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PL
W artykule opisane są wyobrażenia Rosjan mieszkających w Rosji (Moskwa) o dwóch punktach mentalnego obrazu świata – o ojczyźnie i obczyźnie. Semantyka przejścia ze swojej przestrzeni w obcą analizowana jest na przykładzie konceptu ‘emigracja’. Materiałem dla wykazania semantyki oznaczonych konceptów posłużyły wyniki kognitywnego i skojarzeniowego eksperymentów przeprowadzonych wśród studentów moskiewskich uczelni w 2001 roku. W trakcie eksperymentów informatorów pierwszej ankiety proszono o podanie spontanicznych reakcji na słowa-bodźce reprezentujące sferę swojej lub obcej przestrzeni (dom, ojczyzna, obczyzna, rosyjski itd.), w drugiej zaś ankiecie proszono o definicję treści tych pojęć. Ogólna suma otrzymanych odpowiedzi na każde ze słów-bodźców została posegregowana na rubryki tematyczne na podstawie metody wyodrębnienia dominanty semantycznej. Zarówno całe komponenty semantyczne, jak i poszczególne reakcje porównywano i zestawiano w trakcie analizy z danymi folkloru i literatury. Na materiale danych ankietowych, które odzwierciedlają indywidualne wyobrażenia, treść konceptu ‘ojczyzna’ w świadomości dzisiejszych studentów składa się z domu, rodziny, bliskich i krewnych. Te komponenty sfery rodziny przenoszą się, pomijając pośrednie kręgi schematu przestrzeni swojej, w przestrzeń kraju ograniczonego przede wszystkim granicą kulturowo-językową, nie zaś państwową. Obczyzna, odbierana jako przeciwieństwo ojczyzny, przedstawia się w świadomości współczesnych studentów częściej jako oddalony fragment przestrzeni, któremu brakuje jakiegokolwiek rozczłonkowania na komponenty. Introspektywne spojrzenie pozwala zobaczyć obczyznę jako miejsce naznaczone przez niewykonanie całego szeregu warunków koniecznych dla harmonijnego istnienia człowieka.
EN
The article presents the ideas cherished by Moscow-based Russians of two points in their mental worldview: 'homeland' and 'foreign land'.The semantics of transfer from one's own space to foreign, alien space is analyzed on the basis of the concept of 'emigration'. A cognitive-associative experiment was conducted among Moscow students in 2001. In the first part, respondents were asked to spontaneously react to prompt words representing their own or foreign space ('dom' home, 'rodina' homeland, 'chuzhbina' foreign land, 'russkii' Russian etc.). In the second part they were asked to define these concepts. The answers were then divided into thematic categories according to the principle of distinguishing the semantic determinant. Whole semantic components and individual reactions were compared and juxtaposed with folk and literary data. A conclusion is drawn that in the consciousness of present-day students, 'homeland' consists of 'dom' (home), 'semya' (family), 'blizkye' (the close ones) and 'rodnoya' (relatives). These components of the sphere of 'semya' (family) are transferred, with the omission of indirect components of the schema of one's own space, onto the realm of the country, delimited above all in a cultural-linguistic, rather than political manner. 'Chuzhbina' (foreign land), perceived in an opposition to 'rodina' (homeland), is more often conceptualized as a distant portion of space, lacking componential structure. Introspection allows one to see the foreign land as a place which does not meet a whole range of conditions necessary for a harmonious existence of humans.
EN
In chapter 3 of 'Individuals', entitled 'Persons', Strawson argues against dualism and the no-ownership theory, and proposes instead that our concept of a person is a primitive concept. In this paper, it is argued that the basic questions that frame Strawson's discussion, and some of his main arguments and claims, are dubious. A general diagnosis of the source of these problems is proposed. It is argued that despite these problems Strawson gives an accurate and very insightful description of the way we think about ourselves, which should form the starting point for more speculative accounts of ourselves.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2013
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vol. 68
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issue 6
470 – 480
EN
The aim of this article is to compare two different cognitive theses and very similar views on the function of mind: on one hand the thesis of the medieval doctor invincibilis W. Ockham, concerning the crucial architecture of intellect, and on the other hand the psycho-semantics of mind as presented by J. Fodor. These authors deal with different contexts, themes and presuppositions. Through comparing these presuppositions a new and profound significance in both of them can be found.
EN
The contribution is based on the authors' experience gathered during the work on the history of Czech studies from the linguistic point of view that resulted in a book (Kapitoly z dejin ceske jazykovedne bohemistiky, 2007). The authors point out significant moments to be taken into consideration when the development of Czech studies from the linguistic point of view is considered (extralinguistic, theoretical, teleological circumstances) as well as their consequences. Their considerations lead to the conclusion that to know the history of linguistic thought is important not only in order to understand its development as such, but, based on the connections revealed, also in order to better understand the present-day orientation of Czech studies in the Czech context.
EN
Christopher Peacocke is supporter of the standpoint, which claims, that the connection between the content of mental states and concepts, which are constituents of the content, has implications for self-knowledge. Without an answer to the question, 'What is it for a subject to posses a concept?' we cannot answer the question, 'How does a subject acquire self-knowledge?'. The connection between a concept, its possession conditions, and semantic value Peacocke explains in Fregean way. This connection leads also to the specific model of self-knowledge constructed by Peacocke
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2021
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vol. 76
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issue 1
3 – 17
EN
The aim of the paper is to examine whether conceptual relativism is a prerequisite for conceptual engineering (and if so, then to what extent). In the first part of the paper, I explore and classify varieties of relativism to prepare a distinctive definition of conceptual relativism. In the second part I analyse conceptual relativism and I consequently propose two different readings of conceptual scheme: (i) conceptual scheme as a monolithic, timeless, and determinate systems of meanings, and (ii) conceptual scheme as a system of relatively stable meanings, that is based on agreement and is open to change over time. In the third part of the paper, I show that of those two readings only the second reading of conceptual scheme fits into the practice of conceptual engineering.
EN
Empirical examinations about cross-cultural variability of intuitions, the well-known publication of Stich and his colleagues criticizing thought-experiments and intuitions in philosophical debates, is still a challenge that faces analytical philosophers, as any systematic investigation of the methodology of philosophy must give answers to these basic questions: What is an intuition? What role should intuitions play in philosophy? The author presents and examines the sceptical argument of experimental philosophers, and claims that experimental philosophers misunderstand the role of evidence in philosophy. His argument will utilize Goldman’s view, according to which intuitions give reliable (though not infallible) evidence about a person’s Concepts, and this knowledge is valuable for further philosophical research as well. The author will argue that the sceptical conclusions of experimental philosophers are harmless against this conception of philosophy, because even from a naturalist perspective certain kind of intuitive judgments about our concepts can be warranted, and this grants the specific epistemic status of intuitions. Of course, the reliability of introspection can be challenged. However, denying self-knowledge about his internal mental states is disputable – as he will show – both from a philosophical and a scientific point of view.
EN
Theodor Wiesengrund Adorno was one of the most original and important philosophers of the 20th century. His pivotal work is Negative Dialectic (1966). It presents the methodology of his critical thought and aesthetic analyses, the source of the categories, concepts, and theories through which his philosophical thinking operates and develops. I argue for that his methodology has its roots not only in Western metaphysical thought (Kantian, Hegelian) and an anti-metaphysical materialism (Marx), but that an equally important, but almost forgotten source is traditional Jewish thought: Luria’s cabbalah in G. Scholem’s interpretation, and its creative assimilation in the theories of W. Benjamin, E. Bloch or R. Rosenzweig. I therefore describe this vanishing context of Adorno’ s philosophy: Scholem’s thesis of cabbalistic revelation as an insignificant “pure language”; Benjamin’s theory of language as a phenomenon-constellation and presentation of ideas; Bloch’s concept of “traces” as a paradoxical presence of revelation; Rosenzweig’s theory of salvation and its immanent critique of Hegelian Reason as Totality. My goal is to show the specificity and creative continuation of above ideas in Negative Dialectic. I thus underline the importance of the relationship between Western thought and the Jewish tradition, renewed by Adorno’s work.
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