Full-text resources of CEJSH and other databases are now available in the new Library of Science.
Visit https://bibliotekanauki.pl

Results found: 14

first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last

Search results

Search:
in the keywords:  Dewey
help Sort By:

help Limit search:
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
Human Affairs
|
2008
|
vol. 18
|
issue 1
92-99
EN
The paper considers the issue of participatory democracy which has recently got high in the European integration agenda. In the history of ideas, however, it has been a controversial as well as neglected idea associated mostly with Rousseauian and Leftist models of democracy. The autor points to the key features of participatory democracy such as the idea of self-mastery. The philosophical idea of participation lies at the heart of the pragmatist conception of democracy as developed by J. Dewey. Its functioning may be illustrated by the concept of "democratic normative community". This conception of participatory democracy as a broad social rather than a narow political phenomenon provides the framework that makes it both a vital ideal and a creative task for current global as well as local efforts to bring about the sociopolitical change.
Human Affairs
|
2010
|
vol. 20
|
issue 3
224-231
EN
This paper explores John Dewey's theory of the emotions and his reasons for developing it. The author considers two competing accounts for why Dewey might have developed his theory: one based on his attempt to clarify rationality and one based on his attempt to make us morally responsive agents to nature. After a close examination of key texts, the author concludes that Dewey's theory is designed to make us morally responsive. Dewey's theory of the emotions serves his purpose of arguing for our re-union with nature, in a manner similar, in fact, to Hegel, with the addition that Dewey makes it our express goal to be concerned for nature in our return to it.
Human Affairs
|
2011
|
vol. 21
|
issue 3
280-293
EN
Did the pragmatic turn encompass the linguistic turn in the history of philosophy? Or was the linguistic turn a turn away from pragmatism? Some commentators identify the so-called “eclipse” of pragmatism by analytic philosophy, especially during the Cold War era, as a turn away from pragmatist thinking. However, the historical evidence suggests that this narrative is little more than a myth. Pragmatism persisted, transforming into a more analytic variety under the influence of Quine and Putnam and, more recently, a continental version in the hands of Richard Rorty and Cornel West. In this paper, I argue that proof of the linguistic turn’s presence as a moment in a broader pragmatic turn in philosophy can be garnered from close examination of a single article, W. V. O. Quine’s “Two Dogmas of Empiricism,” and a single issue: whether the analytic-synthetic distinction is philosophically defensible.
4
Publication available in full text mode
Content available

Another Kind of Octopus

86%
EN
Philosophy nurtures its actuality from questions, or a call that comes from and leads to a lived risk. This paper embraces that risk in directly responding to nine of the fifteen questions in the Call for Papers for the issue, Philosophy as a Way of Life in a Time of Crisis. Attentive to the idea of PWL, I listened for each question’s latent (or manifest) placement from seasoned historical thinkers. From that, I assigned the order of the questions. Each question served as a bright opening between the latticework of the authors and issues I revisited. I felt transformed and happy under this pergola. Philosophy as a way of life flourishes in such exchanges, and by what ferries from who writes, nurtured in the gardens from whom we write for. Here, too, there are paths to a genre-in-possible-community. May these paths lead us to “everything so that virtue and phronesis are made life-participating.”
EN
Emergentism is an important and yet underexplored component of John Dewey’s metaphysical program, and concerns the ways in which existences relate, operate, and grow in coordination with a more inclusive environment. Through an emergent account, Dewey addresses continuities among the generic traits of nature, inanimate substance, biological life, and experiential “fields” such as mind and consciousness. The notion of a field is especially important for depicting the ways in which existences serially interact in accordance with some particular purpose or set of functions. Apart from an emergent scheme that contextualizes the interactive contexts of experience, phenomena such as “mind” and “consciousness” remain enigmatic occurrences. Moreover, cognition, and with it instances of “knowing,” remain susceptible to merely “subjective” characterizations that reinforce a misleading dualism between mind and nature. In addition to its role in addressing naturalistic continuities, Dewey’s emergentism suggests a non-reductive philosophical methodology that directly challenges contemporary varieties of realism and materialism.
EN
This paper discusses the question of the so-called permissive education. The main point of reference is a short article written by Mara Wolynski (an American journalist). In her article Wolynski describes her school nicknamed “Sand and Sea.” The school is founded on the principle of Rousseau and Dewey’s ideas, i.e. it is content-neutral, without and curriculum, with students who are constantly engaged in the quest after self-realization and authenticity. Such schools, however, end up in personal tragedies because their graduates completely fail as adults. When they arrive at universities, they have no idea how to cope with systematic tuition. Permissive schools do not provide any integral or synthetic approach to education. Excited about the progressive, individual, and original aspect of education, they abandon their curricula. Thus their graduates are totally unprepared to build any systematic and coherent knowledge.
PL
Przedmiotem artykułu jest kwestia tzw. edukacji permisywnej. Głównym punktem odniesienia jest tutaj krótki tekst napisany przez Marę Wolynski, amerykańską dziennikarkę. W swoim artykule Wolynski nazywa szkołę, do której uczęszczała, “Piasek i Morze”. Szkoła ta funkcjonuje na gruncie idei Rousseau i Deweya. Chodzi tu o nauczanie neutralnych treści, bez program, natomiast uczniowie koncentruję się na poszukiwaniu realizacji siebie samych I autentyczności. Takie szkoły jednakże kończą się osobistymi tragediami, ponieważ ich absolwenci ponoszą całkowitą porażkę w życiu dorosłym. Kiedy pojawiają się na uniwersytetach, zupełnie nie mają pojęcia, jak radzić sobie w warunkach systemowego nauczania. Takie permisywne szkoły nie dostarczają swoim uczniom żadnego integralnego czy syntetycznego podejścia do edukacji. Ekscytacja progresywnym, indywidualnym i oryginalnym aspektem edukacji, odrzucają programy nauczania. Tym sposobem absolwenci są zupełnie nieprzygotowani do budowania wiedzy jako całościowego i spójnego systemu.
Human Affairs
|
2011
|
vol. 21
|
issue 4
335-346
EN
In the present paper an interpretation of the political dimension of pragmatic aesthetic reflection is proposed. The interconnection between politics and aesthetics in three classic American pragmatists: William James (1842–1910), John Dewey (1859–1952), and George Herbert Mead (1863–1931) is evoked. The author claims that by emphasizing the role of democratic values in philosophy and life, the classic American pragmatists encroach upon the field of the arts and aesthetics. Their emphasis put upon individual activity, free expression of thoughts, plurality of the forms of expression, and acceptance of criticism as a tool helping create better solutions in human cooperation can easily be converted into the postulates about the character of the artistic principles and of the nature of the aesthetic norms and values.
EN
This paper focuses on analysis of relation between pedagogical and epistemological ideas of John Dewey. Our considerations are divided into four sections. (1) We reconstruct Dewey’s conception of culture as a body of normative and regulative common sense beliefs determining human conduct and language use. (2) Further, we compare common sense based inquiry and its scientific mode with regard to their respective conceptual frameworks in order to show that “theoretical-scientific” perspective provides more comprehensive insight into the relations constituting problem situations. (3) We identify informal education with socialization processes and argue that educational process relies on constant reflection on cultural habits. (4) We conclude that competences of using theoretical conceptual frameworks and conducting scientific inquiry play crucial role in Dewey’s educational ideology of progressivism since they provide basic tools for critical reconsideration and revision of common sense beliefs.
9
72%
EN
Hilary Putnam is widely considered as one of the most distinguished and important philosophers in the analytic tradition of the last fifty years. However, in his most recent publications he has started to emphasize various shortcomings and limitations of that powerful tradition, connected especially with its scientism and naturalism. He has also insisted that what we really need is a serious renewal and transformation of philosophy, drawing upon other philosophical traditions, including pragmatism. We should realize that although philosophy overlaps in some parts with science, it cannot be turned into a science. It is a humanistic enterprise having two dimensions, theoretical and moral, and it is unfortunate when we tend to forget about either of them.
10
Content available remote

Odnowa filozofii według Hilarego Putnama

72%
EN
Hilary Putnam is widely considered as one of the most distinguished and important philosophers in the analytic tradition of the last fifty years. However, in his most recent publications he has started to emphasize various shortcomings and limitations of that powerful tradition, connected especially with its scientism and naturalism. He has also insisted that what we really need is a serious renewal and transformation of philosophy, drawing upon other philosophical traditions, including pragmatism. We should realize that although philosophy overlaps in some parts with science, it cannot be turned into a science. It is a humanistic enterprise having two dimensions, theoretical and moral, and it is unfortunate when we tend to forget about either of them.
11
72%
EN
I. We can talk about the crisis of the truth (in the meaning of the classical correspondence theory) in the contemporary philosophy (of the 20th century). II. In the wake of philosophy the teaching of philosophy reconciled with the destruction of the truth. Then the didactics of philosophy resigned from the placing the aim to the truth among the objectives, which should serve to philosophical education. III. The absence and understatement of the disinterested pursuit to the truth among the objectives or requirements of education impoverish the philosophical education and cause damage to the children, pupils and wards. IV. Therefore the truth understood as an epistemological category, the purpose of education and moral value, should be restored to our didactic and educational activities.
Human Affairs
|
2013
|
vol. 23
|
issue 4
606-615
EN
I propose the next steps in the neuropragmatic approach to philosophy that has been advocated by Solymosi and Shook (2013). My focus is the initial process of inquiry implicit in addressing philosophical questions of cognition and mind by utilizing the tools of neuroscientific research. I combine John Dewey’s pattern of inquiry with Charles Peirce’s three forms of inference in order to outline a methodological schema for neuropragmatic inquiry. My goal is to establish ignorance and guessing as well-defined pillars of methodology upon which to build a neuropragmatic approach to inquiry. First, I outline Dewey’s pattern of inquiry, highlighting the initial problematic phase in which recognized ignorance provides the basis upon which to frame a philosophical problem and initiate the trajectory by which philosophical questions may be addressed with the assistance of neuroscientific evidence. Second, I provide an outline of Peirce’s three forms of inference, focusing upon the first phase of abduction: guessing. Third, I explain the transition between ignorance and guessing, urging the benefit of attending to these two aspects of inquiry. Finally, I provide an initial sketch indicating the next steps concerning a pragmatic reconstruction of neurophilosophy, pointing towards the need for a more thorough examination of scientific methodology within and following analyses of philosophical problems and neuroscientific evidence.
EN
The inheritance of dualism from Plato to Descartes, and since, has impoverished the human relation with nature, the world, other humans, and other species. The division of soul and body, and its counterpart of mind and body, gave us a world from which we believe ourselves to be separate from and superior to other species. This self-othering standpoint has had devastating consequences socially, politically, economically, and ecologically. This essay seeks to identify some resources in the Western tradition in phenomenology and pragmatism that avoid this standpoint and bring them into conversation with some primary insights of Buddhist philosophy: interdependent arising, the not-self, and interbeing. By doing so, it is not only suggested that comparative conversations are not only useful in their own right, but they add dimensions to our experience in the world. Moreover, they offer avenues for living enriched lives in concert with the world without engaging in self-deceptive mental and comforting psychological activities of who and what we really are.
Human Affairs
|
2013
|
vol. 23
|
issue 4
633-644
EN
For most of human history, human knowledge was considered to be something that was stored and captured by words. This began to change when Galileo said that the book of nature is written in the language of mathematics. Today, Dan Dennett and many others argue that all genuine scientific knowledge is in the form of mathematical algorithms. However, recently discovered neurocomputational algorithms can be used to justify the claim that there is genuine knowledge which is non-algorithmic. The fact that these algorithms use prototype deployment, rather than mathematics or logic, gives us good reason to believe that there is a kind of knowledge that we derive from stories that is different from our knowledge of algorithms. Even though we would need algorithms to build a system that can make sense out of stories, we do not need to use algorithms when we ourselves embody a system that learns from stories. The success of the Galilean perspective in the physical sciences has often resulted in an attempt to mathematize the humanities. I am arguing that the dynamic neurocomputational perspective can give us a better understanding of how we get knowledge and wisdom from the stories told by disciplines such as Literature, History, Anthropology and Theology. This new neurological data can be used to justify the traditional pedagogy of these disciplines, which originally stressed the telling of stories rather than the learning of algorithms.
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
JavaScript is turned off in your web browser. Turn it on to take full advantage of this site, then refresh the page.