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EN
Although modern theory of law insists that civil-law courts are not obliged to follow their previous judgements (A), it does not imply automatically that these judgements may be entirely ignored (nonA). Absence of general obligation does not mean total practical irrelevance. Influence of caselaw on the Continent is classified by different set of expressions: although case-law is not „binding“, it can still be „significant“; it does not have formal „normative“ force, but it has substantive „argumentative“ force, it cannot „oblige“, but it can „persuade“… Even if the case-law is not binding, it does not mean that there are no practical reasons why to apply it. And at the same time: even if the case-law is regularly followed, it does not come from its „bindingness“ but from its „significance“. Initial dichotomy „binding/not binding“ (A/nonA) has switched to dichotomy „binding/significant“ (A/B). Although there is change in the meaning of one of the alternatives (nonA became B), it is not accompanied with the change of logical relation which was between the alternatives in their initial state (excluding disjunction). Main aim of the present paper is to show that modern doctrinal reflection of practical effects of the case-law in common-law and civil-law countries is distorting. The main argument in favour of this proposition consists in description, analysis and critique of the way in which genus-species dichotomical definitions are usually advanced. The author of the paper is inclined to believe that accurate description of practical effects of the case-law can be achieved by the complex factor analysis and not by dichotomical classifications.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2006
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vol. 61
|
issue 4
309 - 322
EN
Bourdieu does not blind the fact that he branched from the French structuralism and that he is a critic of its static character which he surmounts by means of the dynamism characterizing the interpretative theories. He introduces a number of new concepts into sociology for what he is blamed on one hand because it complicates understanding his own theory; on the other hand it enables him to avoid the epistemological dichotomy of objective versus subjective approaches, as well as the dichotomy, rather value or political one, of consensual versus conflict understanding of the contemporary societies. He leaves out the structuralist meanings of the words status, structure, class, fights, what still does not place him on the side of the critics of structuralism or the conflict theories. The frame of all Bourdieu's works is his theory of reproduction of society and creation, or preservation of order. It is the substance of his theory of action, even though not always explicitly expressed in all his works. Bourdieu's theory, based on the relation 'position-disposition- interaction', or, in Bourdieu's terms, 'structure-habitus-practice', has rather the character of Merton's medium-range theory than that of Parson's macrotheory.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2011
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vol. 66
|
issue 10
981 – 991
EN
The paper focuses on the disproportion the author sees in Rorty’s work. While the author prices highly Rorty’s anti-representationalism, he criticizes Rorty’s social and political philosophy, which, in his opinion, is rooted in early modern philosophy. The latter, he argues, emphasizes the dichotomy between subject and object – an approach characteristic for that period. In support of his claiming a big difference between full-fledge pragmatism and purely pragmatic eclecticism, the author compares Rorty’s and Dewey’s works to show that those of Dewey are considerably promising as for as the resolution of the problems of our society and politics.
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