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EN
The article presents the history of methodology of econometric sciences and their role in the econometric research. Three methodological approaches to econometric models have been described. The first - logical positivism, where they are used to affirm the theory they represent, to interprete the relation force between economic variables. The second appraoach (instrumentalism) favours observation as a source of information concerning forecasts and simulations that constitute a criterion for the informative value of the knowledge which was used for building a model. On the basis of a data analysis models should be prepared which will be used not for the interpretation of parameters (they usually do not undergo it) but for indicating the forecast. The third approach is referred to as critical rationalism in which an econometric model is to be used for negative verification of the formulated hypothesis.
EN
This paper is an attempt at presenting the construct of open society as a consequence of the critical rationalist position. The above mentioned position was originally taken by Karl Popper on the basis of methodology of the (natural) sciences. If we accept this interpretation, which is quite different from Bryan Magee's thesis (though at first glance seeming identical), it will be much easier to capture the factual 'weaknesses' in Popper's political philosophy. The historical context in which his reflections arose (especially his two books: 'The Poverty of Historicism' and 'The Open Society and Its Enemies') was not without influence on his proposal, which the author treated as his personal contribution to the fight against the authoritarian and totalitarian ideology.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2015
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vol. 70
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issue 8
610 – 619
EN
The problem of demarcation may take on many forms. A philosopher may ask what is a typical of “true knowledge”, or whether science provides it, and if it does, what the reasons are. Thus he faces a demanding task of specifying the particularity of science as such because he has to find necessary as well as sufficient conditions of distinguishing between science and non-science. Add the urge to distinguish between meaningful and meaningless language expressions, and you get the ambition typical for the 20th century logical empiricism. The primary aim of the paper is to sum up a critical rationalist’s criticisms of demarcation criteria proposed by logical empiricism. The secondary aim is to link the criticisms, which are roughly known in our country, with the better known opinions of W. V. Quine and D. Davidson on three dogmas of empiricism.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2009
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vol. 64
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issue 6
545-551
EN
The paper deals with the ethical-moral dimension of Popper's critical rationalism, which is the less analyzed aspect of his philosophy. Critical rationalism is not without assumptions. As a life attitude, it is actualized on the basis of one's moral preferences based rather on assumptions than on critical reasonableness. Critical rationalism does not exclude logical argumentation and reasoning, but the adoption of them is predominantly the result of an individual moral decision and choice, based, paradoxically enough, on an irrational belief in reason. The author considers this attitude to be productive, as it emphasizes individual moral responsibility. Nobody is able to persuade us about the relevance of what we don't want to adopt and apply. Thus we find ourselves in the sphere of personal morality.
EN
The author argues that the epistemic significance of the principle of critical realism is far too great to be limited either to a certain phase in the development of logical positivism or to the post-Popperian line of methodology of natural sciences marked by such names as Thomas C. Kuhn, Imre Lakatos or Paul Feyerabend. He emphasizes the importance of the 'anti-positivistic turn' heralded by Popper's double scepticism with respect to the claims that natural sciences can be purged of metaphysics and that induction can somehow be vindicated. Having presented his assessment of Popper's position the author focuses on the 'reflector' theory of knowledge and emphasises the 'Socratic dimension' of the principle of rational criticism, stressing on both occasions that Popper's solutions have not lost their validity.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2014
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vol. 69
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issue 2
173 – 177
EN
The paper explores Váross’s understanding of philosophy, his philosophical stand, undoubtedly influenced by Popper’s critical realism, as well as Váross’s critique of Marxist dialectic and the unity of psychology and philosophy which is inherent in all his works. Váross’s axiology as the main focus of the author is seen as relevant not only for theory, but also for applied disciplines, such as ethics, aesthetics, theory and critique of visual arts.
EN
A review of Western European theories of science philosophy is made, with focus on neopositivism. The analysis of K.Poper's theory, critical rationalism, is focused on his verification method based on the principle of falsification for demarcation between scientific and non-scientific knowledge. It's shown that absolute reliance on this principle, denial of the objective truth of scientific knowledge, conventional interpretation of human perceptions about the natural world, dissociation of the knowledge producer from the produced knowledge is not in compliance with K.Poper's theory of growth in scientific knowledge. The method of critical rationalism, elaborated for physics, is spread by K.Popper on social sphere. It's shown that his treatment of history as 'interpretation of events', which, not being a verifiable hypothesis (conception or theory), can be falsified, that is, rejected by new facts, is quite effective, as it supposes both distinction between and common character of history and natural science. Unlike neopositivist formal and logical analysis, K.Popper's logic of scientific research represents an attempt for theoretical reconstruction of the dynamics of science, development of science through 'tries and mistakes, or, more exactly, through removal of mistakes'. An indisputable contribution of him is reconstruction of science in its irreversible history and not as an aggregate of separated static deductively organized systems. His historicism implicitly complies with the principle of non-linearity of the scientific progress, hence, the ontology of a theory is always conventional and relational, and the resulting fallibilism (exposure to mistakes) of a theoretical construction supposes that it can be falsified when confronted by contradictory empirical data.
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