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THE MIND'S ANCHORAGE IN ABSTRACT OBJECTS (Zakorzenienie umyslu w obiektach abstrakcyjnych)

100%
Pilat R.
Analiza i Egzystencja. Czasopismo Filozoficzne
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2010
|
issue 11
211-233
EN
Some features of human linguistic competence make one to reconsider the Fregean notion of modes of presentation, which were supposed to correspond to senses of words. Especially two linguistic phenomena invite such a reflection: (1) generalized reports about people's beliefs, like 'Everybody thinks that p'; (2) semantic relations (like synonymy) between empty names (proper or general). In the analysis of belief reports I am referring to studies by Edward Zalta; in the analysis of empty names I am drawing on Jerrold Katz and Georges Rey's accounts. The three entirely independent inquiries seem to support the claim, that Fregean senses (understood as the modes of presentation) presuppose the existence of abstract individuals and properties, which are intuitively apprehended by the speakers. It leads to certain conclusion about the nature of the human mind. In this article I am arguing that to the extent determined by the analyzed phenomena, human mind is in part an abstract entity - it incorporates - as its parts - the abstract entities though which it is referring to itself. This reference to oneself takes place in virtue of possessing ones own thoughts. Possessing thoughts is quite different from having experiences or more generally, psychological states. It requires that a subject is related to certain abstract objects. Although I do not believe that this claim amounts to some sort of spiritualism, I do believe that it imposes rather serious constraint on naturalistic accounts of the mind. This view is committed to rather strong form of emergentism or even to some kind of interactive dualism about the mind.
2

HOW CAN MILLIANS BELIEVE IN SUPERHEROES?

88%
Faccio Lima J.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
|
2021
|
vol. 28
|
issue 1
135 – 167
EN
What is the content of beliefs expressed by sentences with fictional names? Millianism has notoriously struggled to give a satisfactory answer to this question. Some Millians have argued that fictional names are empty names. But such a view entails that the belief that Superman has impressive superpowers and the belief that Aquaman has impressive superpowers have the same content, contrary to our intuitions. Others have argued that fictional names refer to fictional entities. But this view has a long-standing problem, Frege’s Puzzle, and many philosophers are sceptical that Millians have successfully addressed it, despite commendable efforts. In this paper, I put forward a different Millian Theory of fictional proper names that by-passes these and other objections related to belief content. The novelty of my proposal partially rests on a distinction I draw between semantic content and belief content—as opposed to a distinction between belief content and belief state or a way of grasping the content, as it is commonly found in Millian accounts—in a framework where belief contents are not part of the meaning of names.
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