According to instrumental realism (Don Ihde, Instrumental Realism, 1991) science comes about by virtue of instruments and within experimental situ¬ations. This is the idea of the technological embodiment of science in experi¬mentation. In its broader sense, instrumental realism: (a) emphasizes dyna¬mically-developing scientific praxis, giving a central role to instruments; (b) offers a critique of a purely propositional view of the character of analysis used in the philosophy of science; and (c) gives some degree of “reality-sta¬tus” to entities often taken (by the preceding philosophy of science) to be merely theoretical (Ihde, 98-114). However, one can ask what the nature of the instruments is? Do they constitute any specific kind of experience? In this paper I examine the problematic status of the instruments within the IR position developed by Ladislav Kvasz, and I go on to suggest how to defend the position that instruments are not only a part of scientific praxis, but also a key part of our everyday life and our ordinary language.
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