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EN
The radio broadcasts from countries involved in the Cold War had a major role in promoting relevant propaganda. Of course, this applied to the Hungarian Radio Corporation as well. In this study, with an analysis of the documents of the Hungarian Radio, we will present a segment of the foreign language radio programs broadcast between 1949 and 1951; the years of the campaign against Yugoslavia, and personally against Josip Broz Tito, the Yugoslav party leader, who turned against Stalin. The character of foreign languages broadcasts were subordinated to the political propaganda and followed well ups and downs of the Cold War. In 1956, after the settlement of the Soviet-Yugoslav conflict, disappeared not only the Cominform and so its newspaper against Yugoslavia the “New Struggle”, but changed the tone against the West as well.
EN
Knowledge of communism, so carefully presented in the best and the most famous work of Milovan Ðilas entitled The New Class. An Analysis of the Communist System, New York, 1957, undoubtedly resulted from his previous political practice and theoretical reflections. In the years 1941-1949, Ðilas was both a politician and one of the main ideologists and propagandists of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia. In his later writings, books and speeches, he pointed out that even in time of the war he began to express doubts whether the communistic idea, as he understood at that time, indeed could be fully realized. The above mentioned doubts should be treated hypothetically, we should approach to them with caution. Mostly because they are expressed later after World War II. We do not have a possibility to confirm its veracity on the basis of other sources, documents and messages than those presented in the article. However, the analysis of Ðilas intellectual attitude after the outbreak of the conflict between the Soviet and Yugoslav Communists in 1948, leaves no doubts that slowly and gradually, but irreversibly, Ðilas began to undermine the meaning and the possibility of building „socialism” in line with Stalinist principles. Ðilas propaganda initial admiration of Soviet reality gave way to criticism. Of course, in 1949, so at the end of the period, Ðilas was still a communist. Nevertheless, he inclined to the conviction that Stalinist model becomes a clear deviation from the „true” Marxism. It would be difficult to determine to which extent the conviction was authentic and to which extent - primarily the political consequence, arising from the fact that after the Cominform resolution of June 1948, the Yugoslav Communists, if they did not want to give up the dictatorship of Stalin, had to develop their own ideology and a line of conduct. Anyway, like other leaders of the CPY, Ðilas became a „heretic” rejecting Stalinist orthodoxy. Such „heresy” was the beginning of an attempt to build Yugoslav ideology, orthodoxy. Until the turn of the years 1953/1954 Ðilas would be one of its creators.
EN
The primary objective of my article is to draw attention to the presence/absence of women’s stories in the comprehensive discussion about the camps for opponents of the policy in Tito’s Yugoslavia and to show the role which is played within it by the writings of one of the former female prisoners — Milka Žicina. It is accepted that Ženi Lebl’s memories — Ljubičica bela published in 1990 — is the first published statement on behalf of female victims of the Yugoslavian regime. However, Žicina wrote down her memories as early as the 1970s and then — fearing repressions — she kept them hidden for a decade. Before her death in 1984, the author managed to pass the manuscripts to her friend Dragica Srzentić, who initiated the publishing process. The stories first appeared in the magazines Dnevnik in 1993 and Letopis Matice srpske (fragments) in 1998. Then they were published in a book form as Sve, sve, sve… in 2002 (Zagreb) and Sama in 2009 (Beograd).
PL
The Iron Curtain as an Aspect of the Sovietisation of Eastern Europe in 1949–1953Sovietisation of Eastern Europe by the Soviet Union at the turn of the 1950s was a consequence of the division of Europe and strengthened the so-called Iron Curtain. The restrictions of the Iron Curtain included the ban on all travel to the West, except of delegations of sportsmen and some of the members of security services of those countries. Rapid Sovietisation made the nations subjected by the Soviet Union realise how helpless they were and how impossible it was to oppose such a reign of permanent terror of all social groups hostile to communism. Societies became apathetic, passive and submissive to the USSR, seeing it as the only possibility of existence. It is related to one of principal purposes of Sovietisation at the end of the Stalinist period, quite oft en neglected: its consequences for the social development of subsequent generations of indoctrinated societies. The period of Iron Curtain led to the growing civilisation and mentality distance between East-European countries and the West. The implementation of the Marshall Plan and some basis of economic integration of the countries members of the European Coal and Steel Community in the 1950s contributed to an enormous rise of the standard of living, contrary to the states under communist control. For many decades Sovietisation destroyed the generations able to criticise the authorities, but also willing to cooperate with the state. It contributed to a multi-layered demoralisation of societies. Some of social customs of those times, such as robbing the state through tax avoidance or embezzlement of public money through obtaining social allowances under false pretence, are still present in contemporary post-communist states. Taking of some features of the Russian despotism, such as mistrust, envy, contempt for the weak, or egoism, perpetuated many stereotypes of people from Eastern Europe. The division of the world made by the Big Three and sealed during the Stalinist period made it impossible for the Eastern European nations to know new currents of thoughts, and significantly limited their sense of independence and ability to make independent decisions. Consequences of this process are still present in various dimensions of socio-cultural and political life. “Железный занавес“ как аспект советизации Восточной Европы в 1949–1953 гг.Советизация Восточной Европы Советским Союзом на рубеже 40-х и 50-х гг. произошла от совершившегося раздела Европы и она укрепляла «железный занавес”. В обсуждаемом мною временном промежутке все сильнейшая замкнутость Восточного блока на Запад проявлялась также в запрете всех поездок на Запад, за исключением командировок – спортивных и некоторых представителей служб безопасности данных государств. Бурный ход советизации открыл глаза нациям, завоеванным СССР, на их бессилие и невозможность сопротивляться перманентному террору по отношению ко всем социальным группам, выступавшим против коммунизма. Общества становились апатичными, пассивными и послушными СССР, усматривая в таком поведении возможность дальнейшего существования. Это связано с одной из основных целей советизации конца периода сталинизма, о которой сегодня часто умалчивается. Я имею в виду ее последствия для общественного развития очередных генераций индоктринированных обществ. Период «железного занавеса” углубил пропасть между восточно-европейскими странами также в цивилизационной, экономической и ментальной сферах. Принятие Плана Маршалла, а также введение основ экономической интеграции стран ЕОУС в 1950-х гг. сделали возможным невиданное повышение стандартов жизни для Западной Европы в отличие от государств, остававшихся под коммунистическим контролем. Советизация перечеркнула также на многие десятилетия формирование наций способных к критике власти, но и готовых на сотрудничество с государством. Она повлекла за собой многослойную деморализацию обществ. Перенятые тогда общественные нравы обворовывания государства м.пр. путем неуплаты налогов или выманивания социальных пособий, не соответствуя определенным требованиям – часто присутствуют в общественном пространстве посткоммунистических государств. Заимствование некоторых особенностей российского деспотизма, как недоверие, зависть, презрение к более слабым или эгоизм, закрепило существование многих стереотипов, касающихся жителей Восточной Европы. Свершившийся во время встреч Большой Тройки, a закрепленный в сталинский период раздел мира усложнял, а иногда препятствовал восточно-европейским нациям ознакомлению с новыми мыслительными течениями и значительно ограничил чувство самостоятельности и независимости принятия решений. Последствия этого процесса присутствуют и сегодня в разных измерениях общественно-культурной и политической жизни.
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