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EN
The paper demonstrates the evolution on the ECtHR’s jurisprudence concerning Art. 18 ECHR in the light of its recent developments. As it is argued, the interpretation of Art. 18 had three principal historical stages: the first one, when this provision was viewed as competing with limitation clauses and only potentially violable; the second, when after the judgment in Gusinskyi the Court admitted its practical applicability; the third, opened up by the recent case Merabishvili v. Georgia. It is only with this last stage that the Court’s jurisprudence gained sufficient coherence and made Art. 18 an effective tool of opposing abuse of limitations by states. The paper argues that Art. 18 should gain particular importance in times of erosion of liberal democracy in Eastern countries of the Council of Europe.
EN
The paper investigates the role of unilateral declarations of states in the functioning of the ECHR control system, particularly in their relation to the division of competences between the ECtHR and the Committee of Ministers. Unilateral declarations which recognise violations of the Convention, once accepted by the Strasbourg Court, lead to striking out the application from the list of cases. The Court may restore the application if the state in question does not fulfill its declared obligations. Thus the restoration of the application becomes the principal remedy for states' disrespect of their declarations. This mechanism detracts, however, from the Committee of Ministers' competence to oversee the execution of judgments and makes the ECtHR involved in the monitoring process. The recent judgment Jeronovičs v. Latvia (2016) further dismantles the logic of the Convention, because it accepts the admissibility of separate applications pertaining to violations which arise only from the non-execution of unilateral declarations. The paper presents the evolution of unilateral declarations and critically assesses the emancipation of this institution, which diminishes legal certainty and may infringe applicants' rights.
EN
This article is the summary of the current minimum legal standards on the right to legal aid from the European Convention on Human Rights and the case law of the European Court of Human Rights.
PL
Artykuł stanowi podsumowanie dotychczasowych minimalnych międzynarodowych norm prawnych dotyczących prawa do pomocy prawnej na podstawie Europejskiej Konwencji Praw Człowieka oraz orzecznictwa Europejskiego Trybunału Praw Człowieka.
EN
Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights provides that freedom of expression includes the right to receive information and ideas. But it is unclear if that freedom also involves the right to seek information and the right to have access to public information, first of all stored in registers controlled or administered by the State. The first drafts of the European Convention secured a broader right to seek information but that provision has not been enacted in the final version of the Convention. In its case law, the European Commission of Human Rights and the European Court of Human Rights understood the right to receive information as basically corollary of the right to communicate information, i.e. an accompanying entitlement of the receiver to get information from someone else, in principle the media, which already communicates or is going to communicate. Although the Strasbourg Court did not exclude that there might exist, under some circumstances, a right to have access to registers, neither the nature nor the scope of that right have been specified. While rejecting a broader concept of freedom of information as being a part of freedom of expression, at the same time the Court was ready to accept a right of access within the framework of other Convention provisions, first of all that on the protection of private and family right (Article 8). Such an approach was confirmed by the Grand Chamber judgment rendered in 1998 in the Guerra and Others against Italy case. But since 2009 in a series of judgments the Court has started accepting, having identified some specific normative contexts and followed by the ensuing distinctions, that the right of access exists as an aspect of freedom of expression. The Court combined that right of access with the fulfilment of the public watchdog function by the media and non-governmental organisations (access to information is needed for them to be public watchdogs). In another case access to information was made part and parcel of the research activity. That quiet shift, even a revolution, in the Court's approach had given rise to two reactions among judges as expressed in separate opinions (concurring or dissenting) appended to the judgments. Some judges invited the Court to accept a general right of access for all individuals; such a step would correspond with the contemporary trends and understanding of democratic society. Other judges vehemently opposed the Court's activism as demonstrated in the recent case law and persistently insisted that the Court adhere to the restrictive reading of the right to receive information under Article 10. Mindful of the intensifying controversy, the Court decided to hear a new case on access to information as a Grand Chamber panel composed of 17 judges. The upcoming judgment in Magyar Helsinki Bizottság against Hungary, expected in 2016, should clarify what the relevant Convention standard now looks like.
EN
Article 34 ECHR sets forth criteria for the admissibility of individual applications to the European Court of Human Rights but it also states that applications can be submitted by a group of individuals who claim to be a victim of a violation of rights enshrined in the Convention or one of the protocols to it.The aim of the article is to analyze of the Court’s jurisprudence which confirm that the protection of the rights of a group of individuals may also result from a decision of the Tribunal issued in an individual case if only applicant proves that he is a member of a vulnerable group and the whole group require the same protection. It is important, that the vulnerable group and its members must be identified by a set of characteristics criteria and by common circumstances in which their rights have been violated.
PL
Artykuł 34 EKPC określa kryteria dopuszczalności wniesienia przez jednostkę skargi do Europejskiego Trybunału Praw Człowieka, ale stanowi również, że skarga może być wniesiona przez grupę jednostek, które twierdzą, że są ofiarą naruszenia praw zawartych w Konwencji lub w jednym z Protokołów do Konwencji. Celem artykułu jest analiza orzecznictwa Trybunału, które potwierdza, że ochrona praw grup jednostek może również wynikać z orzeczenia Trybunału wydanego w indywidualnej sprawie, jeżeli tylko wnioskodawca udowodni, że jest członkiem danej grupy wrażliwej i cała grupa wymaga przyznania takiej samej ochrony. Ważne jest, aby wrażliwa grupa i jej członkowie byli identyfikowani przez pryzmat charakterystycznych kryteriów oraz wspólnych okoliczności, w których ich prawa zostały naruszone.
PL
Po wejściu w życie Traktatu z Lizbony, Unia oraz państwa UE nie respektują stypulowanych w Traktacie norm dotyczących praw człowieka. Można odnieść wrażenie, że przeważa tu wrogie podejście do nowego systemu ochrony praw człowieka, zwłaszcza ze strony dużych państw Unii i jej instytucji. Dowodzić tego może 6 lat zmarnowanych na mało skuteczne przygotowywanie porozumienia z Radą Europy oraz negatywna opinia 2/13 Trybunału Sprawiedliwości UE. Postawę Trybuna-łu można uznać za zaskakującą, zwłaszcza wobec Traktatowego nakazu przystąpienia Unii do EKPC.
EN
Upon entering into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, the Union and the EU member states do not respect the stipulated in the Treaty standards concerning human rights. One may get the impression that there prevails a hostile approach to the new system of human rights protection, particularly on the part of big states of the Union and its institutions. This can be proved by the 6 years wasted on ineffective preparation of the agreement with the Council of Europe as well as by the negative opinion 2/13 of the Court of Justice of the EU. The stance of the Court may be considered as surprising, particularly in the face of the Treaty ‘s writ on access of the EU to the ECHR.
EN
This essay presents argumentation leading to the conclusion that sports activity is an element of the right to privacy protected inter alia by Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, while it covers aspects of an individuals’ self-development and their interaction with other individuals. As a result, it can therefore be argued that the right to privacy protects, as a matter of principle, the right of an individual to play sports. At the same time, this article deals with issues related to the specificity of sports activity in the context of the protection of fundamental rights.
PL
W artykule przedstawiona jest argumentacja wskazująca, że aktywność sportowa stanowi element prawa do prywatności, chronionego m.in. przez art. 8 Europejskiej Konwencji Praw Człowieka, obejmując aspekty samorozwoju jednostki i jej interakcji z innymi jednostkami. W rezultacie można więc argumentować, że prawo do prywatności chroni, co do zasady, prawo jednostki do uprawiania sportu. Jednocześnie artykuł porusza zagadnienia związane ze specyfiką aktywności sportowej w kontekście ochrony praw fundamentalnych.
PL
Artykuł analizuje dopuszczalność wygaszenia kadencji obecnych członków sędziowskich Krajowej Rady Sądownictwa bez zapewnienia im drogi sądowej z perspektywy orzecznictwa Europejskiego Trybunału Praw Człowieka. Za punkt wyjścia przyjęto wyrok ETPC w sprawie Grzęda p. Polsce, w którym stwierdzono, że wygaszenie ex lege kadencji członków KRS w 2018 r. naruszało art. 6 Europejskiej Konwencji Praw Człowieka. Interpretacja EKPC nie może jednak abstrahować od szczególnego kontekstu związanego z brakiem niezależności obecnej KRS oraz jej negatywnym wpływem na prawidłowość procesu powołań sędziowskich. Te wyjątkowe okoliczności mogą uzasadniać tezę, że art. 6 EKPC nie chroniłby obecnych członków KRS przed wygaszeniem ich kadencji z wyłączeniem drogi sądowej.
EN
The article analyzes the permissibility of terminating the terms of office of current members of the National Judiciary Council without providing them with access to court from the perspective of the case law of the European Court of Human Rights. The starting point is the judgment of the ECtHR in the case of Grzęda v. Poland, in which it was found that the ex lege termination of the terms of office of the NCJ members in 2018 violated Art. 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. However, the interpretation of the ECHR cannot disregard the specific context related to the lack of independence of the current NCJ and its negative impact on the integrity of the judicial appointment process. These circumstances justify the conclusion that Art. 6 ECHR would not protect the current members of the NCJ from the termination of their terms of office.
EN
According to the Polish regulations, a person, who entered into marriage abroad, may request that it be transcribed – i.e. revealed in the Polish civil status records. Nevertheless such a transcription may not be demanded by all those, who entered into marriage abroad, even if all of the foreign legal requirements of marriage were realized. Among others, it is impossible to transcribe to the Polish civil status records a gay marriage, concluded abroad. In the present article, the author will attempt to answer, whether current Polish legal regulations, according to which a marriage successfully concluded abroad, does not enjoy any legal recognition, and by extension – protection, complies with the minimal standards of human right protection, as envisaged by the European Convention on Human Rights and jurisprudence of European Court of Human Rights in Strasburg.
PL
Zgodnie z polskim prawem, osoba, która za granicą zawarła związek małżeński, może domagać się jego transkrypcji - tj. przeniesienia do rejestru stanu cywilnego. To uprawnienie nie przysługuje jednak wszystkim osobom, które zawarły związek małżeński zgodnie z prawem obowiązującym za granicą. Niemożliwym w Polsce jest, między innymi, przeniesienie do polskiego rejestru aktów stanu cywilnego, małżeństwa homoseksualnego zawartego w innym kraju. W niniejszym artykule autor postara się odpowiedzieć na pytanie, czy stan prawny, gdzie małżeństwo skutecznie zawarte poza granicami Polski, w Polsce nie podlega prawnemu uznaniu, a w konsekwencji nie podlega żadnej ochronie prawnej, jest zgodny z minimalnymi standardami ochrony praw człowieka wytyczanymi Europejską Konwencją o Ochronie Praw Człowieka oraz orzecznictwem Europejskiego Trybunału Praw Człowieka w Strasburgu.
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