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THE (UN)CONSCIOUSNESS OF ANIMALS AND THEIR MORAL STATUS. HOW CAN ONE RECONCILE ETHICS WITH THE PHILOSOPHY OF MIND

100%
Kittel M.
Etyka (Ethics)
|
2006
|
issue 39
99-114
EN
Philosophers of mind are beginning to take an important part in the debate about the moral status of animals. However, some of the most promising contemporary theories of consciousness imply that animals cannot suffer like human beings. This claim is unacceptable for many scholars concerned about animal welfare. Moreover, it is equally troublesome for those ethicists who take the ability to suffer to be the basis requirement for granting a being moral standing, because their moral institutions seems to contradict the results of cognitive sciences. The author proposes to solve the problem by rejecting the idea of there being a necessary link between possessing moral status and the ability to suffer (understood in the standard way). Also, he presents a proposal for how at least some of the institutions based on empathy may be defended and become useful in the discussion about the moral status of animals.
2
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Fenomenologia a projekt naturalizacji

88%
Zahavi D.
Avant
|
2011
|
vol. 2
|
issue T
41-57
EN
In recent years more and more people have started talking about the necessity of reconciliating phenomenology with the project of naturalization. Is it possible to bridge the gap between phenomenological analyses and naturalistic models of consciousness? Is it possible to naturalize phenomenology? In their long introduction to the book Naturalizing Phenomenology published by Stanford University Press in 1999, the four co-editors, Jean Petitot, Francisco Varela, Bernard Pachoud, and Jean-Michel Roy set out to delineate what might be seen as a kind of manifesto for this new approach. An examination of this introduction is consequently a good starting point for a discussion of the issue.
3
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Przerysować mapę i przestawić czas: fenomenologia i nauki kognitywne

88%
Gallagher S., Varela F.
Avant
|
2010
|
vol. 1
|
issue 1
EN
We argue that phenomenology can be of central and positive importance to the cognitive sciences, and that it can also learn from the empirical research conducted in those sciences. We discuss the project of naturalizing phenomenology and how this can be best accomplished. We provide several examples of how phenomenology and the cognitive sciences can integrate their research. Specifically, we consider issues related to embodied cognition and intersubjectivity. We provide a detailed analysis of issues related to time consciousness, with reference to understanding schizophrenia and the loss of the sense of agency. We offer a positive proposal to address these issues based on a neurobiological dynamic-systems model.
4
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EXISTENTIAL FREEDOM AND A PSYCHOLOGICAL UNDERSTANDING OF FREEDOM. CAN PSYCHOLOGY AS A SCIENCE ACCESS CATEGORIES OF EXISTENTIAL PHILOSOPHY? (Wolnosc egzystencjalna... Czy psychologii... dostepne sa kategorie egzystencjalnej filozofii?)

75%
Trzopek J.
Analiza i Egzystencja. Czasopismo Filozoficzne
|
2008
|
issue 8
65-83
EN
The range of issues presented in the article is centred around various perspectives of thinking about human freedom: existential freedom, freedom on the mental level as well as freedom in contemporary cognitive sciences. The first one is based on the philosophical (especially in K. Jaspers approach) elaboration of the experience of a person. The second one pertains to our actual psychological capabilities and limitations; here the works of such doctors and therapists as K. G. Jung, E. Fromm, A. Kepinski and others have been adopted for the basis. Finally, the third one deals with the way which freedom is treated in within the cognitive trend dominating scientific psychology. Performed comparisons demonstrate that both the 'existential freedom' as well as the 'freedom on the mental level' seem to be phenomena resisting the investigation by naturalistically-oriented scientific psychology with its 'subjective' 'third person' methodology. Psychology which aspires to be counted among natural sciences, similarly to other sciences from this domain engages in the detection of relations, causative and functional laws and 'mechanism' belying investigated phenomena. 'Freedom' - if it is spoken about - is here rather 'perceived' or 'experienced' - awhile not real. At the same time it seems that psychology, as a detailed science should not - without venturing beyond its own competencies - explicitly formulate statements pertaining to the meaning of the experience of freedom or the existence of freedom 'as such'. The issues mentioned are relevant insofar as they pertain to the question regarding the possibility and a potential scope of changes which can occur in a subject at the participation of its will and its own work.
5
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Umysł w życiu. Streszczenie Mind in Life: Biology, Phenomenology, and the Sciences of Mind

75%
Thompson E.
Avant
|
2011
|
vol. 2
|
issue T
83-95
EN
The theme of this book is the deep continuity of life and mind. Where there is life there is mind, and mind in its most articulated forms belongs to life. Life and mind share a core set of formal or organizational properties, and the formal or organizational properties distinctive of mind are an enriched version of those fundamental to life.
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