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THE OVERSIGHT FUNCTION OF THE SEJM IN THE CONTEXT OF THE DIVISION OF PUBLIC AUTHORITY AND THE PRINCIPLE OF SUPERIORITY OF THE CONSTITUTION

100%
Odrowaz-Sypniewski W.
Przegląd Sejmowy
|
2008
|
issue 3(86)
EN
This article discusses the relation between a theoretical concept of oversight powers of the Sejm and constitutional limitations imposed on the legislature in relation to shaping the structure of public authorities. The subject of this analysis includes answers to the following questions:- Whether the scope of parliamentary oversight is entirely determined by the provisions of the basic law, or does the constitution specify only major functions of public authority which are subject to parliamentary oversight while the legislature has the discretion to extend the scope of such oversight to include extra-constitutional aspects of such control? - Whether the legislature, upon creating extra-constitutional organs of the State, may place them outside the area of the oversight exercised by the Sejm? - Whether parliamentary oversight cover the entirety of the State apparatus, except for those organs whose independence is guaranteed, or whether the scope of oversight exercised by the Sejm is limited only to the activities of the Council of Ministers? The concept of 'broad' oversight function of the Sejm, understood as the right of this legislative body to be informed about the activity of public authorities and institutions, is coherent with both the standpoint in favour of the overall nature of the constitutional regulation of the sphere of State authority and the opinion that the basic law regulates only fundamental institution of the system of government, and leave discretion to the ordinary legislator to define extra-constitutional functions of the State and to delegate them to extra-constitutional organs. Another concept of oversight function of the Sejm assumes that Article 95(2) of the Constitution delimits the scope and nature of oversight exercised by it. As a result, the scope of oversight by the Sejm corresponds to the scope of activity of the Council of Ministers, which covers the affairs of State not reserved to other State organs or local government (Article 146 paragraph 2 of the Constitution). This provision functions as a presumption of competence, which complements the constitutional regulation in relation to actions undertaken by State within its ruling capacity. Without explicit constitutional authorization, the legislature may not reduce the competence of the Council of ministers, since this would contradict the principle of superiority of the basic law. Such a conduct would also lead do diminishing oversight functions of the Sejm. Therefore, a 'narrow' concept of oversight function must assume that the scope of constitutional regulation has an overall nature and includes all aspects of State control and that it determines an organizational structure of the entire apparatus of power. The oversight function of the Sejm, within the above-mentioned meaning, seems not to be reconciled to the practice of creation of extra-constitutional organs of the State which perform extra-constitutional functions. Such organs, existing outside the organizational system of the Council of Ministers, would not be subject to oversight by the Sejm. .
2
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THE CONCEPT OF PARLIAMENTARY OVERSIGHT FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF THE SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT

100%
Stebelski M.
Przegląd Sejmowy
|
2008
|
issue 3(86)
EN
The issue of parliamentary oversight has been the point of interest of the doctrine of constitutional law, particularly in the context of deliberations about the oversight function of the Sejm. However, one may still raise doubts about both the nature of this function and the very concept of oversight as a particular form of activity, although it is admitted that it should consist in comparison of actual state of affairs and that required by law, and formulation of assessment conclusions. Clearly evident influence of the Sejm (which exercises the oversight) on other organs of the State (particularly the Council of Ministers and government administration) sometimes makes the concept of parliamentary oversight take the nature of supervision or even co-decision. The exercise of parliamentary oversight should be seen from a wider perspective of the system of government, including inter alia the principles of legality, separation of powers, sovereignty of the Nation as well as representative nature of the Sejm which represents a particular community. Another aspect to be taken into account in this respect is the principle of transparency of public life and, consequently, the right of citizens to be informed about the activities of public authorities. The requirements imposed on parliamentary oversight by the constitutional principles of separation of powers cannot mean exclusion of several organs of the State from the oversight. It is indeed the separation of powers which requires some mechanisms to secure the independence of public authorities, and to provide those organs with appropriate powers enabling them to perform their functions.
3
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THE CONSTITUTIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY AND SEJM OVERSIGHT: SELECTED ISSUES

80%
Gromek Z.
Przegląd Sejmowy
|
2008
|
issue 3(86)
EN
This article discusses selected issues concerning the exercise by the Sejm of its powers to hold persons performing top State positions (from the point of view of Sejm oversight) accountable before the Tribunal of State. The authors of analysis of the Sejm authority to deal with preliminary motions to hold persons constitutionally accountable pointed out that in such power the oversight function of the Sejm is realized. However, they also noted that such power has at the same time some specific features as compared with other instruments of oversight exercised by Sejm. Then, the proceedings before the Constitutional Accountability Committee of the Sejm were described. In this respect, the standpoint which considers such proceedings as completely consistent with pre-trial proceedings in the penal procedure should be criticized. They also opted for reduction of the scope of the proceedings in the Committee in relation to evidence. Similar criticism was caused by the lack of application by the Committee of instruments regulated in Article 9(2) of the Act on the Tribunal of State. Addressing a controversial issue whether the proceedings to hold persons constitutionally accountable is based on the principle of procedural legality, it was ascertained that in such proceedings the principle of opportunism exists. Therefore, the Sejm is not under legal obligation to initiate, in any case, proceedings in relation to constitutional accountability. Another issue, raised in the article, is admissibility of holding members of collegial bodies constitutionally accountable for actions taken by such body in gremio. As concerns this question, it was stated that individual accountability of members of such bodies for such actions is exceptionally admissible. Finally, the issue of effectiveness of performance by the Sejm of its power to initiate proceedings before the Tribunal of State was discussed. The reasons for low effectiveness in this sphere were indicated.
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