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1

K INTERPRETÁCII MOOROVEJ PROTISKEPTICKEJ FILOZOFIE

100%
Nuhlíček M.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2010
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vol. 65
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issue 1
74-82
EN
G. E. Moore replies to scepticism by using propositions which are trivially true from the common sense perspective. However, it seems that his replies are not effective, because the sceptic's doubts concern precisely the common sense truths. This problem became the subject of various interpretations. N. Malcolm and B. Stroud suggest that Moore is not trying to refute scepticism directly (he would not have been successful and it is not probable that he would have overlooked such a 'fatal' error). Therefore, they look for an alternative interpretation of Moore's replies. They find the ground of their effectiveness in his pointing to the use of words, as well as in the illegitimacy of the sceptic's position. The author offers an interpretation in the terms of reliabilism, which avoids the defects of the previous ones and does not require an alternative understanding of Moore's propositions: Moore insists on the reliability of perception what enables him to yield effective replies to scepticism in agreement with common sense.
2

IS ODYSSEUS CUNNING?

100%
Wójcik B. H.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2012
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vol. 67
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issue 5
387 – 397
EN
What is the status of sentences about fictional entities? What is the reference of their grammatical subject? Do they possess a truth value? The paper explores possible explanations of a truth value of sentences about fictional entities. While avoiding the possible dependency on particular theories, it proceeds in accordance with its fundamental common sense and ordinary language philosophy assumptions, particularly that a statement expressed by a sentence about fiction has a truth value which is not dependent on any dynamic conditions or external changes. The paper argues that a paraphrasing strategy, which emphasises the reference to a past event of a creation of a work of fiction, is the most plausible explanation of such a state. It is not ontologically committed to any speculative metaphysics, while being justifiable both semantically and contextually, considerably simpler and not affected by the problems caused by so called meta-fictional sentences.
3
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ESSAY AND INTERDISCURSIVITY: KNOWLEDGE BETWEEN SINGULARITY AND SENSUS COMMUNIS

100%
Juvan M.
World Literature Studies
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2022
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vol. 14
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issue 4
48 – 59
EN
The disciplines increasingly organize knowledge, but according to Lukács and Adorno, the essay represents a continuing need for an intersection of disciplinary knowledge and the totality of experience. According to Foucault, the essays of Montaigne and Bacon embody the transition from medieval commentary to modern science’s empiricism and criticalness. The essay does not submit to the systematics of science but persists in the singularity of the literary work. It interdiscursively confronts personal experience with various discursive fields and constructs a fragmentary, perspectival, and aesthetic mode of truth. Notwithstanding the literary singularity of the essay, which corresponds to Kant’s “aesthetic idea”, the genre also relies on the sensus communis. Since the 18th century, the essay has established itself in newspapers, where it has become susceptible to stereotypes and ideologies. The tension between singularity and (medial) common sense is also evident in contemporary Slovenian examples (Marjan Rožanc).
4
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Objektivita teologického metaetického základu morálky človeka

88%
Ábel F.
Studia theologica
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2007
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vol. 9
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issue 3
17-30
EN
The world events of the last century again revivified discussion about the objectivity of theological meta-ethical foundation of human morality. The First and Second World War, genocides as the Holocaust or systematic repudiation of the otherness from the side of great majority, societal ethnic cleansing and many other forms of evil in daily life, partly in consequence of destructive activities of man, partly in consequence of natural and biological processes, these all are a part of tragic character of human nature. Despite of these realities, the elementary question about the theological meta-ethical foundation for morality is always the basic necessity in the human life. In this article, we try to show some philosophical as well as theological approaches to this question such as the ethical exegesis, biblical humanism, and the new way of interpretation of both experiences of personal faith and religious tradition. These approaches present some potential solutions, which could be at least a partial answer of this fundamental existential question.
5

FROM DEDUCTION TO KNOWLEDGE REPRESENTATION

88%
Vince M., Šefránek J.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
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2013
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vol. 20
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issue suppl. 2
216 – 234
EN
In this paper, we discuss why deduction is not sufficient for knowledge representation of programs with common sense. Requirements of representation of incomplete, evolutive and conflicting knowledge led to a rise of alternative logic formalisms, dubbed non-monotonic logics. Important features of non-monotonic logic were discussed on the example of default logic – a role of assumptions in reasoning, use of fix point constructions as a formal tool for building a non-monotonic semantics and, finally, computational aspects of non-monotonic reasoning. This overview is completed by a presentation of our approach to updates. Updates are closely connected to non-monotonic reasoning. We construct our approach for assumption based frameworks (and for default theories, as a consequence).
6

ZDRAVÝ ROZUM VO FILOZOFII THOMASA REIDA

88%
Nuhliček M.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2010
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vol. 65
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issue 5
449-460
EN
The paper offers a discussion of the concept of common sense in T. Reid's philosophy. Reid criticizes Hume's scepticism, which is in conflict with common sense, as a 'deadlock of philosophy'. Reid's criticism thus might be seen as naive and 'un-philosophical', and therefore missing the point. The author argues, however, that common sense, as used by Reid, is a metaphysical concept. In his view common sense and its principles delimit all plausible philosophizing. He also sees a remarkable affinity between Reid's philosophy and later Wittgenstein's considerations of 'the image of the world'. Reid's philosophy of common sense is an original philosophical resolution of the problem, which the philosophy 'in a deadlock' is facing, as well as an effective criticism of scepticism.
7
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IN THE SITE OF A THEORY AND HISTORY OF CULTURE. A GLANCE ON LUDWIK FLECK'S THEORY OF THOUGHT STYLES. PART II (W strone teorii i historii kultury. Spojrzenie na teorie stylów myslowych Ludwika Flecka. Czesc II)

75%
Rydlewski M.
Etnografia Polska
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2010
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vol. 54
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issue 1-2
65-88
EN
This article is the second part of the discussion on Ludwik Fleck, the author of The genesis and development a scientifict fact. In this paper I discuss several research areas mentioned in the previous article, such as common knowledge and the theory of perception. I believe they can only be properly understood by using the Fleck's concept of individual as well as the meaning. According to Fleck, a member of modern society lives in several thought collectives. Each individual participates in the collective of common knowledge, which is formed by simplified scientific knowledge and the circulation of thoughts. On its way from the scientific journal to the school handbook the subjective author's view is being changed into proven scientific fact. Before someone becomes an expert and a member of esoteric circle of particular field or domain, he or she is just a laic, who goes to school and learns from the handbooks. Fleck, several decades before Norwood Hanson, pointed out the relation between scientific discoveries and the perception showing that the observation is related to the theory. Fleck's theory of perception is similar to that of Ludwig Wittgenstein, then used by Hanson. Fleck argued that without the knowledge it's impossible to perceive, you can look at something, but you don't see it. It seems like the perception is the matter of mentality and the knowledge is being provided by the thought collective. The novelty of Fleck's theory was the role of metaphors in the creation of perceived figures. There is no observations uninfluenced by the thinking, according to Fleck, it also applies to the common sense.
8

Sceptycyzm i dyskusja z nim w filozofii George'a Berkeleya i Thomasa Reida

75%
Kucharski D.
Studia Philosophiae Christianae
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2010
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vol. 46
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issue 2
25-47
EN
The main aim of the paper is an attempt to characterize two different approaches to refute skepticism, namely, that of George Berkeley and Thomas Reid. The reason to choose these thinkers is twofold. First, the Berkeley's system (among other systems labeled by Reid as 'theory of ideas') was an object of a very serious and even fierce critique by T. Reid. That critique was meant as a first step for creating his own system known as the Scottish School of Common Sense. Second, despite of that critique, in many respects the philosophical views of Reid strikingly resemble these of Berkeley. And among the resemblances, the opinions of the two about the nature of perception of external objects play a very important role. Both philosophers take presentationalism as their own position. Both of them maintain that the other possible view, representationalism, leads inevitably to skepticism. And, last but not least, one should remember that for G. Berkeley and equally T. Reid the refutation of skepticism was one of the most important reasons for building their own systems. However, the similarities mentioned above prove to be rather superficial. It is common knowledge how much differ the outcomes of the attempts taken by Berkeley and Reid to refute skepticism. So similar assumptions and goals do not bring similar answers at all. The paper attempts to show how Berkeley and Reid dealt with the problem of skepticism. Namely, what they meant by skepticism, how they understood an object of perception, and how they defined the reality of an object. And what solution against skepticism they offered. As we know Berkeley came to the conclusion that immaterialism is the best remedy against skeptical doubts about perceiving the real world. The concept of material substance and the mediate perception of things were the main sources of skepticism. Reid, however, defended the material nature of objects of perception - that belief was an intrinsic part of common sense. He maintained that any discussion with that sort of beliefs is impossible, they lay the foundations of any other knowledge. Consequently Reid builds such a philosophical system that would justify and prove right the beliefs of common sense.
9

HUMANITARIAN COMPONENT OF CONFLICTS AS THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE HUMANITARIAN EXPERTISE (Humanitarnyi komponent konfliktiv yak predmet humanitarnoi ekspertyzy)

63%
Ischenko Y.
Філософська Думка
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2010
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issue 2
97-105
EN
An integral approach towards an investigation of 'humanitarian composite' of conflicts, which is not reduced to sociological, psychological, legal, moral and other dimensions, is suggested in the article. To prove it, the author applies to the habitus theory of P. Bourdieu and to the instruments of phenomenological sociology, represented, first of all, by A. Schutz and T. Luckman, as well as to the moral conception of Ch. Taylor, in which human identity is regarded from the standpoint of moral orientation in social space. A thought, that an identity is created by means of liabilities and identifications, that constitute the framework for the space where the identities define their positions, is maintained. So, the issue of moral orientation cannot be solved by means of general terms. The thing we call the 'identity crisis' is an acute form of disorientation, and people often express within the terms of not-knowing who they are. From this standpoint, the definitions of 'humanitarian crisis', 'humanitarian catastrophe', 'humanitarian values', 'humanitarian assistance', 'humanitarian expertise', traditional for humanitarian analytics, are read in a new way. The latter should not be regarded as that, aimed to solve problems instead of a human, but as that, aimed to make a human to take a decision concerning his/her life independently and knowingly. Thus, the emphasis is transferred from an avoidable evaluation of possible risks and dangers to the human's possibility of independent partaking in the treatment of his/her 'disease' (liquidation of the mentioned risks and dangers) and 'good-bad' definition for his/her life, i.e. to achieve the condition, having a sense of a certain therapeutic effect.
10
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IN THE SITE OF A THEORY AND HISTORY OF CULTURE. A GLANCE ON LUDWIK FLECK'S THEORY OF THOUGHT STYLES (W strone teorii i historii kultury. Spojrzenie na teorie stylów myslowych Ludwika Flecka)

63%
Rydlewski M.
Etnografia Polska
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2009
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vol. 53
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issue 1-2
113-132
EN
Humanistic reflection on culture is very important in Polish science. It is one of the most interesting themes of Polish philosophy, represented by Stanislaw Brzozowski, Bronislaw Malinowski, Florian Znaniecki, Leszek Kolakowski, Zygmunt Bauman, Jerzy Kmita. One of the greatest, still unknown, is Ludwik Fleck, who was a medical doctor (outstanding mickrobiologist) and an author of a book Genesis and Development a Scientifict Fact published in 1935, where he discusses sociological perception of science. Fleck is becoming popular among Polish representatives of humanities, especially sociologists and philosophers. His theory and point of view on developing of knowledge, organizes the discussion between realism (philosophy of science) and anti-realism (non-classical sociology of knowledge, sociology of scientific knowledge, science and technology studies). Fleck's theory of 'thought collectives' and 'thought styles' is completely unknown to Polish ethnologists. In author's opinion, Fleck's theory should be treated as a theory of culture in the anthropological sense, which can be useful to describe how culture works. He underlines that Fleck's theory can be useful in studies on cultural change, theory of vision and common sense. From methodological point of view Fleck's theory is more interesting (more empirical) than Thomas Kuhn's, and is putting culture closer to the development of science. In author's opinion Fleck's theory is a mature theory of non-classical sociology of knowledge. However, it appeared almost forty years before this sociological project. Even today Fleck's words are still worth mentioning. We can easily find ideas of H. Putnam, W. V. O. Quine, S. Fish in Fleck's papers. In author's opinion Fleck is a philosopher who is crossing the borders of anthropology, sociology of knowledge and onthological thesis of an American pragmatism. The author considers Fleck's theory to be an useful instrument which helps us to understand society. In his opinion, this theory should be widely discussed and used as a tool in Polish ethnology.
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