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EN
Looking at the past 23 years of Russian history, it would be difficult to miss the ongoing dispute over a key choice facing the state: should the diplomacy of force be continued or should emphasis be on the soft power of diplomacy capable of attracting not only the former Soviet Union countries, but also other allies? In recent years, however, especially since the conflict in Georgia, the role of diplomacy of force has been growing in Russia. The reform of the armed forces launched in 2009 accompanied by a new military doctrine and plans for rearming the army came as a signal that Russia was planning to enhance its security policy. These changes are in harmony with the general tendency to return to the imperial tradition and can be capitalised upon to mobilise Russian society, focusing its efforts (including financial) around the army. In consequence, military power has become one of the main instruments for achieving the goals of domestic and international policy.
EN
The events of the Slovak-Hungarian “Little War” are closely connected to the circumstances of Hungary’s re-annexation of Sub-Carpathia in March 1939, which took place under the motto of re-establishing a common Hungarian-Polish border. Corps belonging to the Carpathian section of the Hungarian army advanced into Sub-Carpathia and then proceeded to attack Slovak territories. Hungaryʼs official explanation for its occupation of Sub-Carpathia ran as follows: since Slovakia has become an independent state and thus Czechoslovakia no longer exists as a state, the Viennese arbitration is no longer valid. Hungary has won the right to exercise its claim to Sub-Carpathia. The military conflict between Slovakia and Hungary came to an end when Germany intervened and ordered the two parties to conduct bilateral negotiations with a view to reaching an agreement. At the negotiations on March 28, 1939, the parties agreed to end hostilities and to establish a neutral zone between the two armies. They also agreed that Hungarian troops might remain at their occupied positions. On March 28 the Slovak delegation announced claims on Hungarian territory by way of compensation, but the Hungarian government rejected these claims. Germany offered no support to the Slovaks on the border issue; indeed, on April 7 Slovak troops were even required to withdraw from various settlements on the Slovak side of the demarcation line. On April 3, 1939, the German Ambassador to Budapest, Otto von Erdmannsdorff, paid a visit to the Hungarian foreign minister, István Csáky; in the course of their discussions, the two men touched upon the issue of the border established with Slovakia. The Ambassador informed Csáky that the Slovak government had turned to Germany for support, but that it had been told that under the circumstances any attempt at the full restoration of the old border, which was Slovakia’s wish, would be futile. The German Ambassador then asked Csáky whether the Hungarian government would be willing to make certain territorial concessions. Csáky responded that this would be inconceivable — “where Hungarian soldiers have trodden, they will stay”. Hungary could keep the 60-kilometre long and 20-kilometre wide strip of land that it had taken from Slovakia. The Hungarian authorities attached the area of land Sub-Carpathia, of which it remained a part until 1944. In 1945 the newly re-established Czechoslovakia was obliged to surrender the railway line between Csap and Ungvár as well as the Ung line: the Czechoslovak-Soviet border — today’s frontier between Slovakia and Ukraine — was drawn ten to fifteen kilometres further west. During its engagements with the Slovak armed forces from March 23–28, 1939, the Hungarian army suffered 25 fatal and 56 non-fatal casualties; it captured 360 Slovak and 211 Czech/Moravian soldiers.
Central European Papers
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2014
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vol. 2
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issue 1
53-73
EN
After concluding the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, the Soviet Union unexpectedly became an ally of the Slovaks. Slovak political decision-makers evaluated this act as a “historic turnaround”, which then enabled the realization of mutual solidarity between Germany and Russia. Soviet diplomats characterized Slovakia in their reports as a “gate facing the Balkans” and as an “eye” into the Western half of Europe. Slovak politicians saw in their relationship with the Soviet Union the possibility to seek a counterbalance against the German influence that was encumbering the country. Slovakia’s foreign policy was hoping that the Soviet Union as a Slavic brother state would support Slovakia in the Hungarian-Slovak conflict. The rivalry between Hungary and Slovakia, when both states had been attempting to gain Hitler’s favour since 1939, eventually led to their attempting to win points to military domain. Thus, both of the states became ensnared in the war against the Soviet Union, an effort which other satellite states also joined. According to Jozef Tiso, Slovakia needed to enter the war against the Soviet Union because it could thus gain a basis from which to regain her territories that had been annexed to Hungary. The relationship between both states was important from the point of view of the Soviet Union foreign policy because the Soviet Union was thus able to gain information about Germany, or as the case may be, it was able to restrain them from declaring war. In the fall of 1939 full diplomatic relations between Hungary and the Soviet Union were renewed, in which the German-Soviet rapprochement also played a role. Soviet diplomats attempted to keep their government informed in as much detail as possible about the Slovak-Hungarian relationships.
EN
The purpose of this study is the introduction of the mediation of János Esterházy in the bilateral relations of Slovakia and Hungary mentioning only a few examples due to limitations in length. In the second part of the study, the activity of Esterházy in the Jewish question is discussed; the reasons behind his voting against the Jewish law. János Esterházy considered it his main goal to forge the Hungarian minority in Slovakia together, and he imagined the life of the community in the form of a great family. The person of Esterházy is interpreted in different ways in the Slovak and Hungarian history writing. This study wishes to present these interpretations based on facts and to get them closer to each other.
EN
Often, a particular historical event, phenomenon or process “defies” inclusion in a specific ideal type or terminology which we are used to using to indicate the particular event. One example of note is the Prague Peace Conference of 1813, which does not meet the“requirements” that a historian might make of a typical peace congress. This is even more reason not to be deterred from attempting to describe, structuralise and systematise it. In this regard, three interconnected paradoxical circumstances come to the fore. First of all, the above-noted conflict between expectation and reality. Secondly the paradox of historiographical disinterest in this “crucial event”, and finally the misappropriation of an event taking place on Czech territory from Czech “national history” and our historical consciousness.
EN
After Japan was forced to open its ports to the western powers, by the threat of western navies, it was further compelled to sign unequal treaties with the Great Powers. This triggered a sonnō jōi movement led by young samurai, who criticized the ruling Tokugawa regime for its concessions to the foreigners. They therefore sought to expel the Westerners and close the country to their trade. Their second task was to bring the downfall of the shogunate and the restoration of the Imperial rule. In order to achieve this, many radical samurai mounted murderous attacks against the foreigners. One of the most serious of these incidents occurred in September 1862, when British merchant Charles Lennox Richardson was murdered by samurai from the Satsuma domain. Apart from the previous attacks this time the culprits could be identified. British minister to Japan Colonel Neale therefore demanded the punishment of the assailants and an indemnity from the bakufu for its inability to secure lives and safety of British nationals. The Tokugawa government tried to resist and resorted to delaying tactics because of its fear of internal impact, if it yielded. It was only after the British representatives demonstrated, that they are willing to use the naval forces at their disposal, that bakufu submitted.
EN
This article focus on Slovak‑Hungarian relations. The study aims to draft a more differentiate and precise picture on Hungarian and Slovak revision efforts and the bilateral relations as one may find in any professional literature till now, in particular in non‑Slavic works. The author has used new archive documents and materials. The political climate between Bratislava and Budapest in the first half of 1939 was strongly influenced by mutual territorial claims. Diplomatic relations between Slovakia and Hungary were characterised by three main problems since 1939 and in 1940: the affiliation of the territories in the Upper Hungary and national minorities living there; gaining Germany as an ally at the expense of the other party, and the principle of reciprocity. Ratification of the Slovak State was the most important goal of the Slovak foreign policy in 1939, both within the regional and European context. The Slovak policy also strived to find new and influential allies and believed that Germany and the Soviet Union could play that role. Slovak leaders wanted revision in respect to Hungary and wanted also to reach the revision of the 1st Vienna Award. In July 1939 the Slovak propaganda clearly presented the idea that Slovaks could not accept the borders of their homeland. The speeches in the Hungarian parliament called the attention of the public in both countries to the problems, especially after they published in the press. In practice, they limited the transgressions of officials and police on both sides to some extent. We can say the biggest mistake in the given period was that the governments were not able to rise above the issue of reciprocity and territories, what hindered their possible cooperation against Germans in the future.
EN
The revisions of Hungarian boarders in the years 1939–1941 caused considerable dissatisfaction among the countries which had to cede considerable territories to the government in Budapest. Therefore these states (Rumania, Slovakia and Croatia) attempted to resurrect the idea of the Little Entente which sought to prevent Hungarian revisionism in the interwar era. However Budapest had German support – therefore the efforts of the countries to form some sort of anti-Hungarian block came to nothing.
EN
The position of Austria–Hungary on the Balkans changed considerably due to the Bosnian crisis in 1908/1909. The effort of the Austro‑Hungarian foreign minister Alois Lexa von Aehrenthal to establish cooperation with Russia on the basis of the previous entente was ruined due to this event. The annexation also completely destroyed Vienna’s prestige in Belgrade and made the Serbs a mortal enemy of the monarchy. Austria‑Hungary therefore had to change its policy on the Balkans. Its main effort was the preservation of the status quo on the peninsula. One of its prerequisites was the maintenance of the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire. Austria‑Hungary therefore tried to cautiously cooperate with the Porte and to force it to conduct reforms. This effort was however unsuccessful. In the meantime Vienna was not able to hinder the creation of an alliance of the Balkan states, which threatened to destroy the status quo. When these countries began their long prepared war against the Ottomans the interests of the Habsburg Monarchy on the Balkans were in mortal peril.
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EN
The Habsburg Monarchy was quite active in Egypt at the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century. Although it had only slight political interest in this area it maintained here several consulates and monitored local events very carefully. It was because a lot of Austro‑Hungarian trading houses established their presence in Egypt and the land on the Nile became an important economic partner of the Habsburg Monarchy. Vienna therefore tried to support this development and to promote good Austro‑Egyptian relations. The interest of citizens of Austria‑Hungary in Egypt was also demonstrated by a considerable number of Austrian residents and travellers in this country. On the other hand the Egyptians travelled to the Habsburg Monarchy (especially students) in order to learn European customs and science. The mutual relations had therefore importance for both countries.
EN
This study seeks to assess the extent to which President Kufuor’s adoption of economic diplomacy impacted the economic growth and development of Ghana from 2001-2008. The economic development of Ghana after inde-pendence vary from one administration to the other with military takeovers influencing and changing the course and rate of development. President Kufuor’s administration however presents a remarkable record of immense economic growth. Kufuor’s era was thus, termed as the “Golden Age of Business” following the gravity of private businesses springing up and an environment created for such initiatives to thrive on. In the final analysis, the study came to the realization that Kufuor’s administration reemphasizes the deepening economic relation Ghana developed with other partners through the implementation of economic diplomacy. The study underlined some initiatives that was embarked on and further provided some macroeconomic indicators representing the level of development during his era. The result revealed the roles of diplomats as primary avenues for the promotion of economic diplomacy and how their activities impact the economic growth of a country. Diplomacy, Economic diplomacy, Diplomat, Globalization, Neoliberalism, Mammon, Corruption Niniejsze badanie ma na celu ocenę, w jakim stopniu przyjęcie dyplomacji gospodarczej przez prezydenta Kufuora wpłynęło na wzrost gospodarczy i rozwój Ghany w latach 2001-2008. Rozwój gospodarczy Ghany po uzyskaniu niepodległości jest zależny od administracji, a przejęcia wojsk mają wpływ na zmianę kursu i tempo rozwoju. Ad-ministracja prezydenta Kufuora wyróżnia się jednak niezwykłmy wzrostem gospodarczym. Era Kufuora została więc nazwana „Złotym Wiekiem Biznesu” ze względu na mnogość rozwijających się prywatnych firm i stworzeniu środowiska dla takich inicjatyw. W końcowej analizie badanie doszło do wniosku, że administracja Kufuor po-nownie podkreśla pogłębiające się stosunki gospodarcze, jakie Ghana rozwinęła z innymi partnerami poprzez wdrożenie dyplomacji gospodarczej. W artykule podkreślono niektóre inicjatywy, które podjęto, a ponadto poda-no pewne wskaźniki makroekonomiczne reprezentujące poziom rozwoju w czasie prezydenta Kufuora. Artykuł ujawnił rolę dyplomatów jako głównych promotorów dyplomacji ekonomicznej oraz ich wpływ na wzrost gospo-darczy kraju. dyplomacja, dyplomacja ekonomiczna, dyplomata, globalizacja, neoliberalizm, korupcja, mamona
EN
The Young Turk revolution changed considerably the position of the Great Powers in Istanbul. The unexpected turmoil in the Ottoman Empire caused considerable anxiety in the European capitals – especially in Vienna. From the point of view of Austria-Hungary it imperiled the occupation of the provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina by the Habsburg government. The change of the regime therefore compelled the foreign minister Alois Lexa von Aehrenthal to turn away from the traditional policy of maintaining status quo on the Balkans. However the Austro-Hungarian statesman viewed this situation as an opportunity to a rapprochement with Russia. At the end of summer 1908 he therefore started negotiations with his Russian counterpart Alexander Izvolsky concerning the status of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
EN
The Bosnian Annexation Crisis was a major diplomatic event of the years 1908 and 1909. The decision of Austria-Hungary to annect the occupied provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina changed a status quo in the Eastern Question. While the crisis threatened the peace in Europe, the press and the European public opinion considerably followed it. The Czech lands were no exeptions – on the contrary the main periodicals brought regular news about the development in this question. They also commented the policy of Vienna government and of the other Great Powers and the Balkan states.
EN
In the study we present and interpret the activities of the Romanian diplomat Nicolae Eric Lahovary, who served as an ambassador to the Slovak Republic from March 1940 to March 1941. Although he was ambassador until March 1941, we focus only at his perception of the internal and foreign policy of the Slovak Republic, as well as the form of mutual relations between Slovakia and Romania until September 1940. This perception is based mainly on his diplomatic reports that have been sent regularly to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Romania.
EN
This article refers to the economic diplomacy of Türkiye and illustrates some changes during the history of the country's political and economic diplomacy. The background of the economic diplomacy process has been clarified and detailed information has been included. Bipolar and unipolar periods are analysed within the framework of economic and political diplomacies in their natural state. The development process of the Turkish economic diplomacy strategy is identified during particular periods in Turkish history. The structural transformation of Türkiye as regards its inward-oriented to outward-oriented economic policies has been evaluated. The mechanisms of Türkiye's multi-directional foreign policy, bilateral trade, and diplomatic relations between Türkiye, the EU and other countries are examined. The role of dependence and interdependence in economics are given in the context of economic globalisation. For this research, the historical methodology has been used. It is suggested that collaborative problem solving with all the institutions involved in economic and political decisions could lead to better outcomes for the country in the international arena.
PL
This paper focuses on the cultural and political importance of papal nuncios’ final reports (relazioni finali) as one of the basic sources of knowledge about the PolishLithuanian Commonwealth in the Roman Curia. The final report was a document, in essence a summary, which a diplomat was required to complete at the end of his mission (or immediately after). During the creation of the office of permanent nuncio to the major European courts, the preparation and delivery of the final report often took place orally. Gradually, the relazione evolved into a written version. Throughout the sixteenth century, when knowledge about Poland-Lithuania in Rome was rather poor, the relazioni finali consisted of colourful descriptions of the geography, the history, and the social and political relations of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. During the seventeenth century, this document became more political in character. It related directly to the activities of the papal diplomats, rituals and ceremonials, and any particular problems regarding the missions, rather than extensive descriptions of relatively banal curiosities. Throughout the seventeenth century in particular, when a permanent papal diplomatic presence had just been established in Poland-Lithuania, the final reports were an important contribution to future missions. Newly-appointed nuncios therefore willingly used the extremely important information contained therein. The practice of writing relazioni finali made it easier for the Holy See to consolidate its diplomatic influence and presence in Central and Eastern Europe in the early modern period. It also fostered papal interest in the social and political features of the enormous ‘noble’ republic.
EN
At the end of the 19th century Great Britain had to cope with new problems in the Far East. During the 90s the position of its international rivals — especially Russia — rose considerably. This was quite apparent in the northern part of Qing Empire — Manchuria. Britain therefore tried to utilize the deepening of the Russo‑Japanese rivalry. After new Russian advances after the Boxer revolution, London started direct negotiations with Tokyo. Their result was the Anglo‑Japanese alliance, which ended the era of British “Splendid Isolation”. Thanks to this development and naval and economic cooperation of both countries, Japan was able to defeat Russia in the Russo‑Japanese war. This was a clear success of the British diplomacy, which was able to stop its main opponent without going to war itself. On the other hand the rise of Japan as a Great Power meant, that the Land of the Rising Sun became a key factor in the British position in China.
EN
Pierre des Noyers was a major personality at the court of Queen Louise-Marie. Officially her secretary and personal treasurer, des Noyers was also an important middle-man for French and Polish relations. Thanks to his knowledge of Poland, the Polish political system and the nobility, as well as having a dense network of correspondents around Europe, he was an invaluable asset and unofficial advisor for France. Through him it was possible, for instance, to bring to fruition the French attempt to place the Prince of Condé onto the Polish throne. Pierre des Noyers was also a man of science. He was known for his interest in astrology, but also astronomy, the weather, and medicine. His curiosity had no observable boundaries. His letters are full of observations, prodigies and even include one of the earliest mentions of the Vampire. He used his network of contacts to spread scientific discoveries, observations and discussions.
EN
The aim of the paper is to evaluate the role that Italy played in the European States System in 1830–1848 from a new, more realist perspective paying particular attention to the policy of Metternich’s Austria in the Apennines. As it attempts to prove, from 1830 to 1848 Italy witnessed considerable reluctance on the part of the Great Powers as well as the Italian states themselves to contribute through cooperation and restraint to the strengthening of the pillars that upheld the system. Italy, much like the Ottoman Empire, was an unstable area with dangerous potential for European peace, and it was no accident that the peace restored in 1815 was disturbed for the first time in Western Europe during 1848 in Italy.
EN
Italian aggression against Abyssinia (Ethiopia) in 1935 placed Czechoslovak diplomacy in a predicament. On the one hand, as a member state of the League of Nations, the First Czechoslovak Republic was obliged to preserve the integrity and independence of other League members, including Abyssinia, and to apply at least economic sanctions against any aggressor. On the other hand, as a product of the First World War, Czechoslovakia was highly interested in maintaining the post-war order in Central Europe against growing German revisionism. Here, apart from France and Great Britain, Czechoslovak diplomats put their hopes in Italy as well and were particularly anxious to gain Mussolini for the defence of Austria. In light of this dilemma, the article examines the attitude and behaviour of foreign minister Edvard Beneš, who was not only Czechoslovakia’s leading diplomat but also the country’s principal actor in the League of Nations, where the Abyssinian crisis had been on the agenda since the beginning of 1935. As far as Beneš’ role in the League is concerned, the study focuses on the sixteenth Assembly in autumn 1935, of which Beneš was elected president. While previous works on Czechoslovakia’s Abyssinian policy are mainly based on documents from the Archives of the Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry, this article also uses sources from the League of Nations Archives in Geneva and the Archives of the Masaryk-Institute in Prague.
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