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EN
This study portrays the beginnings of what has been termed industrial immigration from Czechoslovakia to Soviet Russia in the interwar period. On the basis of materials mainly drawn from Russian archives, it tracks a group of 14 miners and mining engineers primarily from the Kladno mining district, but also from the North Bohemian mining district, and eight members of their families. They departed for the Soviet Donbass region in June 1921 with a vision of earning good income for a period of one year and of the possibility of permanently settling there, but after only a few months some already began returning to their homeland disillusioned and lacking funds. By tracking the fates of individual members of this expedition we elucidate the causes for the failure of this particular program as well as other unsuccessful attempts at employing foreign experts in Soviet industry at the beginning of the 1920s.
EN
Article describes main principles of geopolitical doctrine of Azov Movement and role of polish state in this project. Azov Movement is an entourage of ukrainian nationalists which consists of three main parts: political party National Corps, The Azov Regiment, military force under National Guard of Ukraine command which participates in Antiterroristic Operation in the Eastern Ukraine and „Azov” Civilian Corps which developes social activities. In the face of ongoing armed conflict with Russian Federation and articulated euroscepticism against federalist tendencies inside European Union, Azov proposes formation of an alternative political bloc of countries of Central and Eastern Europe named „Intermarium”, in which, alongside Ukraine, Poland ought to play a vital role.
EN
The article looks at the people of Polish descent that have arrived in Poland from Ukraine in 2015 in the aftermath of the war in Donbass. The author discusses two semi-annual adaptation programmes involving the Poles and their family members. The experience gained from these adaptation programmes was then used in order to amend the Repatriation Act and, as a result, to improve the performance of repatriation scheme. The article is based on the research conducted among the evacuees in 2017, which consisted of in-depth interviews with the members of 19 families which settled in Poland.
PL
W ukraińskim społeczeństwie zawsze istniały stereotypy. Główną przyczyną ich występowania były z reguły różnice w rozwoju historycznym niektórych regionów. Pod wpływem czasu niektóre stereotypy zniknęły, ale inne pojawiły się w ich miejscu. Wojna w Donbasie doprowadziła do pojawienia się nowych stereotypów, które zaczęły mocno zakorzeniać się w świadomości społecznej. Zasadniczo te stereotypy odnoszą się do osób wewnętrznie przesiedlonych (IDP) z Donbasu i mają negatywną konotację. Głównymi dostarczycielami stereotypów są osoby publiczne, działacze społeczni i media. Celem artykułu jest analiza najbardziej rozpowszechnionych stereotypów w niektórych regionach Ukrainy nieobjętych konfliktem oraz poznanie przyczyn ich wystąpienia.
EN
Stereotypes have always existed in Ukrainian society. The main reason for their occurrence as a rule, was the differences in the historical development of certain regions. With the influence of time, some stereotypes disappeared, but others appeared in their place. The war in the Donbass, has led to the emergence of new stereotypes, which began to firmly take root in the minds of people. Basically, these stereotypes relate to Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) from the Donbass and have a negative connotation. The main disseminators of stereotypes are public figures, community activists and the media. The purpose of the article is to analyze the most widespread stereotypes in some regions of Ukraine not covered by the conflict and to find out the reasons for their occurrence.
PL
The article focuses on the subject/thematic peculiarities of the Donbass poets’poems included in the collectives of civil lyrics, which were published on the territoriesof the unrecognized Republics in the period from 2014 to 2016. Theformal and meaningful markers of the forming Donbass poetic text have beendiscovered. Donbass lexicode (mine, coal, waste banks, steppe etc.) and regionaltoponymy (the names of the cities, districts and streets) are referred to the formermarker, while the motive complexes connected with the “city”, “country/remote area”, “destruction” concepts are ascribed to the latter one.Having appeared at a time of acute ideological confrontation, Donbass poetry acquiresthe character of a mental, poetic and historical document, it becomes anevidence of time and destinies break-up, and, at the same time, of the formationof a new territorial and ideological community – “my Donbass”.
PL
The subject of the article is an analysis of the three aspects of depicting urban space of Eastern Ukraine, focusing specifi cally on the Donbass region and the city of Kharkov as depicted in the novels Voroshilovgrad (2010) and Mesopotamia (2014) by Serhiy Zhadan. The urban space of Eastern Ukraine overlaps with the most important values that shape a person’s personality and aff ect her or his self-identifi cation. The city space is also a “place of memory” and experiences of generations that infl uence current events. In addition to the historical and axiological dimension, the imaginative aspect of space is also important. This approach is used by the author to describe the urban space as a functioning imagination or stereotypes associated with it as opposed to its realistic depiction.
EN
Germany has shown in its history great interest in Central and Eastern Europe. This approach did not change after the reunification in 1990. The Eastern policy of Germany focused on such activities as strengthening political and economic cooperation with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and supporting their aspirations for membership in the European Union and NATO; wide-ranging cooperation with Russia; supporting Russia’s involvement in cooperation with organizations from the Western world; financial support for economic transformation in Russia. From the perspective of Germany, Russia was perceived as one of the most important partners in the process of strengthening international security. In turn, the Orange Revolution of 2004 drew Germany’s greater attention to Ukraine. The conflict in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine, initiated in 2014, became the cause of deep concern in Germany. The article aims to discuss Germany’s attitude to the Russian-Ukrainian conflict in 2014-2018 - the position of the German government and the main political parties. The author mainly refers to official documents as well as statements of politicians, mostly taken from the press and websites of German political parties. The research problem raised in the article is the attitude of German political parties to Russia following the annexation of Crimea and support of separatist activities in the East of Ukraine. The author verified two research hypotheses: – Traditional political parties, rooted for several decades in the party system of West Germany, show a high degree of principled attitude to the observance of international law. The consequence of such an approach is a critical position at the official level on Russia’s actions in Ukraine. This does not interfere with the phenomenon of pluralism of views on this issue within particular parties. – The political circles of the Eastern federal states, irrespective of the party colors, due to the economic interest tend to lean towards a more flexible approach to Russia’s policy, including limiting or abolishing the sanctions regime. In implementing the goals of the article, the author used appropriate research methods. He decided to resort primarily to elements of institutional and legal analysis, which was used in the examination of documents. In addition, he applied the comparative method, indispensable for comparing the attitude of German political parties to the title problem.
PL
Aneksja Krymu i wojna w Donbasie spowodowały intensywne migracje wewnętrzne z tych obszarów do regionów nie objętych konfliktem. Osoby wewnętrznie przemieszczone (OWP) w początkowej fazie konfliktu głównie przemieszczały się w sąsiednie regiony graniczące z obszarem dotkniętym konfliktem. Niekończąca się wojna w Donbasie znacząco wpłynęła na pogorszenie się sytuacji gospodarczej na Ukrainie, co również wpłynęło na stosunek do osób wewnętrznie przesiedlonych. Społeczne podejście do OWP z Donbasu było początkowo pozytywne, ale stopniowo zmieniło się w negatywne, głównie we wschodnich, rosyjskojęzycznych regionach Ukrainy. Na zachodzie kraju postawa była bardziej pozytywna. Głównym czynnikiem, który może zmniejszyć stopień napięć w społeczeństwie między osobami wewnętrznie przesiedlonymi a społecznościami przyjmującymi, jest koniec wojny w Donbasie, ale jak pokazuje sytuacja, nie można liczyć na szybkie zakończenie konfliktu.
EN
The annexation of the Crimea and the war in Donbass resulted in intense migration flows from these areas to the non-conflict areas of Ukraine. Internally displaced persons (IPDs) in the initial phase of the conflict were mainly received by the neighbour regions bordering with the area affected by the conflict. The endless war in Donbass significantly affected the deterioration of the economic situation in Ukraine, which also influenced the attitude towards IDPs. The social attitude towards IDPs from Donbass was initially positive, but gradually changed into negative one, mainly in the eastern Russian-speaking regions of Ukraine. In the west of the country, the attitude was more positive. The main factor that could reduce the degree of tension in the society between IDPs and the receiving communities is the end of the war in Donbass, but as the situation of the conflict indicates, it cannot be finished quickly.
PL
W badaniu postawiono hipotezę mówiącą o wpływie wywieranym przez Rosję na Ukrainę od czasu rozpadu Związku Radzieckiego. Przed kryzysem polityczno-wojskowym w 2013 r. był to wpływ pośredni, a po 2014 r. przerodził się w wielu sferach we wpływ bezpośredni. Należy podkreślić, że ze względu na priorytety polityki zagranicznej, język, religię i kulturę Ukraina zawsze była podzielona na dwie części. Wspomniał o tym S. Huntington, który w swoim „Zderzeniu cywilizacji” przewidział intensywny kryzys w stosunkach dwustronnych między Rosją i Ukrainą. Na Ukrainie istniały dwie partie, które uzyskały szerokie poparcie w południowo-wschodniej Ukrainie, mianowicie Partia Regionów i Partia Komunistyczna. Partia Regionów nigdy nie mówiła o integracji Ukrainy w ramach rosyjskich projektów integracyjnych, ponieważ jej politycy obawiali się agresywnego kapitału Rosji. Aby wygrywać wybory posługiwali się jedynie retoryką prorosyjską. Partia Komunistyczna natomiast otwarcie popierała integrację z Rosją, ale nie uzyskała wystarczającego poparcia dla tego pomysłu. Udowodniono też, że żadne partie nie były wspierane finansowo przez Rosję, ponieważ partie, które oferowały coś w rodzaju unii z Rosją, nigdy nie uzyskały mandatów w parlamencie. Od 2014 roku Rosja narzuca Ukrainie swoje wpływy w różnych sferach, takich jak ekonomia, polityka, dyplomacja, sfera wojskowa itp. Po podpisaniu dwóch porozumień o zawieszeniu broni Rosja i Ukraina nie zdołały ich zrealizować, wobec czego kryzys wciąż trwa.
EN
The hypothesis of this research is that Russia has been imposing its influence on Ukraine since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Before the political and military crisis in 2013, it was an indirect influence, whereas since 2014 it has been a direct impact in many spheres. It is necessary to underline that Ukraine has always been split into two parts in terms of foreign policy priorities, language, religion, and culture. This fact was mentioned by Samuel Huntington, who predicted an intense crisis in bilateral relations between Russia and Ukraine in his work Clash of Civilizations. There were two parties in Ukraine that were widely supported in South-Eastern Ukraine, namely the Party of Regions and the Communist Party. The former never spoke about the integration of Ukraine as part of Russian integrational projects because its politicians were afraid of aggressive Russian capital. So they only used pro-Russian rhetoric to win elections. The Communist Party openly backed integration with Russia, but didn’t get enough support as for this idea. It is also demonstrated that there were no parties that were backed financially by Russia, because the parties that offered a kind of a union with Russia never got any seats in the parliament. Since 2014, Russia has been imposing its influence on Ukraine in various spheres, such as economics, politics, diplomacy, the military sphere, etc. Having signed two cease-fire agreements, Russia and Ukraine have failed to apply them and the crisis continues to this day.
EN
The authors of this article use the examples of the Donbass and Pridnestrovie regions to examine the relationship between regional identity, separatism, and armed conflict. On the basis of comparative methods of analysis, they describe the historical and sociological processes and political conditions that, over the course of history, produced the formation of a specific sense of regional separateness among the inhabitants of those regions. They prove that regional identity need not rest on centuries of tradition and that Soviet modernization could be a key component of that identity.This analysis of the relation between regional identity and war indicates that the popular explanation of the underpinnings of separatism in Eastern Europe by reference to identity is insufficient in the case of these two regions. In contemporary Donbass and in Pridnestrovie both, identity is constructed on the basis of a war narrative but has become a foundation for effective separatism only in connection with the interests of the local elites and/or external political and cultural factors.
PL
Na początku zostanie przedstawiona geneza kryzysu i wojny propagandowej związanej z Krymem i konfliktem w Donbasie, który w najnowszej historii Ukrainy ma powiązanie z Pomarańczową Rewolucją z 2004 roku, kiedy to rosyjskie media atakowały opozycję i wspierały prorosyjskiego kandydata na urząd Prezydenta – Wiktora Janukowycza, który najwyższe poparcie miał właśnie w Donbasie i na Krymie. Następnie zostanie przedstawiony w skrócie Euromajdan, kryzys krymski i konflikt w Donbasie, który spowodował eskalację wojny medialnej. Kolejno zostaną przedstawione przykłady propagandy strony ukraińskiej (np. zakaz emisji rosyjskich filmów, seriali i zastępowanie ich polskimi produkcjami, czy też zakazem wjazdu dla rosyjskich artystów) i rosyjskiej (np. dyskredytacja Ukrainy w rosyjskich mass mediach), które niejednokrotnie są absurdalne i mają podłoże polityczne, przez co dzielą oba bliskie sobie narody mimo toczącej się wojny na froncie i w mediach. Na końcu nastąpi podsumowanie wojny propagandowej pomiędzy Republiką Ukrainy a Federacją Rosyjską od 2013 roku (od Euromajdanu, poprzez kryzys krymski, referenda, wybory na terenie Donieckiej Republiki Ludowej (DRL) i Ługańskiej Republiki Ludowej (ŁRL), a także konflikt zbrojny we wschodniej Ukrainie).
EN
At the beginning there will be presented the genesis of the crisis and the propaganda war related to the conflict in the Crimea and Donbas, which in the modern history of Ukraine has link to the Orange Revolution in 2004, when the Russian media has attacked the opposition and supported the pro-Russian candidate for President – Viktor Yanukovych, who had the highest support in the Donbas and Crimea. Then it will be shortly presented Euromaidan, Crimean crisis and conflict in the Donbass, which caused an escalation of the media war. Then we will present the propaganda of the Ukrainian side (f.e. non- issuance of Russian films, series and replace them Polish productions or entry ban for Russian artists) and Russian (f.e. to discredit Ukraine in the Russian mass media), which often are absurd and have substrate political thus dividing the two nations close to each other despite the ongoing war at the front and in the media. At the end it will be a summary of the propaganda war between the Republic of Ukraine and the Russian Federation from 2013 (from Euromaidan by the crisis Crimean, referendums, elections in the Donetsk People’s Republic and Luhansk People’s Republic, as well as the armed conflict in eastern Ukraine).
PL
Cele artykułu wiążą się z omówieniem dążeń Ukrainy do zbliżenia z Unią Europejską, zwłaszcza po „pomarańczowej rewolucji” z 2004 r. oraz w kontekście konfliktu z Rosją o Krym i wschodnią Ukrainę, jaki rozpoczął się w 2014 r. Ponadto został przybliżony zarys stanowiska Niemiec wobec samego konfliktu i relacji Ukrainy z UE. Autor podjął próbę rozstrzygnięcia problemu szans Ukrainy na przystąpienie do Unii w przewidywalnej perspektywie. Wykorzystane zostały przede wszystkim publikacje naukowe, prasowe oraz dokumenty Unii Europejskiej.
EN
The goals of the article are to discuss Ukraine’s aspirations for rapprochement with the European Union, especially after the „Orange Revolution” in 2004, and in the context of the conflict with Russia over Crimea and eastern Ukraine that began in 2014. In addition, to outline of Germany’s position toward the conflict and Ukraine’s relations with the EU. The author attempts to resolve the problem of Ukraine’s chances of joining the Union in a predictable perspective. First of all, scientific and press publications, as well as European Union documents were used.
EN
Publications on the conflict in eastern Ukraine rarely describe the situation of children living in the combat zone. More attention is paid to the political, economic and military aspects of this confrontation. The author has set himself two goals. The first one is to check how the war affects the biological and mental aspects of children’s lives. The second is an attempt to answer the question whether there is a possibility of improving the situation of minors. The paper on the problematic system is divided into three parts. The first part draws attention to the following problems: difficulties with access to medical care, increased incidence of infectious diseases, growing drug addiction, drinking water pollution, as well as the threat of unexploded ordnance. The second part describes: threats to mental health of children, socialization problems (pre-school and school education, family crisis, shaping of national identity), as well as participation of child soldiers in the conflict in Donbass. The last section of the article contains conclusions. The considerations were prepared on the basis of carefully verified materials in English, Ukrainian and Polish. Many publications were downloaded from the websites of international organizations, analytical centers and scientific institutions.
RU
публикациях, посвященных конфликту на востоке Украины, редко описывается положение детей, живущих в зоне боевых действий. Больше внимания уделяется политическим, экономическим и военным аспектам этого противостояния. Автор поставил перед собой две цели. Первая – выяснить, как война влияет на биологи¬ческие и ментальные аспекты жизни детей. Вторая цель – это попытка ответить на вопрос, есть ли возможность улучшить положение несовершеннолетних? Текст статьи состоит из трех частей. В первой части обращается внимание на проблемы трудного доступа к меди¬цинскому обслуживанию, роста заболеваемости инфекционными заболеваниями, роста наркомании, загрязнения питьевой воды, а также угрозы невзорвавшихся боеприпасов. Во второй части описываются угрозы психическому здоровью детей, проблемы социализации (дошкольное и школьное образование, семейный кризис, формирование национальной идентичности), а также участие детей-солдат в кон¬фликте в Донбассе. Заключение статьи содержит выводы. Размышления были подготовлены на основе тщательно подобранных материалов на английском, украинском и польском языках. Многие публикации были загружены с веб-сайтов международных организаций, аналитических центров и научных учреждений.
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2021
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vol. 9
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issue 1
165-176
EN
The author of the article analyses how literary text can be a cultural instrument for overcoming the traumatic experience of war. Ongoing events in the Donbass prove that manipulating with the historical consciousness of the inhabitants of this region of Ukraine and important events from the past have become the reasons for a new military implosion between the colonized and colonizer. Literary texts published in the last few years not only reflect the Russian-Ukrainian war in eastern Ukraine but also shed light on the consequences of Soviet colonization, which played the main role in the process of mental separation of this region. In the context of post-communist society transformations, the Donbass war is similar to the military conflicts in Transnistria, Georgia and, above all, to the war in former Yugoslavia. Contemporary literary texts are the most accurate examples of it from the point of view of the traumatic experience of culture.
PL
Przedmiotem przedstawionego artykułu jest analiza tekstu literackiego jako instrumentarium przezwyciężenia traumatycznego doświadczenia wojny. Współczesne wydarzenia w Donbasie dowodzą, że manipulacja historyczną świadomością mieszkańców wskazanego regionu i nieprzepracowane ważne wydarzenia z przeszłości stały się przyczyną nowej militarnej implozji między skolonizowanym a kolonizatorem. Publikowane w ostatnich latach teksty literackie nie tylko odzwierciedlają realia wojny rosyjsko-ukraińskiej na wschodzie Ukrainy, ale także naświetlają konsekwencje sowieckiej kolonizacji, które odegrały główną rolę w procesie mentalnej separacji tego regionu. W kontekście postkomunistycznych przemian społecznych wojna w Donbasie przypomina konflikty zbrojne w Naddniestrzu, Gruzji, a przede wszystkim wojnę w byłej Jugosławii. Z punktu widzenia traumatycznego doświadczenia kultury współczesne teksty literackie są tego znakomitym przykładem.
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