Full-text resources of CEJSH and other databases are now available in the new Library of Science.
Visit https://bibliotekanauki.pl

Results found: 3

first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last

Search results

Search:
in the keywords:  DEONTIC LOGIC
help Sort By:

help Limit search:
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
EN
Since its inception in 1984, several ‘simple’ solutions have been proposed to answer the deepest paradox of deontic logic. In this paper, I present the simplest one yet: the deepest paradox is simply ill-formulated.
EN
In this paper, I will discuss boulesic and deontic logic and the relationship between these branches of logic. By ‘boulesic logic,’ or ‘the logic of the will,’ I mean a new kind of logic that deals with ‘boulesic’ concepts, expressions, sentences, arguments and systems. I will concentrate on two types of boulesic expression: ‘individual x wants it to be the case that’ and ‘individual x accepts that it is the case that.’ These expressions will be symbolised by two sentential operators that take individuals and sentences as arguments and give sentences as values. Deontic logic is a relatively well-established branch of logic. It deals with normative concepts, sentences, arguments and systems. In this paper, I will show how deontic logic can be grounded in boulesic logic. I will develop a set of semantic tableau systems that include boulesic and alethic operators, possibility quantifiers and the identity predicate; I will then show how these systems can be augmented by a set of deontic operators. I use a kind of possible world semantics to explain the intended meaning of our formal systems. Intuitively, we can think of our semantics as a description of the structure of a perfectly rational will. I mention some interesting theorems that can be proved in our systems, including some versions of the so-called hypothetical imperative. Finally, I show that all systems that are described in this paper are sound and complete with respect to their semantics.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2019
|
vol. 74
|
issue 8
652 – 662
EN
A plenitude of motivations can and has been enlisted to speak for the hyper intensionality of epistemic modals. This fact is well-known and many logical frameworks have been introduced to capture the fine-grained nature of epistemic modals. Recently, hyper intensionality of deontic modals has been brought into the focus. Paradoxes of deontic logic and the failure of substitution of classical equivalents have been enlisted to motivate hyper intensionality in deontic logic. This paper formulates a new argument for hyper intensionality of deontic modals. The argument is based on an over-looked analogy between epistemic logic and deontic logic. This leads us to the question whether any hyper intensional framework apt for epistemic modals would be apt for deontic modals as well. The paper argues that many, but not all would be.
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
JavaScript is turned off in your web browser. Turn it on to take full advantage of this site, then refresh the page.