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Annales Scientia Politica
|
2020
|
vol. 9
|
issue 2
5 – 15
EN
The article opposes the rejection of autonomy in favour of coercive paternalism. Based on the thought of especially John Stuart Mill, Immanuel Kant, and Joel Feinberg, it suggests that autonomy as an ideal, a moral capacity, and a foundational principle in liberal democracies must not be surrendered for a doctrine of benevolent coercion. The arguments are equally concerned with the justifications for coercion, the value of autonomy and moral agency, and the dangers of paternalism (e.g. infantilization). The article concludes that Mill’s soft paternalism based on the harm principle could serve as a reasonable middle-ground allowing for the most severe types of self-harming behaviour to be avoided without surrendering autonomy altogether.
EN
Descriptivists' method of naturalizing moral language is neither the only nor the most promising one in metaethics. The paper deals with attempts to combine the expressivistic account of moral concepts with an evolutionary research programme. As Allan Gibbard (1990, p. 70) puts it: 'Normative discussion is part of nature but it does not describe nature'. First, Gibbard's expressivism is outlined against the background of the theory of evolution. Then the Author proceeds to his own metaethical theory according to which, to take but one example, the judgment that 'a' is morally wrong consists of a belief that it is possible to avoid a, a belief that there is a universal property 'P' which 'a' exemplifies, a desire not to actualize 'a', a disposition (1) to desire not to actualize anything that instantiates the property 'P', and a disposition (2) to desire to subject everyone who does 'a' to coercive measures (including punishment). Language thus interpreted is shown to be an opposite tool for negotiating a stable normative consensus; it addresses specific problems of cooperation viewed from the evolutionary perspective. Finally, it is argued that the Author's proposal exhibits some important advantages over Gibbard's theory.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2010
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vol. 65
|
issue 5
417-427
EN
There is nothing like power in itself. What we can experience is only the particular forms and effects of the power relations. Similarly, there is no single and universal definition of power. The concept of power embodies its various relations and aspects, such as power relations, the relationships between power and institutions, government, influence, authority, coercion, violence, manipulation, freedom. Attention is paid to each of these relationships and aspects. Their interconnections and differences are shown as well.
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