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1

KONTRAMOŽNÉ KONDICIONÁLY A NEINTUITÍVNE ÚSUDKY

100%
Gahér F.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2022
|
vol. 77
|
issue 7
545 – 557
EN
Counterpossible conditionals are a special kind of conditionals whose antecedents are necessarily false (impossible). There has been a long-standing debate about their nature. According to the supporters of the orthodox view (Lewis, Stalnaker, Williamson and others), they are only trivially or vacuously true. Opponents of the orthodox view (Berto, Jago, Sendłak, Kocurek and others) do not agree with such a position, and according to them, some counterposible conditionals are true (and informative) also in a specific sense. We analysed some “non-intuitive” arguments of classical logic as precursors to counterpossible conditionals. We demonstrated that these arguments are correct in propositional and predicate logic. Their non-intuitiveness becomes evident only when we accept the tacit assumptions that are imposed by the content of the premises and conclusions. The components of the premises and conclusions of such arguments are enthymemes of other “sub-arguments”, and their non-intuitiveness is based on the factual falsity of the disjunctively connected components of the conclusions as abbreviations of two incorrect arguments. In order to explain the truth of counterfactuals and the validity of the rules of classical logic in this context, it is necessary to assume the validity of the comparative and eliminative principle of ceteris paribus. We used the same methodology for counterpossible conditionals and explained why some conceptual or mathematical counterposesible conditionals are non-trivially true and others are not. It is decided by the acceptance of tacit assumptions that are in accordance with the explicit assumptions, and the validity of the comparative and eliminative principle of ceteris paribus. Finally, we showed why logically counterpossible conditionals cannot be non-trivially true: we cannot support them with other tacit logical truths in order to make them true.
2

ON CICERO’S FABIUS ARGUMENT

88%
Marko V.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2020
|
vol. 75
|
issue 8
677 – 692
EN
This article aims to show that it is impossible to put Cicero’s testimonies regarding The Fabius Argument in a consistent inferential order. Either we must suppose that additional premises are tacitly assumed in the text or we must compare it with other sources, which leads to inconsistencies in the proof’s reconstruction. Cicero’s reconstruction of the progression of the argument has formal shortcomings, and the paper draws attention to some of these deficiencies. He interpreted sources in a revised and intentionally simplified way, with the aim of undermining the views of his opponents, casting them as inconsistent and similar to views held by Diodorus. Rather than being a consistently interpreted argument faithfully transcribed from the Stoic sources, Cicero’s Fabius Argument is ultimately anti-Stoic.
3

THE EXPERIMENTAL INVESTIGATION OF THE CONDITIONAL STATEMENT : DOES IT HAVE LOGIC?

75%
Vaszelka A.
Magyar Pszichologiai Szemle (Hungarian Psychological Review)
|
2007
|
vol. 62
|
issue 4
475-488
EN
In the experimental studies of the abstract conditional statement 4 tasks and 3 types of negatives are used, that is, 12 possible experimental layouts. Only the selection task was properly investigated with all the three negatives. In this study the author runs the missing experiments. Waiting biconditional responses for theoretical reasons, he also investigates the performance of the participants on definitely biconditional problems in selection task. Based on the 8 experiments of which 2 are reported in detail, the participants predominantly interpret the conditional statement as biconditional. The selection task demonstrably hides the biconditional inferences. The interpretation inherently relates to the results of the experiments used to demonstrate the suppression of valid inferences and based on an experiment can be extended towards the interpretation of thematic tasks evoking the P and not-Q response.
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