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Zagadnienie zakresu języka

100%
Godlewski R.
Filo-Sofija
|
2006
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vol. 6
|
issue 6
119-134
EN
The article analyses questions concerning the measure of the relation between language and the world. The author distinguishes questions related to the domains of reality that can be described in a given language (these are based on the dualism of content and conceptual scheme so they are dualistic ones) and questions related to the types of objects that you can talk about in a given language (particular ones). Besides, questions about the measure are divided into two categories: 1. ontological (concerning the objects or domains that you can talk about in a given language); 2. transcendental (concerning the experience data that can be considered in a given language). Some problems that arise in the context of presented questions are discussed. Dualistic and transcendental particular questions are recognized as incorrect. Ontological particular questions are limited only to comparisons between object languages, whereas our language (metalanguage) can never be compared to any other. All theses in the article are supported with the author’s own argumentation.
2
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Kłopoty z Davidsonem, czyli „O pojęciu schematu pojęciowego” inaczej

100%
Godlewski R. P.
Filo-Sofija
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2008
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vol. 8
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issue 8
207-223
EN
In his article “On the very idea of the conceptual scheme”, Davidson rejected the dualism of content and conceptual scheme. The article is hard to understand for the following reasons: 1. Davidson seems to claim that the third dogma of empiricism is independent from the first one; 2. he seems to maintain that the idea of conceptual scheme may have sense even when the notion of meaning is rejected; 3. he does not fight conceptual relativism arguing that it breaks the principle of contradiction or that incommensurable conceptual schemes cannot speak about the same; 4. he considers only the question of how to identify an alien scheme at another person but passes over the possibility that one person has a few schemes; 5. contrary to his previous statements, he says that translatability is not necessary for the concept of conceptual scheme but in return he gives a few metaphors only.
3

O NEÚPRIMNOSTI A SEBAKLAMANÍ

75%
Smreková D.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2011
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vol. 66
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issue 9
856 – 867
EN
The key issue of the contemporary discourse on self-deception is the necessity to explain the inner structure of consciousness or the state of mind which enable us to tell lies to ourselves or to be fooled by one’s own tricks. Two different approaches to the problem are analyzed: Sartre’s concept of bad faith as well as Davidson’s concept of self-deception. What these divergent conceptions have in common is their intentional approach. However, Sartre’s conception deriving from his ontological considerations (conceiving the consciousness in its unity) is seen as substantially different from Davidsonian rationalizing the phenomenon in question by claiming the division of mind. For Sartre a person of a bad faith is one disguising his or her freedom, i.e. the non-coincidence, which defines her or his being.
4
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THE PROBLEM OF ACTION INDIVIDUATION AND INTERNALIZATION (Problem indywiduacji i internalizacji dzialan)

63%
Paprzycka K.
Analiza i Egzystencja. Czasopismo Filozoficzne
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2010
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issue 11
291-315
EN
One of the striking features of Davidson's account of action individuation is the internalization of actions to the domain of bodily movements. I reconstruct Davidson's arguments for that claim as applying mainly against naive externalism (according to which actions are simple events, extending in time and space beyond the agent's body) but also against externalist moderationism (according to which actions are complex events, extending in time and space beyond the agent's body). I show that the debate between Davidson's internalist minimalism and externalist moderationism is at a standstill. Externalist moderationism is better at explaining some of the claims we are prepared to make about actions (the temporal problem) while internalist minimalism is better at capturing some deeper intuitions about actions. I argue that one can use the old distinction between process and product as applied to agency to help get out of the impasse and restore healthy externalist intuitions.
5
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Główne typy metafizyki analitycznej

45%
Szubka T.
Filo-Sofija
|
2011
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vol. 11
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issue 4(15)
849-864
EN
In a widespread general view about analytic philosophy it is often emphasized the supposed animosity or mistrust of that movement towards metaphysics. That opinion is in many respects one-sided and incorrect. First, one cannot find that animosity towards metaphysics in the works of G.E. Moore and B. Russell, the founders of modern analytic philosophy. Of course, they criticized the speculative, Hegelian metaphysics of their idealistic predecessors, but they did it in order to defend metaphysics of a different kind, more careful, empirical, and realist one. Moreover, even if it is to some extent true that over a few decades analytic philosophy was dominated by the attitude of mistrust towards more theoretical and comprehensive metaphysical investigations, it should be stressed that that attitude has almost completely disappeared in the last fifty years. Metaphysics has again regained the status of central and vigorously pursued philosophical discipline. One of the main originators of that metaphysical turn in contemporary analytic philosophy was Sir P.F. Strawson, the Oxford philosopher, who in 1959 forcefully articulated the idea of descriptive metaphysics. A somewhat similar way of doing metaphysics was later developed in the writings of D. Davidson, M. Dummett, and – in certain respects – H. Putnam. One may say that all those thinkers have attempted to identify the basic structure of reality by describing and elucidating the basic structural features of our thought and talk. Since in such a method of doing metaphysics one can discern some characteristic marks of Kantian transcendental arguments, there is a point to call it analytic-transcendental metaphysics. In a completely different way metaphysics has been pursued by those analytic thinkers who are under heavy influence of the conception of philosophy put forward by W.V. Quine. For Quine philosophy, including metaphysics, is continuous with science, and, to be more precise, constitutes the theoretical end of science. Among many followers of that kind of metaphysics, that may be called analytic-naturalistic one, there are D.M. Armstrong and D. Lewis. The paper presents those two varieties of analytic metaphysics, and succinctly discusses their main difficulties. Subsequently, it mentions those examples of contemporary analytic metaphysics that, for one reason or another, do not belong to either of those two varieties. The paper ends with a brief appendix discussing the most recent revival of metaphysics within the analytic movement and a critical response toit from the deflationary point of view.
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