jan Sobieski, certainly at the beginning of the career. At the time of Augustus II the number of petitioners writing to Szczuka diminished only slightly. Finally, it must be added that the letters addressed to Szczuka constitute a rich source for learning about the mechanisms which shaped his public career. At the same time, they indicate that the competence of the referendary office played a secondary role, and that the discussed letters do not enhance our knowledge about its functioning.
2

NEW SOCIAL VACUUM, OR THE NATURE OF SOCIAL BONDS IN THE THIRD REPUBLIC OF POLAND.

80%
Kubiak A., Miszalska A.
Kultura i Społeczeństwo
|
2004
|
vol. 48
|
issue 2
19-43
EN
It is argued that social vacuum and atomisation typical of the Polish People's Republic (PRL) have recurred as vacuum and atomisation of the new democratic society. The observed symptoms include lack of social trust in Poland, use of social capital to pursue particularistic goals at the cost of common interest, erosion of extended horizontal bonds, decline of working environment (and the lack of working environment in case of the unemployed), pathology of power among local self-government authorities, within party and corporate systems, corruption, political and economic clientelism. The authors have outlined a number of sources of social atomisation such as Poland's historical legacy, persistent social instability, pessimistic attitudes, individualistic egoism, trauma of transition, 'cultural vacuum', axiological and normative chaos.
3

NEW-OLD CLENTELISM

80%
Tyminski M., Korys P.
Kultura i Społeczeństwo
|
2004
|
vol. 48
|
issue 2
97-120
EN
This article reconstructs the mechanisms underlying elections to supervisory boards of public media. The analysis is based on protocols of hearings conducted by the Parliamentary Investigation Commission, which investigated mechanisms of a paid protection and log-rolling among political elites in the so-called Rywin-gate. Starting from a description of clientelist connections under the communist regime and the role played by the nomenclature, the authors associate the mechanisms occurring during the previous regime with those observed in the National Council for Radio and Television Broadcasting (KRRiT). From a formal point of view, the current procedures of selection to supervisory boards of public media differ from the nomenclature rules which applied during the communist time. Nevertheless, both of them resulted in similar development of informal connections and group interests. The rules of appointment in the post-communist Poland imitate the informal structures developed by the previous regime. The selection to supervisory boards exemplifies the mechanisms of reproduction of political elites and the cooptation inherited from communism.
4

NEPOTIZMUS V SPRÁVE SPIŠSKEJ STOLICE V ROKOCH 1711 – 1785

70%
Janura T.
Historický časopis (Historical Journal)
|
2020
|
vol. 68
|
issue 3
409 – 437
EN
The study is devoted to the creation of nepotistic ties between individual officials in the administration of the County of Spiš (Comitatus Scepusiensis, Szepes vármegye, Zipser Gespannschaft, Spišská stolica). In comparison with the County of Liptov, the ties between officials in Spiš were usually not on the level of cousin, uncle, nephew, son-in-law, brother-in-law or god-son. On the basis of the surviving registers, it is possible to conclude that the system of ecclesiastical officials also did not develop in Spiš in a similar way to that in Liptov. These phenomena were clearly connected with the lack of a firm marriage alliance between the Görgey and Máriássy families, which were comparable to the two firmly allied Liptov families: the Okolicsányis and Szentiványis. The only deputy sheriff of Spiš who systematically build up a network of relations was Stephen Máriássy.
5

THE DRIVING FORCES FOR UNWANTED REFORMS: LESSONS FROM THE UKRAINIAN TRANSITION (Rushiini syly nebazhanykh reform: uroky ukrainskoho perekhidnoho periodu)

70%
Dubrovskiy V., Szyrmer J., Graves I. W., Golovakha Y., Haran' O., Pavlenko R.
Sotsiolohiia: teoriia, metody, marketyng (Sociology: Theory, Methods, Marketing)
|
2010
|
issue 1
56-72
EN
The article explores the political-economic mechanisms that lead to economic reforms even if the state is 'captured' with the rent-seeking interests, as was the case in Ukraine in 1990th. The authors argue that unless the social capital is strong enough to solve the coordination problems, the rent seeking can be sustainable for a long time only if the players are coordinated forcedly by an authoritarian arbiter. Such arrangement is mutually associated with peoples' passivity, and inability of comprehending the virtues of market coordination based on the private property rights. Until this public consciousness will change such way, that already emerged market institutions will start crowding out the rent-seeking ones, the deterioration of authoritarian control and coordination due to the technical and societal progress remains the main long-term factor of reforms. Although such deterioration does not cease the rent seeking and can even release it, a lack of control makes it unsustainable, so replacing of the forced coordination with the market one based on universal protection of the property rights is required. Due to this mechanism the market reforms may occur despite absence of either a benevolent reformist government, or even vested group's interests.
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