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SELF-KNOWLEDGE, DISCRIMINABILITY, AND DEMONSTRATIVE THOUGHTS

100%
Yi H.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
|
2020
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vol. 27
|
issue 1
106 – 128
EN
According to content externalism, the content of our thought is partly determined by the linguistic environment responsible for it. However, there is growing scepticism about the compatibility of content externalism and self-knowledge. The sceptical position holds that, if content externalism is true, then we cannot know our own thought content because we would not be able to discriminate it from relevant alternative thought contents. This argument rests on the proposition that knowledge requires some type of discriminability. In this paper, I argue that this requirement does not apply to a particular type of demonstrative thoughts, more specifically, that in a typical case where we demonstratively denote an object without taking it as anything in particular, our second-order judgment about our own thinking, whose content includes this use of a demonstrative, constitutes knowledge without due discriminability.
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SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS AND SELF-KNOWLEDGE. EPISTEMOLOGICAL POINT OF VIEW. (Samoswiadomosc i samowiedza z punktu widzenia epistemologii)

75%
Zieminska R.
Analiza i Egzystencja. Czasopismo Filozoficzne
|
2008
|
issue 7
33-51
EN
Self-consciousness is the source or set of information about our own present mental states. My self-knowledge is the set of all my information about myself, not only about my present mental states, but also my past mental states, my personality, my body or even my unconsciousness. Many philosophers thought that self-consciousness data are certain knowledge (Brentano, Husserl, Ingarden) but many contemporary philosophers claim that the first-person knowledge does not exist (Wittgenstein, Ryle, Dennett). Davidson refutes both behaviorism and subjectivity myth and takes some moderate position: first-person knowledge is dependent on third-person knowledge but third-person knowledge is dependent on first-person knowledge. There are some problems to reduce consciousness to physical states and to know about it. So, first-person knowledge is not certain and autonomous but it does exist and play important role. The two interdependent kinds of knowledge are two pillars of human knowledge. According to Davidson there is also some third pillar and it is the second-person knowledge.
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