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Stosuj ustawy i rób, co chcesz? Pojęcie niezawisłości a deontologiczny model cnót sędziowskich

100%

Rocławska A.

Acta Universitatis Lodziensis. Folia Iuridica

2017

vol. 78

81-95

This article explores judicial independence in light of a deontological model of virtues. It analyses judicial decisions and attitudes in the process of application of law, arguing that their aspirations to pursue judicial virtues are a secondary requirement against an overriding demand for abiding by law. The thesis is that judicial independence is a kind of a system presupposition that judges have some qualities which help them not only to fulfil their duties, but also to rise to ethical challenges during adjudication. The author recalls two theories of judicial reasoning in hard cases and tries to answer the question which of the theoretical models – by H. L. A. Hart or R. Dworkin – proposes a better characteristic of the judicial practice in the Polish justice system.

W niniejszym artykule autorka rozważa niezawisłość sędziów w świetle modelu deontologii cnót. Analizuje ich decyzje i postawy w toku stosowania prawa, argumentując, że aspiracje, by realizować sędziowskie cnoty, mają charakter wtórny względem nadrzędnych wymogów przestrzegania prawa. Stawia tezę, że przestrzeń niezawisłości stanowi wyraz swoistego zaufania ustrojodawcy, iż sędziowie posiadają dyspozycje, które umożliwiają nie tylko wywiązywanie się z obowiązków, lecz także sprostanie wyzwaniom etycznym podczas orzekania. Przywołuje teorie orzekania w trudnych przypadkach autorstwa H. L. A. Harta i R. Dworkina oraz próbuje odpowiedzieć na pytanie, który z teoretycznych modeli – Hartowski czy Dworkinowski – lepiej charakteryzuje praktykę orzeczniczą polskiego wymiaru sprawiedliwości.

Positivism Buried Alive? In Defence of Inclusive Legal Positivism

71%

Dyrda A.

Studia Prawnicze

2010

issue 2(184)

5-36

The efforts taken by the "soft" (inclusive) positivists (H.L.A. Hart's followers, ie. J. Coleman, W. Waluchow, M. Kramer, K. E. Himma) to defend the legal positivist position (the separability thesis, the social sources thesis) are combined with theoretical references to the moral arguments which are present in judicial practice. Therefore, the inclusive positivists treat the relationship between law and morality as a contingent relationship and try to justify it on the basis of the system’s overriding rule of recognition. This position, as an attempt to find the "golden mean" in theory of law, is criticized both by non-positivists and "hard" positivists. For instance, R. Dworkin or L. Morawski claim that, despite its declarations, soft positivism actually does not respond to the requirements of modern legal practice and is a "degenerated" and stagnant research program. On the other hand, J. Raz contends that due to the incorporation of morality, soft positivism is no longer a real positivism. The article presents a defense of soft positivism, especially against its non-positivistic critics, as well as a version of soft positivism, which can be called a "constructive" one (V. Villa). It also shows that soft positivism, as being consistent with the "spirit" of positivism and complying with the requirements of the present judicial practice, may be justified by reference to postmodern thinking.

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1 Acta Universitatis Lodziensis. Folia Iuridica

1 Studia Prawnicze

1 2017

1 2010

1 Dyrda A.

1 Rocławska A.

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Stosuj ustawy i rób, co chcesz? Pojęcie niezawisłości a deontologiczny model cnót sędziowskich

Positivism Buried Alive? In Defence of Inclusive Legal Positivism