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1

RACIONALITA VEDY A VEDECKÁ METÓDA

100%
Gálik D.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2009
|
vol. 64
|
issue 1
1-8
EN
The aim of the paper is to give a description of the development of understanding scientific method in the history of science and philosophy of science. The thesis is defended that crucial changes in understanding scientific method had fundamental consequences for the development in scientific knowledge, for the position of science in the system of knowledge and for its role in human culture. Basic attitudes to scientific method in contemporary philosophy and philosophy of science are shortly outlined and the rationality of scientific method is defended.
2

HRUŠOVSKÉHO ANALÝZY VÝVINU VEDECKÉHO POZNANIA

100%
Viceník J., Zigo M.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2009
|
vol. 64
|
issue 10
949-959
EN
The article deals with the comprehensibility of the model of empirical science (i.e. the model of hypothetical confirmationism) in Hrusovsky's writings. Further, it examines Hrusovsky's conception of the development of scientific knowledge as related to his concept of 'radical revision' (corresponding to scientific revolution). The authors draw mainly from books written by Hrusovsky in 1935 - 1948.
3

NEUKONČENÝ PROJEKT TRANSPARENTNEJ INTENZIONÁLNEJ LOGIKY

75%
Hanzel I.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2019
|
vol. 74
|
issue 2
126 – 138
EN
In my paper I present a new view on the Transparent Intensional Logic (TIL), namely, from the point of view of Carnap’s so-called logic of science understood by him as logic of the language of science and, to be more specific, logic of the language of empirical science. First, I present Carnap’s project of the logic of science and show that it was not realized on the basis of Carnap’s semantics of intension and extension. Next, I show the negative effects of the absence of this realization for the philosophy of empirical science as it became apparent in the dispute between P. K. Feyerabend and C. G. Hempel. Finally, I indicate the set of issues that TIL could solve in the future by realizing Carnap’s (reformed) project.
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